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CHAPTER I 
THE PROBLEM 
, 
Statement of ~ Problem: The purpose or this study is to care-
1 fully and critically examine the methodologies and preconceptions of 
Bronislaw Malinowski. Because Malinowski was very influential in the 
2 field of anthropology and the social sciences in general, his method-
ologies and preconceptions are not peculiar to him alone. As a matter 
of fact a whole "school 11--the so-called "functional school"--was buil~ 
up around Malinowski. Moreover, the tradition which Malinowski typi-
fies is symptomatic of fundamental developments which were/are taking 
place in all fields of inquiry. That is, the basic problems which con-
fronted Malinowski and with which ha struggled are similar to those 
facing economists, philosophers, psychologists, historians, political 
scientists, sociologists--all cultural inv~stigators. For example, 
the problem of evaluation is universal. Thus, this thesis will have 
a wider orientation than that indicated by the title . 
. 
The author is particularly interested in discovering the 
1 I am using "preconceptions" in the Veblenian sense; that is, to 
denote a priori, prejudiced beliers--beliefs held in the face of scien-
tific evidence to the contrary. 
2 . 
The field of anthropology is extremely broad; the term "anthro-
pology" has many meanings. In this thesis, I shall use "anthropology" 
to mean "cultural anthropology"; that is, the study of all the pat-
terns of social life which have and are being developed--:riirough man's 
adjustment to his environment. 
1 
2 
fundamental methodologies and preconceptions of Malinowski, in criti-
cally analyzing them and testing ~heir validity, in comparing them 
with those of other influential and representative anthropologists and 
outstanding social scientists. In addition, the methodologies and 
preconceptions of those men with wbom I shall compare Malinowski's 
way-of-thinking will not escape my critical analysis and evaluation. 
This problem may be c9mpared to that which faces the archaeolo-
gist in his attempt to establish spatial and chronological relation-
ships between different foci. That. is, the archaeologist attempts to 
compare the material culture of on$ focus with that or others, whereas 
I shall be interested in comparing the methodologies and preconcep-
tions of Malinowski with those of h_is fellow anthropologists and so-
cial scientists. 
Importance of~ Problem: The importance of this thesis will 
lie in whether or not it succeeds in fulfilling the following three 
aims: 
(l} To place Malinowski in pro-per perspective. That is, to show 
his relationship to other ways-of-thinking in his own field and in 
other fields of inquiry and to the general climate of opinion. 
(2) To develop critical awareness on the part of the student of 
current techniques and theories in his own field of investigation. 
(3) And most important of all, to focus attention on the major 
points of agreement and disagreement in the field of cultural anthro-
pology. That is, to uncover the fundamental problems which no~ face 
the anthropologists. For example, 3ome very influential anthropolo-
; 
gists hold that there is an innate normative-descriptive dualism and 
that anthropology should concern itself with "pure description11 ; 3 on 
3 
the other hand, some equally well-known anthropologists hold that fact 
and theory are innately distinct, but are equally important and that 
it is legitimate to be concerned with theoretical issuea. 4 It is 
obvious that the latter is only a modification of the first position. 
Very few anthropologists5 hold the viewpoint common to some social and 
6 physical scientists that the normative-descriptive dualism is a false, 
artificial and non-existent dualism in reality. This latter viewpoint( 
3Radin, Method and Theory of Ethnology, 1933, particularly 
pp. 115-117 but actually the whole book, is based upon this position; 
Herskovits, Dahomey, 1938, pp. viii-ix; Strong, "Anthropological 
Theory and Archaeological Fact," Essays in Anthropology, 1936, pp. 364-
365; Drucker, American Anthropologist, Vol. 40, p. 520; MUrdock, 
Studies in the Science of Society, 1937, p. xix; and Boas' "mono-
graphic11work expressesei ther a "pure" fact-theoretical dualism or 
makes normative statements about the desirability of pursuing purely 
factual investigation. In Culture and Ethnology, 1929, p. 21, Lowie 
makes a "pure" fact statement but later in The History of Ethnological 
Theory he notes that: "The clarification of concepts .-•• directly 
gauges scientific process" (p. 281). 
4Malinowski, Sorcerers of Dobu, 1932, pp. xxiv-xxv; Radcliffe-
Brown, "The Present Positionofl\iithropological Studies," JRAI, 
Vol. LXX, 1931, pp. 150 and 157; Lowie, The History of EthiiOIOgical 
Theory, 1937, p. 281; Ashley Montagu, "Physical Anthropology and 
Anatomy," AJPA, Vol. 28, No. 3, 1941, p. 263; Goldenweiser, History, 
Psychology and Culture, 1933, the entire book; Lesser, Linton, Kroeber, 
Mead, Firth-;-'fhurnwald, and the entire German school emphasize the 
role of theory in anthropology. 
5Kluckhohn, "Theory in Anthropological Studies," Philosophy of 
Science, Vol. 6, No. 3, 1939, pp. 328-344; Parsons, The Structure-Or 
Social Action, 1937, p. 8; Wallis, ·Culture and Progress, 1930, p. 4b; 
and Richards, "Field Viork Methods in Social'li.ilthropology," in The 
Study of Society, 1939, p. 274. -
6Peirce, Dewey, G. H. Mead, Angell, Childs, Veblen, Lundberg, 
Lynd, Bridgman, Franz, Lashley, C. E. Ayres, and G. v. Gentry, etc. 
4 
on the basis of vital evidence furnished by modern pragmatic experi-
mental psychology, sets forth the position that the distinction be-
tween a "fact" and a "meaning," or a ''theory," is a functional, logi-
7 
cal distinction rather than an innate, given dualism. 
Here is an issue on which there is widespread disagreement not 
only in anthropology, but in economics, philosophy, physics, pay-
chology, etc. Because of the scope of the controversy, it is clear 
that this is a significant and pressing problem. Kluckhohn has al-
ready placed this issue, which he considers to be of fundamental impo~­
tance, before the anthropologists in a challenging article in Philosophy 
of Science. 
It is probably true that the greater number of contem-
porary American anthropologist.a feel that "theory" is a very 
dangerous kind of business which the careful antbropologist 
must be on his guard against. • . • It is • • • symptomatic 
that not until 1933 did a book by an American anthropologist 
include the word "theory" in its title (Radin). Only a 
single book published subsequently is explicitly given over 
to anthropological theory (Lowie) .•.. My impression that 
American anthropologists (in s~ite of some evidence of a re-
awakening of theoret1c8l interest during the past rive years) 
are still devoting an overwhelming proportion of their ener-
gies to the accumulation of facts seems confirmed by the 
following empirical test sam~les. I examined all articles 
which have appeared in the .American Anthropologist, the 
·.Amoricun Journal of Physical Anthropology, and American 
Antiquity ••• sTiice January 1st, 1935. In the first-named 
journal I found . • . only seven articles out of 152 were 
devoted to theory in the sense of discussion of the canons 
of reasonins in anthropological pro.cedures. In the AmeTican 
Journal of Physical Anthropology but one article in ninety-
eight was concerned with theory .•.• In .American Antiquity 
7 Dewey, J. , Logic--~ Theory of Inquiry (New York: Henry Rol t 
and Company), 1938, Chpt. 9. 
four articles out of sixty-eight. • • . I must simply record 
my honest impression (and those anthropologists whom I have 
specifically questioned on this point agree that it was 
theirs also} that the very word "theory" has a pejoratif con-
notation for most American anthropologists. To suggest that 
something is "theoretical" is to suggest that it is slightly 
indecent. "Theory" indeed tends to be roughly equated with 
"speculation." B 
5 
This is only one of the points around which controversy revolves 
in anthropology and the social sciences. We shall examine in detail 
in the body of this thesis some of these more basic problems. 
statement of Procedure: The organization of this thesis is as 
follows: Chapter II will consider the "Biography of Bronislaw 
Malinow·ski"--his training, field work, teaching, and bibliography. 
Special attention is paid to the signific~nt formative influences upon 
his way-of-thinking. Chapter III is a discussion and a partial eval-
uation of "Theories and Methodologies Basic to Malinmvski's View-
points," and Chapter IV will include some "Methodological Comparisons." 
In Chapter V, his fundamental "Preconceptions" will be examined and 
evaluated. · The "Conclusion," Chapter VI, will include a critical 
analysis of Malinowski's positive and negative contributions to the 
"Study of Man," and a brief discussion of the ruture of anthropology. 
Although there is criticism and evaluation throughout the thesis, 
the body of the latter will be round in Chapter V, "Preconceptions." 
This procedure was followed because it became evident that Malinowski's 
SKluckhohn, C., "The Place of Theory in Anthropological Studies," 
Philosophy of Science, Vol. 6, No. 3, 1939, pp. 328-333. 
6 
preconceptions were "organically" related. For example, his concept 
of "mores relativism" impregnated all of his work. A criticism of any 
one of his beliefs must, in part, be in terms of his acceptance of 
relativism. Thus, a criticism of "mores relativism" is a criticism of. 
most or his other viewpoints. 
,. 
) 
CHAPTER II 
BIOGRAPHY OF BRONISLAW MALINOWSKI 
Training: Bronislaw Kasper Malinowski was born in Cracow, 
Poland, in 1884 of an aristocratic, "cultured," and scholarly family. 
His father was a Slavic philologist and a university professor. This 
l 
environment prepared Malinowski for an academic career. 
His first academic training was at the University or Cracow, 
1vhere in 1908 he obtained a Ph.D. degree in physics and mathematics.·. 
Ill-health kept him, however, from pursuing as his life work research 
in these fields. 
Malinowski's interest in anthropology, or the study of human cul-
tures, was first awakened "as he left the University to recuperate~ 
2 (and] struck accidentally a copy of Frazer's Golden Bough," He sub-
sequently attended the University of Leipzig for two years, falling 
under the influence of Wilhelm Wundt, "who turned his interests toward 
folk psychology and thence to cultural anthropology. ,,3 Malino1.,.ski' s 
1Murdock, G. P., "Bronislaw Malinowski," obituary in American 
.Anthropologist, Vol. 45, No. 3, Part I, 1943, pp. 441-451. 
2 . Richards, A. I., "Bronislaw Kaspar Malinowski," obituary in~. 
Vol. XLIII, January-February, 1943, pp. 1-4. 
31\ brief discussion at this point of Wilhelm Wundt's theories and 
contributions might possibly clarify some of Malinowski's subsequent 
viewpoints. Wundt is best known in psychology as the father of 
"physiological psychology, a new and experimental psychology that 
should apply the methods of science to the problems of the mind" .. 
(Boring). Because "Wundt was probably the most complete expression in 
7 
/ 
, 
a 
prime interest in the psychology of a people, the "V/eltanschauung," 
can probably be traced initially to his contacts with Wundt. In addi-
ti on, it was V/undt' s influence that set Malinowski on the Gestalt path, 
for as Boring says: "The inheritance of Wundt can be found in Gestalt 
psychology," In the early part or the twentieth century, Malinowski 
was more deeply impressed by Gestaltism than any other competing 
school or psychology. In~ and Repression in Savage Society, Mali-
nowski expresses his indebtedness to such Gestalt psychologists as 
C. Lloyd Morgan and Kohler. It was through Gestalt psychology that 
Malinowski became interested in such synchronous movements as the 
his time of the scientific forces that were remaking psychology" 
(Murphy), he "approached the problem of primitive mentality with a far 
broader and deeper equipment in scientific method than.did Spencer, 
Tylor, or Frazer" (Goldenweiser). Wundt, foreshadowing the social-
psychological behaviorism of G. H. Mead, Dewey, Hull, and others, 
"realized that the psychological foundations of civilization cannot be 
sought in the isolated individual, but that the group always actively 
co-operates in the production of attitudes and ideas" (Goldenweiser). 
His psychology, however, is broadly classified by Boring as associa-
tionistic sensationism. Wundt attacked the "rationalism" of Tylor and 
others; that is, he attacked the concept that the whole universe is 
rationul and that man's mind is also rational, being a mere reflection 
of the rational environment. Wundt escaped the errors of philosophi-
cal "individualism," realizing that "with reference to the individual, 
the group (the •others') was the carrier of habit, of tradition. It 
set the pattern and held the individual to it. And patterns, histori-
cally transmitted, are culture. Culture, then Wundt taught, was a 
group product, a creation of the folk. As a culture-maker the indi-
vidual was part of the folk, and only for purposes of analysis could 
he be separated from it, and then only with difficulty" (Goldenweiser). 
wundt, unlike many of the contemporary American a~d English writers, 
was never a unilinear social evolutionist, always insisting upon the 
complexity of evolution. Furthetmore, he did a grea.t deal to purge 
the study of man of mysticism, insisting upon the "folk-psychological 
nature of language, art, mythology, religion" (Goldenweiser), Wundt's 
specific contribution to anthropology was, of course, Elements of Folk 
Psychology, published in 1916. - --
9 
behavioristic trend in America, We know that later on he was more 
profoundly influenced by the behaviorist and pragmatic developments. 
' Certainly, during the last years o~ his life, Malinowski was leaning 
more and more toward a pragmatic psychology. 
While at Leipzig, according to Richards, Malinowski was'also in-
fluenced by Carl BUcher. 4 
In 1910, Malinowski traveled to London, being attracted by the 
"pre"eminence of English anthropology." Here he became a student at 
the London School of Economics, as well as engaging in research at the 
British Museum. In London, Malinowski was one of many, as Richards 
. 
5 brings out, who was stimulated and encouraged by C. G. Seligman. He 
4carl BUcher, celebrated economic historian, was a Professor of 
Political Economy at the University of Leipzig when Malinowski was 
studying there. BUcher was one of the first, if not the first, to 
emphasize the importance of "comparative economics" (Firth); that is, 
he was one of the first students of society to question some of the 
current economic theory and preconceptions on the basis of data de-
rived from a comparative analysis of "primitive" societies. He early 
saw the kinship of economics and field anthropology. With comparative 
data obtained from 19th-century ethnographies, he attacked the concept 
of "economic man," illustrating that not all peoples have the degree 
of regulation, planning, accumulation, and transmission of economic 
goods as was characteristic of European societies. Furthermore, he 
saw, as only a few do, the technological (as well as magical) history 
of money--"money as the favorite exchange commodity furnished a medium 
that brought together men from tribe to tribe in regular peaceful 
trade and prepared the way for a differentiation of tribes in the 
matter of production." BUcher, while discarding many of the prevail-
ing preconceptions of the economics of his age, retained--ironically 
enough--the basic mythology of classical economics. That is, he main-
tained, along with Adam Smith and others, that Capital (money funds) 
is the creative factor in industrial society. His most important work 
from an anthropological viewpoint is Industrial Evolution, Malinow-
ski's interest in "primitive" economics was stimulated by B\lcher. 
5
rt is interesting to note that Seligman•s primary interest was 
also the relationship between anthropology and psychology. 
also worked under We~termarCI) Fraz~r, Rivers, and Haddon. In 1916, 
Malinowski received a D.sc. in anthropology from the University of 
London. This COllll>leted his formal education, although in 1936 he 
received an honorary D.sc. from Harvard University. 
10 
Field~: In 1914, tlespite the fact.that he was already lectur-
ing in the London School of Economics (since 1913), Malinowski left 
for the -South Pacific with the Robert Mond expedition. This expedi-
tion lasted four years, during which time Malinowski did field work in 
New Guinea and northwestern Melanesia. · 
Malinowski's first actual contact with native peoples was with 
the Motu of Papua; here he spent only a few weeks. Following this, 
Malinowski lived for six months with the natives of Mailu in New 
Guinea. This provided the basis for his first ethnographic publica-
6 tion, although he had previously published a theoretical treatise on 
the family among the aborigines of Australia. 7 Then for two years, 
during 1915-1916, 1917-1918, Malinowski did extensive and systematic 
field work in the Trobriand Islands. During these two years, as 
Frazer so aptly states in the Preface of Argonauts of ~ Western 
Pacific: "Dr. Malinowski lived as a native •.• watching them duily 
at work and at play, conversing with them in their own tongue, and 
deriving all his information from the surest sources--personal 
6The Natives of Mailu: Preliminary Results of the Robert Mond 
Resear"C'Fl"work in British New Guinea (Transaction"S""o'f"the Royal Society 
of South "A.UStralia, Vol. 39, pp. 493-706), 1915. 
7The Family .Among the Australian Aborigines (London: University 
of LondOii Press), 191).~ 
11 
observation and statements made to him directly by the natives in their 
own language without the intervention of an interpreter." It was dur:.. 
ing these two years of intimate personal contact with the Trobrianders 
that Malinowski collected "the mat.erials for those classic works of 
anthro~ological description and iDterpretation upon which his reputa-
tion largely rests: Argonauts!!!..~ Western Pacific (1922), Crime 
~ Custom..!.!!, Savage Society (192&), The Sexual ~ of Savages in 
Northwestern Melanesia (1929), anQ Coral Gardens~ Their Magic 
(1935). 118 
The work in the South Pacific did not, however, comprise all of 
his field-investigation, for, as J;turdock notes, "he spent from one to 
several months each among the Hopi or Arizona in 1926, the Bamba and 
Chagga of East Africa in 1934, and the modern Zapotec of Mexico in 
1940 and 1941. 119 He also made a flying trip to Africa in 1935 to 
visit students in the field in Tan.ganyika, Kenya, Northern Rhodesia, 
and Swaziland. He lived in Poland, Germany, Australia, England, the 
United states, and in the canary Islands for a short time, thus "giv-
ing him an exceptionally wide first-hand acquaintance with different 
systems of living and a broadly oolllparative outlook toward cultural 
phenomena. 1110 
Teaching: Malinowski's role as a teacher really began when, in 
8 Murdock, G. P., "Bronislaw Malinowski," obituary in American 
Anthropologist, Vol. 45, No. 3, Pa:rt I, 1943, P• 441. 
9Ibid. 
10 
~· • p. 442. 
12 
1924, he was appointed to a Readership in Social Anthropology at the 
University of London. In 1927, he was nominated to "the first Chair 
in Anthropology" as a professor. It was during this period that "he 
trained and stimulated a generation of younger anthropologists": Mair, 
Richards, Firth, Ashley Montagu, Schapera, Fortune, Hogbin, et al. In 
1926, for a short time, he taught at the University of California; in 
1933, he again returned to the United States, this time to give the 
Messenger Lectures at Cornell. From 1939 until his death in May, 1942, 
he was at Yale University, first as Bishop Museum Visiting Professor 
of Anthropology and later as President or the Polish Institute for 
Arts end Sciences. At the time of his death, he was under appointment 
11 
as Professor of Cultural Anthropology at Yale. 
Bibliography: Malinowski may be complemented both for the quality 
and the quantity or his publications. Ail examination or the bibliog-
rapby compil~d by Underwood will show the vast extent of his contribu-
12 tions to anthropological knowledge. Besides his classic work on the 
Trobriands, commented on above, a few of many outstanding contribu-
tions may be noted: "Culture," Encyclopedia of~ Social Sciences; 
"The Problem of Meaning in Primitive Languages," supplement in Ogden 
and Richards' ~Meaning ~ Meaning; "The Scientific Approach to the 
Study of Man," article in Science ~ ~. edited by R. N. Anshan; and 
11 Ibid., p. 422. 
12 A nearly complete bibliography compiled by Frances Wenrich 
Underwood may be found in the American Anthropologist, Vol. 45, No. 3, 
Part !, 1943, pp. 445-451. 
13 
,, 
his famous foreword to Hogbin's Law and Order in Polynesia. With but 
few exceptions, Malinowski's writings concern social-psychological 
problems, such as sex, myth, custom and tradition, marriage, kinship, 
''" religion and magic, and law. Malinowski was never very interested in 
II 
the "material" elements of culture; this, in part, can be explained by 
his training under Wundt, Seligman, Westermarck, and Frazer. 
A typical cosmopolitan, Malinowski spoke English, French, German, 
Italian, Polish, Russian, Spanish, Portuguese, and Afrikan, as well as 
Motuan and Trobriand. He furthermore published in English, Polish, 
German, French, and Spanish--primarily in English. Although a cosmo-
politan, Malinowski identified himself with English anthropology and, 
as Richards brings out, "London was ••• the centre of his intellec-
tual life and interests." 
Thus, not only through teaching, but also through extensive pub-
lications, Malinowski gathered a whole score of students about him. 
Through them, and through personal influence, his theories and method-
ologies have impregnated anthropology. As Murdock sums up: "In the 
degree of influence he has exerted upon anthropological theory, Mali-
nowski stands beside Morgan, Tylor, and Boas." 
In conclusion, let us reiterate the five significant formative 
influences in Malinowski's Mfe: 
(1) the influence of his cosmopolitan and aristocratic background; 
(2) the influence or his scientific training in physics and mathe-
matics; 
(3) the early influence of the associationistic-sensationistic 
526216 
14 
psychology of Wundt; 
(4) the influence of comparative economics; and 
(5) the later influence or the Gestalt school and the behavior-
istic-functional trend in psychology, as well as the related pragmatic. 
trend in philosophy. (This factor, although of ~he greatest signifi-
cance, is almost altogether overlooked in other criticisms.) 
Throughout the rest of this thesis, repeated reference will be 
mnde to these formati-ve influences, for Malinowski's work can be fully 
understood only in the light of these factors. The fifth point will 
be treated in some detail, because it is of crucial importance in 
Malinowski's intellectual development. Furthermore, his outstanding 
contributions stem from this fifth influence. 
CHAPTER III 
THEORIES AND METHODOLOGIES BASIC TO 
MALINOWSKI'S VIEWPOINTS 
Whether or not the science of man is 
going to become a real science depends on 
three questions: can observation in the >,/, 
field be empirical and precise; is there ":/' 
any chance of discovering laws and general 
rules in anthropology; is the practical 
application of anthropological princip~, 
possible?1 
Malinowski and Science: Common and basic to all of Malinowski's 
methodologies and theories is the belief that anthropology must be 
"the .scientific approach to the study of ~an." Murdock states that if 
any label must be used to characterize ·the objectives and emphasis of 
Malinowski's work, it should be "scientific" and not "functional," for 
"?lalinowski always fought hard and sometimes even ruthlessly for the 
2 development of a well integrated science of human behavior." In pur-
suing t~e goal of scientific legitimacy, Malinowski not only improved 
the calibre of his own field work, but also developed scientific 
methods of investigation unique to anthropology. 
Before discussing Malinowski's contributions to a science of 
)." Malinowski, "Introduction" to Fijian Frontier by L. Thompson 
(Honolulu: American Council-Institute of Pacific Relations), 1940, 
p. xvii. 
2 Murdock, G. P., "Bronislaw Malinowski," obituary in American 
Anthropologist, Vol. 45, No. 3, Part I, 1943, p. 445. 
15 
16 
anthropology, let us first question: "What is science to Malinowski?" 
In the first place, Malinowski does not consider mere fact gathering 
as science, but conceives of science as being an organized system of 
relationships. As G. H. Mead brings out in the following quotation: 
Science always tries to state an organized system of 
relations, but it never states the character of the object 
in itself apart from its relations •••• You cannot deal 
with a body just by itself and find out what it is and so 
build up a system; you have to state it in terms of its re-
lation to some system there. Now it is these necessary 
relations between bodies with which science is occupied.3 
It was such a conceptual basis that led Malinowski to reject the 
"atomic" or "piecemeal" work of Westermarck, Tylor, and others, and to 
formulate the so-called "functional" approach. In Malinowski's own 
words: 
We can only plead for the speedy and complete disappear-
ance from the records of field-work of the piecemeal items 
of information, of customs, beliefs, and rules of conduct 
floating in air, or rather leading a flat existence on pape4 
with the third-dimension, that of life, COlllJ>letely lacking. 
·The systematic nature of science is furthermore clearly brought 
out by Malinowski in the following paragraph: 
After all there is no value in isolated facts for 
science, however striking and novel they might seem in them-
3 Mead, G. H., The Philosophy of the Act (Chicago: The University 
of Chicago Press), 1938, p. SO. - - -
4Malinowski, Crime and Custom in Savage society {New York: Har-' 
court Brace and Company)-:-1926, p. 126. 
selves. Genuine scientific research differs from mere curio-
hunting in that the latter runs after the quaint, singular 
nnd freakish--the craving for the sensational and the mania 
of collecting providing its twofold stimulus. science on 
the other hand has to analyze and classify facts in order to 
place them in an organic whole, to incorporate them in one 
of the systems in5which it tries to group the various as-pects of reality. 
And elsewhere he states: 
It is the search for this common measure which modern 
anthropology begins to recognize more and more as its main 
aim. Intuitive schools may still rhapsodize about "specific 
tribal. geniuses," about the "incommensurability of human 
cultures," and provide each culture with its own colorful 
descriptive label. Real scientific work is confirmed to the 
thorough, consistent, and clear consideration of what all 
cultures have in common with each other, or why they differ, 
because of envirgnment, contacts, and level of evolutionary 
differentiation. 
17 -
Thus, as a science, anthropology mus~ show both intra and inter 
tribal or cultural relationships. While the data is being collected 
by the field anthropologist, he must show the interrelations between 
the individual and "the organized bodies of activities carried out by 
each·social group in fulfilment of a primary biological need" (which 
' is social structure, cf., Radcliffe-Brown) and the relationships be-
tween individuals, the "imponderabilia of actual life" (which is so-
cial relations, cf., Radcliffe-Brown), and finally a sociological 
5Malinowski, Argonauts of the Western Pacific (London: George 
Routledge and Sons), 1922, p-;--509. 
6 Malinowski, "Introduction" to Fijian Frontier by L. Thompson 
(Honolulu: American Council-Institute ot Pacific Relations), 1940, 
p. xviii. 
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comparison of the social structure and social relations of one society 
with that of another--for the establishment of "generalizations," 
"laws" if you will, about cultural behavior. The primary aim of 
science, and anthropology, is the establishment of predictive values, 
as the following quotation by Malinowski brings out: 
SCience--to give an unpretentious yet clear definitiorr 
or reminder--is the translation of experience into general 
laws which have predictive value. We have to inquire, then, 
v1hether it is possible to establish general rules and prin-
ciples concerning cultural process and product. such rules, 
to be scientific, must be inferred from observation and be 
subject to experimental test. They must be generalizations 
of universal validity. It is essential to have statements 
of principle 'l'Thich remain true whether applied to primitive 
or to highly developed cultu7es, to an arctic or a tropical 
island-tribe in the Pacific. 
Malinowski thus believes that anthropology can become scientific 
only when/if it accepts (which it has to a great extent) the "func-
tional" or interrelational approach. This assumes, of course, that 
anthropology must improve its methods and theories for collecting 
data; a problem of which Malinowski was well aware, and which will be 
discussed at length below under the following headings: Structural, 
Functional Participatory, and Pragmatic Approach. 
Normative-Descriptive Dualism: The most interesting part of Mali-
nowski's outline for a scientific anthropology is contained in the 
following quotation: "Is the practical applicati.on of anthropological 
7 Malinowski, "The Scientific Approach to the Study of Man," in 
Science and Man, edited by R. N. Anshan (New York: Harcourt Brace and 
Company)-:-1942, p. 208. 
principles possible?" And, "This change of front in anthropological 
research is mainly due to the fact that, like every other science, 
anthropology has had either to show its practical utility or become 
8 disqualified as an idle mental game." Unlike a great number of an-
thropologists, Malinowski does not see the value of "science qua 
science," an attitude that assumes "pure" observation, and the devil 
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take care of application. But instead, Malinowski realizes that there 
is an unbroken continuity between the collection and organization of 
data with preconceived methods and techniques and the application of 
such data, still under the influence of the normative methods and 
techniques. In other words, Malinowski would not agree in full with 
Murdock when he says: 
The reader will now be prepared to understand why the 
articles in this volume are characterized by a striking ab-
sence of normative or melioristic views. These relate to 
policy, with which pure science has no concern. The scien-
tist, as an individual, may, of course, favor any social 
policy which seems.to him desirable, whether it be that of a 
Mussolini, a Stalin, a Hoover, or a Roosevelt, but' he cannot 
import such views into his scientific writing and remain 
true to science. The authors of the articles in this volume 
hold personal opinions on social and political questions 
ranging from reactionary, through conservative and liberal, 
to radical. Since they are here speaking as scientists, 
however, a fundamental consistency, representing the common 
ground of science, runs through their various contributions.9 
8Malinowski, B., "Introduction" to Hogbin' s La,., and Order in 
Polynesia (London: Christophers), 1934, p, xviii.~~-
9Murdock, G. P., "Editorial Preface" to Studies in the Science 
of Society (New Haven: Yale University Press), 1937, P:- xix. The 
underscoring in the quotations throughout this thesis is the author's • 
. · ~ ·. ~ 
.. ~ . -.--
... ~t. ~ · .. 
·.:._i; '. • - :- ••• 
\ 
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It would follow froin reading the above quotation that science had 
no relation whatsoever to any social-political question and that 
"pure" science was something apart from and irrelevant to human ac-
tivity. This is the logical conclusion of such an absurdity which ha~ 
arisen as a relatively late abstraction from·the physical sciences; 
that is, the idea of a non-social world. SUffice to say it is a mean-
ingless concept, because nothing has meaning aside from the existence 
of the interpreter. The interpreter is a necessary precondition to 
meaning. 
The above implied dualism between normative and descriptive data 
is basic to modern anthropological theory and, as a111atter of fact, to 
the whole modern "climate of opinion:" Hov1ever, to modern pragmatic 
philosophers and modern experimental psychologists such a dualism is 
untenable. 
The "pure fact" school in anthropology, and in all other branches 
of inquiry, hinges its position, unwittingly or implicitly, on two pre-
scientific theoretical traditions: "Empiricism" in philosophy, and 
"Introspectionism" and "Sensationism" in psychology. That is, the 
proponents of the above related theoretical positions, as well as the 
"pure fact" scientists, believe that the "senses" have the capacity to 
receive raw data; for ex8111ple, you see a tree, just as it is--a tree. 
Furthermore, the empiricists assume that a "fact" is innate--already 
given. All that is required is for the human "mind" to grasp this 
given "fact"--a kind of miraculous revelation occurs. They do not 
recognize the interaction which takes place between the total organism, 
• 
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including the senses and the environment. These "empiricists" believe 
\ that the "mind" is essentially receptive or, as Locke states, a blank 
tablet upon which experience writes. Sensations are the basis of 
simple, primitive ideas; a complex idea is simply the combination of 
simple ideas. The "Empiricists" would agree ~~with Herekovi ts 
when he says: 
Unlike many recent anthropological monographs, the 
present work is purely descriptive. It is to be regarded as 
unfortunate that we have not held to an earlier tradition 
that dictated tho separation in publication of ethnographic 
materials from ethnological controversies, leaving the 
former to be drawn on by all, irrespective of theoretical 
position, to document the problems in the study of culture 
that transcend materials from a single folk. 10 
Or with Strong when he says: 
Good ethnology is purely descriptive. Only when the 
results are used for generalizing or historical purposes are 
sociology or anthropology involved. The cardinal sin against 
ethnology is to curtail in any way or obscure its concrete 
facts. "Historical reconstructions," "elucidations of mean-
ing," or "functional interpretations". should be made sepa-
rately. The facts themselves are sacred. As such they may 
be employed as desired by the administrators, sociologist, 
anthropologist, psychologist, and others.11 
And Lowie, who illustrates explicitly in the following statement 
the confusion in the normative-descriptive dualism: 
10Herskovi ts, M. J., Dahomey (New York: J. J. Augustin, Publisher}, 
1938, pp. viii-ix. 
11 Strong, "Anthropological Theory and Archaeological Fact," 
Essays in Anthropology (Berkeley: University of California Press), 
1936, p"j).'" 364-365. 
\ 
One of the important subjects for ethnographic study is 
artistic form. The ethnologist notes in a purely descrip-
tive way the decorative patterns employed by various tribes, 
the fact that curvilinear motives are prominent among the 
Maori of New Zealand while the rawhide bags of Plaine In-
dians are covered with angular paintings.12 
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Modern experimental psychology, pragmatic philosophy, as well as. 
the whole history of man, offer instrumental (experimental operations 
which yield predictive consequences) evidence to attack the above 
"Einpirical" position. In the first place, the "Mind" is not something 
given to begin with--a static entity--but is an evolutionary product I 
subject to change and modification. As a matter of fact, modern ex-
perimental psychologists do not talk about the "Mind," but rather 
about the highly complex nervous system of man, which is a relatively 
late evolutionary resultant. This evolutionary attitude allows for a 
naturalistic theory of knowledge. such a theory sets forth the basic 
fact that it is only through the interaction of the organism with the 
environment that ideas arise, and that we really "know.'' In other 
words, a "pure" fact or "pure" science is a phenomenon unknown to man; 
for man, the fact is always contained within a cultural context which 
determines its significance. It is in the interactive process that 
man "knows," and bis actions indicate what he knows. Habits of action, 
or tendencies to act, are thus the only locus of rational, logical 
thinking--of ideas, if you please. This mundane,. naturalistic explana-
tion of thought meets with furious resistance on the part of tradi-
12 Lowie, R.H., Culture and Ethnology (New York: Peter Smith), ' 
1929, p. 21. 
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tional philosophers and psychologists, but this is essentially the 
thesis of modern experimental science. Its general acceptance is only 
a matter of time. 
In the second place, modern experimental animal psychologists and 
the pragmatists have also illustrated that a "fact" is not something 
already given or innate. The pragmatists emphasize that the "fact"-
"theory" distinction is purely a functional, logical distinction. For 
example, X comes to a fork in the roadj he does not know whether to 
take Road A or Road Bi thus, a problematic situation confronts X; X, 
after some reflection, looks for a signpost; upon finding the signpost, 
the signpost becomes a "fact" for X in this particular situation, but 
only by virtue of its "pointing" function (it points to, or is a sign 
of, a solution of his problem). The signpost was not a given, innate 
"fact" of this situation; it became a,"fact" only because of its func-
tional role in the entire situation. 
"Functionalism" in Anthropology: The functional school of psy-
chology, which arose at the end of the 19th century, was the first to 
strongly emphasize the process of the adaptation of the organism to 
the environment--an interactive process. This school, predicated on 
the findings of the new biological sciences, had wide repercussions in 
all fields of investigation, particularly philosophy, economics, and 
(I believe) anthropology. Malinowski, in emphasizing the adaptive 
process, is obviously a product of this trend--an offspring or the 
functional school of psychology. 
out of such naturalistic psychological foundations, the theory of 
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instrumentulism arose, a theory to which Malinowski, in part and inso-
far as he understands it, subscribes. That is, through the develop-
ment of tools, techniques, concepts or "instrumentalities," man has 
widened his range of interaction with the environment, as well as his 
control over the environment. As a matter of fact, the number of 
stimuli have been increased by technological developments. This can 
13 best be illustrated by comparing marginal and western societies. 
Science--in Marginal ~ Western Societies: In comparing the 
level of scientific achievement of marginal and western groups, we 
must first dispel the notion that differences exist because of biolog-
ical capacities. There is no scientific evidence to show a biological 
difference between the nervous systems of the marginal and western 
man, or that race is causally related to culture. Therefore, we must 
seek for differences in the cultural matrix. 
The basic reason for the difference of the position of science in 
marginal and western groups can be attributed to "the state of the 
13
rn this thesis, I shall use the terms "marginal peoples," "mar-
ginal groups," or "marginal societies," rather than the terms "primi-
tive peoples," "savage peoples," etc. By "marginal peoples" is meant 
all peoples who have not yet acquired modern western technology to any 
significant .degree. That is, "marginal peoples" are marginal to 
modern technological societies. This, I believe, to be the real dis-
tinction between the so-called "savage man" and the so-called "civil-
ized man." This same distinction is implicit, although usually unrec-
ognized, in all comparative anthropological works which deal with the 
subject of man. The term used in this sense does not have "geographi-
cal" implications. 
"M~rginal peoples" is a more satisfactory terminology than "prim-
itive peoples," "savage peoples," etc., precisely because it does 
imply technological differences· rather than psychological differences. 
And, of course, the former is the actual locus of the differences. 
arts" or the "cultural threshold." As Dewey brings out: "The prog-
ress of inquiry (science) is identical with advance in the invention 
and construction of physical instrumentalities for producing, regis-
tering, and measuring change. 1114 '!hat is, with the proliferation of 
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instrumentalities, with the development of more accurate means Qf test-
ing hypothesis, 15 man has gained greater control over his environment. 
16 With the development of tools, "junk piles," man is faced with a 
greater number of problematic situations. As Charles Peirce would 
state, technological development is a factor causing more doubt and 
leading to reflection as a means of establishing "belief." The prag-
matic behavioristic psychologist would also add that tools are a 
basic factor contributing to the increased capacity of the organism to 
receive stimuli, hence increasing the interaction between the organism 
and the environment. 
For example, when marginal man is faced with a problem (and he is 
not faced with problems as often as western man), what means does he 
have for solving the problem? Because he does not have the tools and 
techniques for a scientific solution of the problem, he resorts to 
magic. This "~uest'for Certainty" is clearly illustrated by Dewey in 
14
newey, J., The Ql.lest for Certainty (New York: Minton, Balch and 
Company), 1929, p. 84. 
15 . . 
"An hypothesis is a statement based on evidence, and not cer-
tain, because some.of the relevant evidence is lacking." Knowledge 
and Society (New York: D. Appleton-Century Co.), 1938, p. 67. 
16As tools, we include not only mechanical contrivances which 
operationally widen fields of inquiry, but also ideas and reflection. 
the following paragraph: 
As a drowning man is said to grasp at a straw, so men 
who lacked the instruments and skills developed in later 
days, snatched at whatever, by any stretch of imagination, 
could be regarded as a source of help in time of trouble. 
The attention, interest and care which now go to acquiring 
skill in the use of appliances and to the invention of means 
for better service of ends, were devoted to noting omens, 
making irrelevant prognostications, performing ritualistic 
ceremonies and manipulating objects possessed of magical 
power over natural events. In such an atmosphere primitive 
religion was born and fostered. Rather this atmosphere was 
the religious disposi tion.17 -- -
And by G. H. Mead: 
Before science men triea to control the world by magic. 
The ends of magic and the ends of science are not essen-
tially different; it is the means that are different. The 
magician and the medicine men were undertaking to control 
the environment in the interests of certain social ends, 
just as definitely as science does, but they did not succeed 
in any such degree.18 
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This does not mean that all problems in a marginal community are 
solved by magic {or that magic is unknown in a western community), or 
even most of them, for ~ cannot live ~ magic. However, it does 
imply that there is more magic in a marginal coIIUllunity than in a west-
ern society, because of the level of the instrumental development. 
What means, then, does marginal man use to solve problems, to control 
nature? 
l7Dewey, .£E.· cit., p. 10. 
18 Mead, G. H., The Philosophy of the Act (Chicago: The University 
of Chicago Press), 1938, p. 475, 
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Common Sense: As noted above, man cannot live by magic alone, 
for life in any society is one of constant interaction with the envi-
ronment, and through this interaction problems arise which must be 
solved with at least common-sense techniques. Common sense is well 
defined by Evans-Prichards in the following quotation: 
These are patterns of thought that attribute to phe-
nomena only what men observe in them or what can logically 
be inferred from observation. So long as a notion does not 
assert something which has not been observed, it is not 
classed as mystical even though it is mistaken on account of 
incomplete observation. It still differs from mystical no-
tions in which supra-sensible forces are always posited.19 
The way in which common sense, rather than magic or science, is 
used to solve problems in a marginal community is shown in the follow-
ing quotation which concerns the relation of magic to practical (com-
mon sense) work among the Trobriand Islanders. The quotation also 
shows how effective adjustment to nature is on a common-sense, and not 
a magical or scientific level. 
The gift of fertility bestowed by the mythical founders 
and wielders of magic on the richest districts of that re-
gion is without exception conceived in a two-fold manner, 
magical and natural. The natives realise--ui'at""Oii sandy, 
brackish and stony soil neither yams nor taro, and still 
less taytu, could ever grow .••• At the same time they 
attribute the supreme fertility of some districts, the pros-
perity which dwells there permanently and the beautiful ex-
panse of successful gardens, to the superiority of one magi-
cal system over another .••• The two ways, the way of 
magic and the way of garden work, are inseparable. They are 
19 
. Evans-Pritchard, E. E., Witchcraft, Oracles and Magic .Among the 
Azande (Oxford: The Clarendon Press, 1937, p. 12. 
never confused, nor is one of them ever allowed to supersede 
the other. The natives will never try to clean the soil by 
magic, to erect a fence or yam support by a rite. They know 
quite well that they have to do it by hand and in the sweat 
of their brow .•.. To the natives, therefore, the aims of 
magic are different from the aims of work. They know quite 
well what effects they try to produce by competent and indus-
trious labour. They equally know that certain evils, such 
as pests, blights, bush-pigs, drought or rain, cannot be 
overcome by human work however hard and consistent. They 
see also that, at times and in a mysterious way, gardens 
thrive in spite of all anticipations to the contrary, or 
else that, in a fairly good season favoured by good work, 
the gardens do not give the results they should. Any unac-
countable good luck over and above what is due the natives 
attribute to magicj exactly as they attribute unexpected and 
undeserved bad luck to black magic or to some defiaienay in 
the carrying out of their own magi~.'O · 
The Aznnde, as Evans-Prichard clearly brings out, also distin-
guish between natural and mystical causation: 
Now a granary is the surrunerhouse·or a Zande homestead 
und people sit beneath it in the heat of the day and chat . 
. Consequently it may happen that there are people sit-
ting beneath the granary when it collapses and they are in-
jured, for it is a heavy structure •• · •. Now why should. 
these particular people have been sitting under this particu-
lar granary at the particular moment when it collapsed? ••• 
We say that the granary collapsed because its supports were 
eaten away by termites. That is the cause that explains the 
collapse of the granary. We also say that people were sit-
ting under it at the time because it was in the heat of the 
day and they thought that it would be a comfortable place to 
talk and work. This is the cause of the people being under 
the granary at the time it collapsed. To our minds the only 
relationship between these two independently caused facts is 
their coincidence in time and space. We have no explanation 
of why the two chains of causation intersected at a certain 
time and in a certain place, for there is no interdependence 
between them. 
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20Malinowsk1, B., Coral Gardens and Their Magic (New York: .Ameri-
can Book Company), 1935, Vol. I, pp. 75-77. 
zande philosophy can supply the missing link. The 
Zande knows that the supports were undermined by termites 
and that people were sitting beneath the granary in order to 
escape the heat and glare of the sun. But he knows besides 
why these two events occurred at a precisely similar moment 
in time and space. It was due to the action of witchcraft . 
. . • Witchcraft explains the coincidence of these two hap-
penings. 
Witchcraft explains why events are harmful to man and 
not how they happen. A Zande perceives how they happen just 
as we<fo. He does not see a witch push over a granary, but 
termites gnawing away its supports. He does not see a physi-
cal flame igniting thatch, but an ordinary lighted bundle of 
straws. ~ perception of how events occur _!.! ..!:.!! clear as 
our own. 
The separation on an operational level between ritual (magical) 
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and technical (common-sense) activity is further illustrated in Firth's 
study of the Tikopiuns: 
The ritual of net-making is hardly to be described as 
part of the technique of production. It is not intended to 
assist the manufacture of the net itself, but to help the 
net to fulfill its proper function afterwards. It may be 
described as~ rite of deferred production, not a rite of 
immediate production .•.. As far as its effects on the 
efficiency of the process of production are concerned, the 
ritual does not challenge the autonomy of the technical 
processes for the work as a whole. But the ritual has cer-
tain positive effects ..•. Granted the present technique 
and knovtleage of resources, the ritual system is a positive 
factor in the situation of production, contributing directly 
to the organization and indirectly affecting the output . 
. . . The ritual beliefs and practices may have some nega-
tive influence upon technical advance. By insisting upon 
the truth of certain false propositions, and by treating 
failure as an event of a non-technical order, to be cor-
rected by further ritual rather than by experiment, beliefs 
and practices such as those described may immobilize some 
21
..Q.E.. cit., pp. 69-72. 
I 
I 
of th~2forces of invention and hamper more efficient adapta-tion. 
In the light of the above quotations (and by a mass of othet 
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anthropological data), it can be shown that marginal people face prac-
tical problems, demanding active adaptation, with common-sense evalua-
tions. And, when they do not have the techniques for even common-
sense interpretations, they rely upon "mystical notions. 11 • By "mysti-
cal notions" we mean "patterns of thought that attribute to phenomena 
supra-sensible qualities which, or part of which, are not derived from 
observation or cannot be logically inferred from it, and which they do 
not possess. 1123 By "mystical" we do not mean "supernatural" as com-
monly used, for as long as there is no body of "natural" knowledge 
(and marginal peoples have no such body of knowledge) defined by in-
strumental investigation, then there can be no 
( 
more accurate to speak of the ordinary and the 
"supernatural." It is 
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extraordinary events. 
Common sense is the most common form of evaluation in all socie-
ties--marginal and western alike. But always common-sense beliefs are 
empirical (observational), and because they are, evaluations based 
upon common sense are both individualistic and sensationistic. Fur-
thermore, common sense is typified by greater emotional intensity than 
scientific inquiry, but by less emotional intensity than "mystical" 
22Firth, R., Primitive Polynesian Economy {London: George Rout-
ledge and Sons, Ltd.), 1939, pp. 179-186. 
23Ibid., p. 12. 
24Ibid., pp. 80-83. 
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notions. 
In contradiction to Evans-Prichard's statement that the Azande•s, 
and by implication marginal peoples, "perception [observation] of how 
25 
events occur is as clear as our own," we note that observation, like 
scientific behavior, is not a constant in all societies. That would 
'imply the psychic unity of mankind (cf. Bastian); and likewise, 'obser-
vation does not differ from society to society because of innate dif-
ferences in mentality (cf, Levy-Bruhl). Common-sense observation, 
like science, is a changing factor because of tools, as Dewey clearly 
brings out in the following quotation: 
Common sense in respect to both its content of ideas 
and beliefs, and its methods of procedure, is anything but a 
constant. Both its content and its method alter from time 
to time not merely in detail but in general pattern. Every 
invention of a new tool and utensil, every improvement in 
technique, makes some difference in what is used and enjoyed 
and in the inquiries that arise with reference to use and26 enjoyment, with respect to both significance and meaning. 
To further illustrate the enormous variance in the contents and 
methods of common sense, as well as science, from one mode of life to 
another, I would like to refer to an argument with a fellow anthro-
pologist in which the following challenge was made: "How do you ~ 
the world is flat?" The argument up to that point had centered about 
whether I was more scientific, as an individual in a western society, 
25 Supra, p. 29. 
26 Dewey, J., Logic--~ Theory of Inquirz (New York: Henry Holt 
and Company), 1938, p. 64. . 
32 
than an average native in a marginal society. In the first place, to 
put this argument on such an individualistic level is ridiculous and 
irrelevant, for no one person epitomizes a way-of-life and knowledge. 
Rather, we should have compared the body of knowledge of one society 
with that of another. However, the challenge was made in order to 
solicit the statement on my part that I did not have on the tip of my 
tongue the proof of the earth's sphericity. And the statement was 
made either overlooking or underemphasizing the influence of instru-
mental development upon western "climate of opinion." For although I 
cannot give the theoretical and operational explanations of the earth's 
sphericity, I have available a body of scientific knowledge (for 
science is the most social of all knowledge), and I have available 
scientific instruments whereby such a statement could be answered. The 
marginal man, in contrast, has no scientific means for testing such a 
problem (it would probably not be a problem), so it is not illogical 
for them to assume by common-sense observation that the world is flat. 
Also, tools have not only increased scientific means for solving 
such a problem, but they have widened our common-sense range of expe-
rience. For example, I have seen, and so have hundreds of thousands 
of other individuals, the photograph by Capt. A. w. Stevens taken from 
an elevation or 72,395 feet, the highest point ever reached by man, 
which shows the.actual curvature of the earth. 27 · 
And finally, common-sense notions when taken out of context and 
27copyright Supplement of the National Geographic Magazine, May, 
1936. 
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handed down from generation to generation become traditional (mystical) 
notions. The scientific process, on the contrary, is ~-corrective--
it discards irrelevant material. 
~ Aspects I!! Science: It follows from the above discussion 
that marginal peoples have very few scientific explanations. However, 
some anthropological data has been forwarded to indicate "scientific" 
experiment and attitude. Peter Freuchen in Artie Adventure notes one 
such extremely interesting approximation to scientific methodology: 
During the fall the natives turned pagan again. They 
had been Christian for more than a year and it had done them 
no good--the dogs had come down with distemper just the same. 
The Eskimos had even gone so far as to hang tiny crosses 
about the dogs• necks, but it had not helped. Then a young 
woman remembered that once as a child she had cured a dog by 
binding pagan amulets around its neck. She was a cautious, 
clever girl, so now she fastened both a cross and a round 
piece of wood to several dogs• necks,.and the animals recov-
ered. Then, by a scientific system of trial and elimination, 
they set about to determine which had been responsible for 
the cure. Half the remaining sick animals were treated with 
crosses, the rest with wooden 8.lllulets, The dogs wearing the 
pagan wood recovered, Whereupon the natives returned to the 
ways of their forefathers, and doubtless remained satisfied 
until another problem arose.28 
In order to bring out olearly other aspects of science, let us 
analyze the above illustration of a nscientific system." 
a. Control: The above "experiment" is not scientific, for one 
very important reason: there is no ncontrol" group. That is, the 
28 See pp. 422-423. Furthermore, a more careful research on this 
particular incident would probably show that it was stimulated by 
white contact--a borrowed technique out of "context." . Actually the 
"experiment" could not have and did not have scientific "meaning." 
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young woman did not observe the dogs which had neither amulets nor 
crosses to see if they died. Control is always a part of scientific 
technique. Thia experiment is, incidentally, logical in an Aristote-
lian sense, but not in a modern scientific sense. 
b. Multiple Causality: The magi~al disposition of the young 
woman (a product of a lack of tools and a pre-scientific "climate of 
opinion") led her to never question the poesibility of natural causa-
tion. For in this "experiment" the choice was between two objects 
with a single function--magical protection. Science, however, demands 
that all relevant alternatives be considered as causal. But, in order 
to frame a problem, marginal man must see causal relationships; he 
cannot do so if he does not have the instrumentalities. He is aware 
that the dog is sick, that there are disturbing factors about which 
there is doubt, and he finds a solution (the certainty) in super-
sensible reference, and not through scient~fic investigation. As long 
as the "state of the arts" was insufficient for solving problems scien-
tifically (microscopes, glass test tubes, naturalism, etc.), solutions 
were on a common-sense or magical level. Furthermore, the "scientific 
system of trial and elimination" used by the young woman was really 
just common-sense trial and error technique. 
c. Reflection: Science, too, demands reflection; that is, sym-
bolic activity based upon past experience which selects (admits or 
rejects) possible alternative solutions with reference to future ac-
tivity. In reflection, "future action" is conditioned by reference t9 · 
the "known" results, active consequences, of methods and techniques 
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utilized in the past. Scientific reflection does not grow out of 
patterns innately a part of the "Mind," but grows out of a logical 
analysis arising as a part of scientific inquiry. 
d. Adequate Tools: Part of the job of modern anthropology is to· 
discard the pseudo-scientific attitude that it is a "pure" science, 
and dig into the problem of improving its theoretical and methodologi-
cal tools. The anthropologists today are not doing this job, as 
Gorer brings out in the following quotation: 
. • • the fact that fUrther knowledge has invalidated the 
earlier hypotheses of social evolution is not a proper ex-
cuse for not trying to form new hypotheses which will take 
into account the newer sources of knowledge; and in so far 
as they fail to do this anthropologists are inadequately 
fulfi~ling.their functions.29 
Malinowski, many years earlier, in reaction to the atomic trend 
in anthropology of "pure" fact gathering, stated: 
What still remains to be done is to develop both a the-
oretical background and a method suitable for comparative 
analysis and field work, which will allow us to account for 
certain phenomena. , . ,30 
And, even more emphatically: 
I am still deeply convinced that anthropological theory, 
especially in reference to methods of field-work, has to be 
29 Gorer, G., Himalayan Village (London: Michael Joseph), 1939, 
pp. 435-436. 
30Malinowski, B., "Introduction" to Hogbin's Law and Order in 
Polynesia (London: Christophers), 1934, p. xxxii. ---~ 
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reformed and reformed rapidly. One of the most urgent needs 
for us is to develop a set of theoretical principles refer-
ring to the mechanisms of primitive law, economics and edu-
cation; theories which would focus the interest and atten-
tion of the field worker on the actual working of the social 
and cultural institutions of his natives.31 . 
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The argument that theories are pernicious to valid field-work is 
repeatedly attacked by Malinowski. He first notes that 11the field 
worker relies entirely upon inspiration from theory," and 11foreshadowed 
problems are the main endowment of a scientific thinker, and these 
32 
problems are first revealed to the observer by his theoretical studies." 
Malinowski also shows how a lack of technical knowledge caused the 
33 
anthropologist to overlook, or to be unaware of, valuable data. 
My botanical ignorance has been a great handicap to me. 
Some knowledge of tropical cultivated plants would have been 
an immense help. I was not able to judge for myself where 
rational procedure ended and which were the supererogatory 
activities, whether magical or aesthetic. Thus the whole 
question of the training of vines, the method of planting 
taro, taytu and large yams, lacked one important cultural 
dimensibn. Above all, I was not quite able to see whether 
31 Ibid., p. lix. 
3~alinowski, B., Argonauts of the Western Pacific (London: 
G. Routledge and Sons, Ltd.), 1922:"~9. 
33 In this thesis I am not using the two terms "ethnographer" and 
"ethnologist." Halinowski and his followers use "Ethnography for the 
empirical and descriptive results of the science of Man, and ••• 
ethnology for speculative and comparative theories"· (Malinowski). 
This implies an empirical-theoretical dualism. It is interesting to 
note that the dual'ism implied by Malinowski's use of these two words 
is not consistent, for the most part, with the rest of his attitudes 
towards theory and method. In discarding these terms, I hope to avoid ,.-
the dualism implicit in their use. For intensive sociological inves-
tigation, I shall use the term "field-anthropology." 
/ 
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some aspects of the native technique and theory of planting, 
thinning out and weeding were definitely dictated by scien-
tific principles emp~fically reached and correctly trans-
lated into practice. 
And, elsewhere: 
My ignorance of certain technological principles comes 
out clearly .•• a knowledge of technology is indispensable 
as a means of approach to economic and sociological activity 
•.• a thorough grasp of how natives construct a yam-house 
would have enabled me to judge why they construct it in that 
way, and to discuss with them, as between equals, the scien-
tific foundations of their manual systems.35 
As stated before (cf. Dewey), the progress of scientific inquiry 
depends directly upon improved physical instrumentalities--adequate 
tools. In recent years, field-anthropology has greatly benefited 
through the use of improved cameras and photographic techniques. For 
one of the most striking deficiencies of the "classic" monographs is 
the primitive character of the photographs. Malinowski's work, by his 
own admission, is included. In 1942, Gregory Bateson and Margaret 
Mead published a photographic analysis of Balinese character which 
36 
will remain a milestone in anthropological methodology. This book 
is a collection of 700 candid-photographs carefully selected f~om 
25,000 Leica negatives. Along with each photograph, or group of photo-
3~alinowski, B., Coral Gardens and Their Magic (New York: .Ameri-
can Book Company), 1935, Vol. I, p.· 41;0': · 
35Ibid. 
36 Bateson, G., and Mead, M., Balinese Character: A Photographic 
Analysis (Special Publications of the New York Academy of Soienoes, 
Vol. 2), 1942• 
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graphs, is a verbal analysis by Bateson. Psychologically related be-
havior, spatially and contextually separated but of the same emotional 
trend, is cross-referenced by placing a aeries of photographs on the 
same page. In the words of the authors: 
In this monograph we are attempting a new method of 
stating the intangible relationships among different types 
of cultural behavior by placing side by side mutually rele-
vant photographs. • • • To present them [mutually related 
behavior] together in words, it is necessary either to re-
sort to devices which are inevitably literary or to dissect 
the living scenes of each behavior so that only desicated 
items remain. [But] ••• by the use of photographs, the 
wholeness of each piece of behavior can be preserved.37 
There are some errors and limitations in this book, principally 
because of the primary thesis--Balinese character. Without enough in-
dividual documentary support, the authors drew conclusions (through 
photographs) about Balinese psychology. But such conclusions can only 
be drawn, as Lois and Gardner Murphy bring out,. "after achieving a -
good over-all understanding of the culture," and through studying indi-
vidual life-histories, which would not require the enormous difficul~ 
ties of taking 25,000 photographs.Jg 
However, the important thing is not whether or not this book has 
used photography with complete satisfaction, but whether it is a step 
forward in the development of a "science of man." In bringing to 
J?Ibid., p. xii. 
38Murphy, Loia and Gardner, "Review" of Mead and Bateson's 
Balinese Character: A Photographic Analysis, in the American Anthro! 
pologist, Vol. 45, No. 4, Par~ I, 1943, pp. 615-619. 
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attention the need for a more complete use of cameras and photographic 
techniques, in an attempt to develop research techniques, it marks, I 
believe, progress towards the documentary filming of a culture. The 
study further illustrates how science is improved through the develop-
ment of new instrumentalities. 
Modern field-anthropology enjoys the use of a number of other 
physical instrumentalities--tools which have enabled the anthropolo-
'• 
I ',1i' 'i 
,,,r' 
gist to make more varied und more thorough investigation. 
The revolution in transportation, the so-called "age of dis-
covary," made possible comparative studies in anthropology. SUbse-
quently, anthropology has benefited from all improvements in transpor-
tation which enable the field worker to reach the fartherest outpost. 
For example, from Austin, Texas, contact can be made by airplane with 
any marginal group any place in the world in sixty-four hours. These 
improvements in transportation also make greater cultural homogeneity 
inevitable; consequently, the anthropologist is being forced to change 
his theories and methodologies to take into consideration the phenom~-
non of acculturation. This accounts for the recent intense interest 
in culture-contact evidenced by Melville Herskovits, Robert Redfield, 
Isaac Schapera, Ernest Beaglehole, and others. 
Modern medical development has made possible field investigation 
under almost any condition. For example, malaria need no longer be 
feared by the field worker in the tropics. 
The phonograph has been of great value to the field-anthropologist. 
/ 
Frances Densmore and Laura Bolton have used it very successfully in 
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recording "folk" music. It is a stock trade-tool of the linguist. The 
phonograph also provides a very accurate means of recording rituals, 
chants, and genealogies. 
These are only a few of the tools which have increased the effi-
ciency and skill of the anthropologist. The tool factor cannot be 
overemphasized, for new tools effect a revolution in anthropology, as 
in all other phases of cul~ure. 
e. Interdependency: The sciences are interdependent, constitut-
ing a "structural" or "genetic" whole. 39 Mathematics in one form or 
another is utilized by all fields of inquiry. Modern experimental 
psychology was made possible by developments in the biological sciences 
which in turn depended upon developments in physics and chemistry. The 
conceptual structure of Darwinism has had repercussions in all fields. 
Anthropology typifies this interdependency, as it relies upon 
investigation in all of the physical, biological, and cultural 
sciences. For example, the so-called "Functionalist," when discussing 
the needs of the organism and the adjustments it has made, must keep 
up with the latest development in psychology and physiology, as well 
as chemistry. The human biologists, like Raymond Pearl, have provided 
social anthropology with the foundation for one of its most fundamen-
tal premises: that "culture is only casually and not causally related 
to race" (Wallis). The culture-area concept developed by Wissler i.s 
an extension, according to Radin, of the quantitative methods of physics 
39Mayer, J., Social Science Principles in the Light of scientific. 
Method (Durham: Duke University Press), 1941-;-p-:-T2. ~ 
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and biology. 4° From geology and history, anthropology gained histori-
cal perspective. In the light of the above discussion, the argument 
about whether or not social anthropology (the social sciences) is 
scientific appears futile. For anthropology and all the social 
sciences have grown out of the physical and natural sciences. Most of 
the basic methodologies of the social sciences are those of the physi-
cal and natural sciences, though many new scientific tools have been 
developed in the social sciences--each problem to a certain extent 
demanding a unique approach. 
f. Misconceptions: It is argued that the problems and the data 
of the social sciences are too complex, but, if and insofar as they 
are, it is due to insufficient and confused theoretical foundations 
and tools. This was the state of biology and related disciplines not 
so long ago. Many state that.no controls are possible in the social 
sciences. The confusion here lies in that controls are thought of 
on],.y in the specialized "laboratory" sense. The job of the social 
scientist is not to "ape" scientific laboratory methodology, but to 
develop instrumentalities which meet new problems and which meet scien-
tific specifications as outlined in this chapter. 
One of the most frequently encountered misconceptions is that the 
social sciences cannot develop "laws"--"natural" laws. But that in 
itself is a preconception about science, for science is not interested 
in stating immutable laws (ends), but relations. Science attempts to 
~ ~ Radin, P., Method and Theory of Ethnology {New York: McGraw-
Hill Book Company, Inc.), 1933. -
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show the relations between certain phenomena under specified condi-
tions and at a specified time. The modern scientific formula is: 
"such a thing will occur .!! these conditions are fulfilled at this 
time." Part of the specified conditions is the tool factor; when 
tools change results change. In this sense, science is operational. 
As Bridgman brings out: 
Relativity in the general sense is the merest truism if 
the operational definition of concept is accepted, for expe-
rience is described in terms of concepts, and since our con-
cepts are constructed of operations, all our knowledge must 
unescapably be related to the operations selected.41 ' 
In the final analysis, science is a practical way of solving 
42 
problems. And, most significantly of all, science is self-corrective. 
That is, a given hypothesis is used as long as it works more effi-
ciently than any alternative hypothesis, and in the use of the hypothe-
sis further refinements and corrections are made. Thus the scientific 
process is continuous and progressive. 
The Structural Approach: Malinowski's best known contribution to 
anthropological methodology is the famous so-called "functional 
method." This ambiguous method usually refers to a "systematic tech-
nique for studying the interrelationship of different aspects of a 
particular culture--a technique which forces a field-worker to see 
each fact in a variety of .different settings, and·hence stimulates him 
41 Bridgman, P. , The Logic 2£ Modern Physics (New York: The Mac- / · 
millan Company), 1927, p. 25. 
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to follow a number of alternative lines of research. 1142 Howeyer, fre-
quently the term is used to refer to Malinowski's behavioristic treat-
ment of basic human needs and their "cultural responses." At other 
times, "functionalism" is used to denote what a culture trait ''does." 
Hence, the term is used with at least three different meanings--a sit-
uation which causes considerable confusion. 
For purposes of analysis and clarification, we will refer to that 
part of the so-called "functional method" which merely shows the inter-
relationship of culture traits as the structural method. This use of 
"structuralism" is not an arbitrary one, but is consistent with the 
general use of the term in other fields of inquiry. The term "func-
tionalism" will be used to denote Malinowski's analysis of "human cul-
ture into those basic institutions that exist to fulfill such funda-
mental human needs as food, sex, procreation, shelter, or defence." 43 
Thus, the functional approach is concerned with the interaction (inte-
gration--cf. Dewey) of the organism and its e~vironment.44 The use of 
''func·tionalism" with this meaning will be consistent with its use in 
psychology and philosophy. The term "function-role" will be used to 
42 Richards, A. I. , "Bronislaw Kaspar Malinowski," obituary in 
Man, Vol. XLIII, January-February, 1943, p. 3. 
43Ibid. 
44Linton, in Chpt. XXIII of The Study of Man, discusses the con-
fusion and misunderstanding resulting from the--various uses of the 
term "function." After noting four interrelated qualities of every 
element of culture--form, meaning, use, and function--he defines func-
tion as "the contribution which it [any particular element of culture] 
makes tow·ard the satisfaction of a particular need or needs." This is 
consistent with· the above use of the term.. See pp. 411-412. 
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des.ignate specifically what a trait "does." It must be stressed that 
the above divisions are only for purposes of analysis, as in reality 
all three are interdependent. 
Malinowski's use of a structural approach in field-anthropology 
can, in part, be traced to his early scientific training. For every 
scientist knows that an element can only be understood with reference 
to the complex or system of which it is a part. We can understand the 
behavior of individuals only by understanding the cultural forces and 
controls that play upon him. In order to understand how an economic 
system works in a society, its relationship to religion, material 
technology, the family and other social institutions must be studied. 
As Evans-Prichard states: 
One type of human behavior is related to other types, 
and it is therefore desirable in describing one type to re-
fer to all the others in so far as it is directly dependent 
on them or they on it.45 
A scientific study of culture, or any scientific inquiry, demands 
an interrelational analysis. such an interrelated treatment of human 
society was made possible by the appearance of Darwinism and the new 
biological sciences. This was discu.ssed at length above. 46 
Gestalt psychology was a powerful movement on the continent (par-
ticularly in Germany) and in England during the early part of the 20th 
45 Evans-Prichard, E. E., Witchcraft, Oracles and Magic Among the 
Azande (Oxford: The Clarendon Press), 1937, pp. 2-3':"""" / 
46supra, pp. 22-2J. 
/ 
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II century. The heart of Gestaltism is its concept of wholeness: . . . 
the whole is not a mere summation of parts, but a unitary structure, 
in which the change of any part changes the whole, and conversely. 1147 
Many psychologists use the terms "Gestaltism" and "structuralism" 
synon~nously. Malinowski personally acknowledges the influence of 
Gestnltism upon him, and undoubtedly this influence was a potent fac-
tor in the formation of Malinowski's structural approach. It would be 
no great exaggeration to say that his structural approach is applied 
Gestnlt psychology. 
Structuralism in modern anthropology, as used by Malinowski and 
others, also arose as a reaction against the comparati·ve, non-scien-
tific and "piecemeal" techniques of Wester.marck, Spencer, and others. 
It must be remembered that Gestaltism, •too, was a reaction against 
"associationism" or 11 atomism." It can probably be safely stated that 
the "atomic'' approach was the result of the influence of Newtonian 
physics upon other fields of investigation at the time. The following 
quotation from Lovrie's The History 2£_ Ethnological Thought character ... 
izes the deficiencies in the "atomic" approach: 
His [Westermarck's] use of aboriginal data, however, is 
unsatisfactory. Indeed, his own account of the procedure 
when preparing one of his later books is not apt to arouse 
confidence: "I made use of the same method as I had em-
ployed in my book on marriage. I made my excerpts on slips 
of paper, which I numbered according to subject-matter, so 
that afterwards I should be able so much the more easily to 
47Boring, E. G., A History of E~erimental Psych~logy (New York{ 
D. Appleton-Century Co.), 1929, p. 57 . 
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group together all data bearing upon the same question: 
homicide, theft, love of truth and falsehood, adultery, can-
nibalism, and so on . • • " (Memories of My Life). This ap-
proach is doubly suspect: first of all,~he classification 
does not grow naturally out of the material but is imposed 
'on it; secondly, the collector is likely to concentrate only 
on what seems to fall under his rubrics, omitting correlated 
phenomena of the utmost significanoe.48 
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Dewey further illustrates the abuse of the comparative technique when 
"facts are torn loose from their context in social and natural envi .. 
ronment and heaped miscellaneously together": 
What would we think of a biologist who appealed suc-
cessively to some external characteristic of say snake, but-
terfly, elephant, oyster and robin in support of a statement? 
And yet the peoples mentioned [in Spencer's works] present 
widely remote cultural resources, varied environment and dis-
tinctive institutions. ~Ihat is the scientific value of a 
proposition thus arrived at?49 
·Wallis, in pointing out that "reality" is derived from showing 
relationships, notes the following: 
"Should a naturalist who had never studied the elephant 
except by means of the microscope think himself sufficiently 
acquainted with the animal?" (Poincare) As well hope to 
understand the elephant by piecing together the information 
obtained from sections under the microscope as to attempt to 
,understand culture by Eiecing together information about 
isolated individuals.5 
48Lowie, R.H., The History of Ethnological Theory (New York: 
Farrar and Rinehart, Inc.), 1937,--p, 97. 
49De•vey, John, "Interpretation of savage Mind," in VI. I'. Thomas' 
source Book for Social Origins (Boston: The Gorham Press), 1909, 
p. 174.-- --
50 Wallis, w., Culture and Progress (New York: McGraw-Hill Book ' 
Company, Inc.), 1930, p. 21-;:;;-
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For the above reasons, the results obtained from studying human 
culture in an "atomic" fashion were obviously unsatisfactory. · And 
there were other reasons. First of all, an 'uncritical use of material 
--comparative judgment as to the source of the material--was fre-
quently lacking. Secondly, the collection and organization of the 
data was based upon inadequate and unscientific preconceptions such as 
unilinear social evolutionism and "primitive mentality." Thirdly, the 
studies were superficial rather than intensive--much of the data was 
derived from the journals of explorers and travelers who had through 
necessity but casual contact with the natives. Finally, and most im-
portant of all, the studies lacked structural and functional perspec-
tive. 
~afore discussing the Kula, an example of the application of the 
structural approach, let us note briefly some field techniques which 
are, according to Malinowski, foundatio'ns for a structural and func-
tional analysis. "The principles of method can be grouped under three 
51 
main headings": 
(1) "· .. first of all, naturally, the student must possess real 
scientific aims, and know the values and criteria of modern (scien-
tific) ethnography. 1152 For example, to anticipate merely collecting 
isolated facts about marriage is not sufficient scientific aim; science 
demands an interrelational analysis. Furthermore, the student field-
51 Malinowski, B., Argonauts of the Western Pacific (London: 
G. Routledge and Sons, Ltd.), 1922;°~6. ,. 
52Ibid. 
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worker should be provided with relevant instrumental field-technique~. 
The work of the early missionaries--Ellis, Dobrizhoffer, Turner 1 Gill, 
and Livingston--and of the early travelers--Marco Polo, Pinkerton, 
Bougainville, and Cook--is of limited value because they possessed no 
"real scientific aims" or field-tools. As Malinowski says, with some 
qualification, "· .• the scientific field-work is far above even the 
best amateur productions. 1153 
53one interesting exception is the scientific field-anthropology 
of the Swiss missionary Henri A. Junod. Though frequently overlooked, 
Junod's The Life of!!. South .African Tribe is 'one of the best accounts I 
of a marginal group ever published. Written in 1913, Junod's work • 
predicates, and even goes beyond, present field-techniques. First of 
all, he systematically introduces all the informants, "faithful col-
laborators," and discusses their position in the tribe, their limita-
tions (for example, the degree to which they were Christianized), and 
so on. Secondly, he notes that his work has two primary aims: scien-
tific and practical. Although a missionary with typical preconcep-
tions, he is aware of his prejudices and has "enough respect for 
science to avoid mixing the two subjects." Besides scientifically 
stating the techniques by which he collected the data 1 Junod made an 
intensive sociological study. This is clearly brought out in the fol-
lowing quotation: "After having briefly explained in a preliminary 
chapter what is the Tonga tribe, I will consider an individual and 
follow him in his career from birth to death; the story of the evolu-
tion of a man and of a woman will constitute the first part of the 
book. Then I shall pass on to the first social organism formed by 
these individuals and study the life of the family and of the village, 
which is but an enlarged family. The village will make up the clan 
and the tribe. The national life will form my third part, where I 
will deal especially with the Chief, the Court, the Army" (pp. 9-10). 
By making an intensive study of one tribe, and by showing "organ-
istic" (structuralistic) relationships, Junod achieved results pre-
viously unknown. Furthermore, Junod anticipated the role of Adminis-
trative Anthropology in his belief that native studies could bring 
practical help to native commissioners and missionaries. In his own 
words: "Let those who are prejudiced against the black race study 
more carefully its customs, its mind, such as it reveals itself in the 
old rites of the Bantu tribe. They will see that these ·natives are. / 
much more earnest than they thought and that in them beats a true 
human heart" (p. 11). 
/ 
/ 
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(2) "Secondly, he ought to put himself in good conditions of work; 
that is, in the main, to live without other white men, right among the 
54 
natives." This introduces the problem of residence, which will be 
discussed at length below under the heading: The Participatory Ap-
proach. However, we will note here that a thorough structural analy-
sis, as outlined by Malinowski, demands face-to-face relations with 
the group being studied." 
(3) "Finally, he has to apply a number of special methods of col-
lecting, manipulating and fixing his evidence."55 The structural 
method is the result of a number of special operations. 
Malinowski notes three avenues, principally structural, that lead 
to the final goal of grasping "the native•s point of view, his rela- · 
tion to life, to realize his vision of his world." They are: 
(a) The first avenue: "The organization of the tribe, and the 
anatomy of its culture must be recorded in firm, clear outline." To 
do this the method of "concrete, statistical documentation" must be 
56 
used.· A number of steps, however, necessarily precede the actual 
statistical documentation of a culture. In the first place, marginal 
groups have no explicitly formulated (written) code of laws, of 
tribal tradition, or of social structure. They have no specialists--
historians, archivists, sociologists--whose purpose is to document 
54 
Op • .£.!l· ' p. 6. 
551bid. 
561bid., 
' 
p. 24. 
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institutional behavior. Consequently the data must be gathered "from 
the most elusive of all materials; the human being," and from observ-
ing human action. For example, "it would be in vain to put to a native 
such a sweeping question as, ''How do you treat and punish a criminal?" 
But instead the field-anthropologist must hypothetically formulate a. 
specific case, or best of all, wait for a real incident. '11he follol't-
ing paragraph brings out this point: 
A real case ••• will start the natives on a wave of 
discussion, evoke expressions of indignation, show them tak-
ing sides--all of which talk will probably contain a wealth 
of definite views, of moral censures, as well as reveal the 
social mechanism set in motion by the crime conunitted.57 
Then if the recorder has scientific aims of real importance, and 
if he is trained and able to recognize definitive social mechanisms, 
he can push relevant questions. As Malinowski says: 
From there, it will be easy to lead them on to speak of 
other similar cases, to remember other actual occurrences or 
to discuss them in all their implications and aspects. From 
this material, which ought to cover the widest possible 
range ~f facts, the ini'erence is obtained by simple induc-
tion. 5 
.. 
This will provide the field-anthropologist with a "mental chart" 
of cultural relationships. 
With this "mental chart," Malinowski (the field-worker} writes 
57 Malinowski, B., Argonauts of the Western Pacific (London: 
G. Routledge and Sons, Ltd.), 192°2;P:-12. 
5Sibid. 
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down a short preliminary sketch of results. In doing this, ."rifts and 
gaps'' appear in the description. The job is then to collect more rele-
vant data and fill in the gaps. This is a structural process which 
M·alinowski calls "cross-fertilization." Malinowski in this connection 
advocates the use of "synoptic charts" (~., a genealogy table) to 
bring authenticated data into ~heir natural groupings. 
The follo,ring summary by Malinowski briefs the above discussion 
of the first avenue of a structural analysis: 
To summarise the first cardinal point of method, I may 
say each phenomenon ought to be studied through the broadest 
range possible of its concrete manifestations; each studied 
by an exhaustive survey of detailed examples. If possible, 
the results ought to be embodied into some sort of synoptic 
chart, both to be used as an instrument of study, and to be 
presented as an ethnological document. With the help of 
such documents and such study of actualities the clear out-
line of the framework of the natives' culture in the widest 
sense of the word, and the constitution of their society, 
can be presented. This method could be called the method of 
statistic documentation by concrete evidence5.9 ---
(b) The second avenue: "Within this frame, the imponderabilia of 
60 
actual life and the type of behavior have to be filled in." Mali-
nowski's use of the phrase "the imponderabilia of actual life" is 
illustrated by the following quotation: 
Here belong such things as the routine of a man's work-
ing day, the details of his care of the body, of the manner 
of taking food and preparing it; the tone of· conversation 
and social life around the village fires, the existence of 
59Ibid. , p. 17. 
601b1a., p. 24. 
strong friendships or hostilities, and of passing sympathies 
and dislikes between people; the subtle yet unmistakable 
manner in which personal vanities and ambitions are reflected 
in the behavior of the individua6 and in the emotional reac-
tions of those who surround him. 1 
By "type of behavior" Malinowski means the "tone" or degree of 
vitality of an act. The field-worker must find out whether acts of 
tribal life flourish with full vigor or are survivals kept alive for 
tradition's sake. Malinowski further states: 
There is no doubt, from all points of sociological or 
psychological analysis, and in any question of theory, the 
manner and·~ of behaviour observed in the performance of 
~act rs-or the°liighest importance.62 ~ ---
Besides noting the normal and the typical "types of behavior," 
the field-anthropologist must record the deviations. By doing this, 
the field-worker "will be able to indicate the two extremes within 
which the normal moves."63 
52 
(c) The third avenue: "A collection of ethnographic statements, 
characteristic narratives, typical utterances, items of folk-lore and. 
magical formulae has to be given as a corpus inscriptionum, as docu-
~ . 64 
ments of native mentality." 
In the previous avenues of approach, the field-anthropologist 
61 Malino>\"ski, B., Argonauts of the Western Pacific (London: 
G. Routledge and Sons, Ltd.), 19~PP:- 18-19. 
62 Ibid., p. 20. 
63 ~·· p. 21. 
64 Ibid. I p. 24. 
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presented the framework of the social institutions that prescribe and 
guide the behavior of individuals, and the data of daily life which 
make up the individual's adjustment to his total environment. In the 
third avenue of approach, the field-worker records what the natives 
feel and think as members of a conununity. Malinowski calls this the 
"Weltanschauung" of life--the wapirit--the natives' views and opinions 
and utterances." Malinowski in his work is largely preoccupied with 
an interpretation of this "Weltanschauuilg." 
This "spirit" of native life is of course a reflection, for the 
most part, of the social and cultural environment in which they move. 
Consequently, to record the feelings and opinions of natives, the 
field-worker must be thoroughly familiar with native life. Thia de-
mands not only residence with the natives, but a knowledge of their 
lang1,lage. According to Malinowski, the mentality of a people can be 
' 
best recorded by writing exclusively in the language of the people 
being studied. The body of data thus presented is called the corpus 
inscriptionum, or in the case of the Trobrianders. the corpus inscri~­
tionllin Kiriwiniensium. This "corpora" Malinowski believes 
.•• can be utilized, not only by myself, but by all those 
who, through their better penetration and ability of intgr-
preting them, may find points which escape my attention. 5 
In Part Five of Coral Gardens~ Their Magic, Malinowski pre-
sents "The Language of Gardens" or the "Corpus Inscriptionum Agricul-
65Ibid., p. 24. 
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The Kula: The primary purpose of Malinowski's best work, ~ 
Argonauts of~ Western Pacific, was a systematic analysis of the 
54 
Kula "institution." Because the analysis was principally structural, 
it will be apropos to examine the Kula at length here, always keeping 
in mind the methods and techniques outlined above and used by Mali-
nowski in recording this "institution." However, Malinowski's descrip-
tion of the Kula also includes a great deal of functional analysis. 
Consequently, Malinowski's definition of "institution," which includes 
all of the numerous manifestations of the Kula complex, is both struc-
tural and functional. 67 
For purposes of a clear analysis and,to avoid ambiguity, it will 
be necessary to distinguish between that part of the Kula complex 
which is structural and that part which is functional. The term 
"institution" will be used to refer to structurally related culture 
complexes of the Kula. And f.ollowing Ralph Linton, the term "activity" 
.. 68 
will be employed to designate functionally related complexes. 
The essential characteristics of the Kula are noted in the follow-
ing quotation: 
66 
See pp. 77-210. 
67 
The term "institution," as used by Malinowski, specifies a com-
plex of interrelated features or "aspects," viz., social groupings 
(structural), which must come into being to "C"arry out basic needs--
sex, food, and shelter (functional). 
68 6 ~ Linton, R., The Study of Man (D. Appleton-Century Co.), 193 , 
p. 397. 
The Kula is a form of exchange, of extensive, inter-
tribal character; it is carried on by conununities inhabiting 
a wide ring of islands, which form u closed circuit. This 
circuit can be seen on Map V, where it is represented by the 
lines joining a number of islands to the North and East of 
the East end of New Guinea. Along this route, articles of 
· two kinds, and these two kinds only, are constantly travel-
lins in opposite directions. In the direction of the hands 
of the clock, moves constantly one of these kinds--long 
necklaces of red shell, called "soulava." In the opposite 
direction moves the other kind--bracelets of white shell 
called "mwali." Each of these articles, as it travels in 
its own direction of the closed circuit, meets on its way 
articles of the other class, and is constantly being ex-
changed for them. Every movement of the Kula articles, 
every detail of the transactions is fixed and regulated by 
> a set of traditional ~ules and conventions, and some acts of 
the Kula are accomganied by an elaborate magical ritual and 
public ceremonies. 9 
The main act of the Kula, therefore, is the ceremonial exchange 
of the two cultural i tems--the "soulava" and the "mwali. '' The Kula 
might be considered as a form of trade, if' by "trading" we mean any 
exchange of goods. The Kula, however, is not merely a form of eco-
nomic transaction. It is a big and complex institution which has 
relationships to all of the Trobrianders' ways-of-doing, believing, 
and thinking. 
For example, the building of the sea-going canoe, the "masawa," 
which is used in the Kula expeditions, is inextricably a part of the 
~hole institution. When the date of the Kula expedition is fixed, 
and canoes need to be built, the whole of village life is affected. 
The building of the canoes follows two main stages. The first stage 
69 Malinowski, B., Argonauts of the Western Pacific (London: 
G. Routledge and Sons, Ltd.), 1922:°P:--81. 
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is primarily technical. The canoe-builder with a few helpers selects 
and cuts down the tree, hollows out ~he basic dug-out, and prepares 
planks, boards, and poles. This may take from two to six months, and 
is accompanied by only a few magical rites. The second stage, however, 
which lasts only a week or two, is one of intense communal labor, and 
is accompanied by a great deal of community Kula magic. The second 
·stage begins (after the headman has gathered a large number of natives 
from neighboring villages) with a rite in which the ceremonial prow-
boards are inserted into the ends of the canoe. '!his rite is inune-
diately followed by another in which all the men present push the body 
of the canoe into the water and wash away the evil influences. 
After that, in a body the natives lash the canoe together, con-
struct outrigging, make sails, caulk seams, and paint the canoe. The 
w~ole second stage, including the accompanying elaborate ceremonies 
and rites, may take only two or three days, Along with the building 
of the canoe, a number of taboos must be kept: no one should walk 
over a canoe log or stand on it, etc. 
When the canoe is completed, it is publicly displayed with great 
festivity. Following this, there is a ceremonial launching and a 
trial run. And, finally, a communal feast. 
Thus, we see that the ritual exchange of the arm-shells and the 
necklaces, the main act of the ·Kula, is necessarily preceded by the 
building of the ceremonial canoes for the expedition. Furthermore, 
we see that the actual building of the canoes, as well as all other 
Kula behavior, is prescribed by myth, magic, and tradition. And that 
I 
the whole of com.~unity life is affected during the canoe building, 
launch~ng, and feasts. 
57 
The Kula is ·also associated with other daily patterns-of-behavior. 
Sexual taboos must be kept before the sailing of a Kula expedition and 
during its absence. Taboos resulting from mortuary ceremonies are 
placed on Kula goods, darning up the Kula ~aluables, and thus prevent-
ing the normal distribution of the items. 
The actu~l participation in the Kula exchange is done by only a 
few men from every village, but the ramifications of the ceremony 
affect, of course, a.very individual in the conununity. Every man who 
is in the Kula has a lifelong partner from whom he regularly receives 
one of the two ceremonial items, and to whom he gives the opposite in 
exchange. The number of partners a man has will vary with his rank 
und importance--a commoner may have only a few, but a headman will 
have hundreds. Between partners there are a number of mutual duties 
and obligations (traditional sociological'rules) that govern their 
reciprocal relationships. The partner is expected to be friendly, to 
provide food and shelter if necessary for his partner, and to ally 
himself with his partner in times of danger. The Kula ceremony thus 
involves a whole system of individual relationships. 
. Besides the sociological patterns which accompany preparation for 
the Kula, and the ritual pat~erns w~ich govern individual behavior, 
there are a.number of secondary institutions associated with the Kula. 
Along with the ceremonial exchange of the arm-shells and the necklaces, 
the natives carry on regular ~rade by bartering. Malinowski calls 
this "secondary trade." Within the Kula area there is industrial 
specialization, as well as natural resourc~s unique to a particular 
locality. Consequently, during the Kula the natives take the oppor-
tunity to exchange wooden dishes from Bwoytaul for lime pots from 
Yalaka and Kadukwaykela, and in the old days, axe blades from Tila-
taula. And the Dobuans will fish in the Trobriands; the Sinaketane 
70 
will dive for spondylus in Sanaroa Lagoon. 
The Kula is thus "a vast and complex social mechanism." The 
ceremonial act of exchanging the •tsoulava" and the "mwali" is struc-
58 
turally related to canoe-building, mythology, magic, taboos, economic 
activity, and individual patterns of behavior. A field-anthropologist 
could not study any phase of Trobriand culture which was not in some 
way related to the Kula. And the Kula cou~d not be thoroughly under-
stood without making a systematic investigation of the entire Kiri-
winian social structure and relations. Therefore, to describe the 
Kula as Malinowski has done is an extremely difficult task. The field-
anthropologist cannot simply ask the natives what the Kula is. The · 
natives have no picture of the total outline of the Kula; their knowl-
edge is limited to subjective personal experience. As Malinowski says: 
" 
• the integral picture does not exist in his mind; he is in it, 
and cannot see the wh~e from the outside. 1171 But the field-worker by 
developing a skeletal outline of the institution, and by filling it in 
70The description of the Kula ceremony showing its structural 
ties was abstracted from Argonauts, pp •. 81-194, 
71Ibid., p. 83. 
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with the "imponderabilia of actual life" gathered through intimate 
contact, can construct (to use Malinowski's own term) a picture of the 
complex institution. 
Reciprocity: Rising logically from Malinowski's emphasis upon 
structuralism is his treatment of reciprocity. Reciprocity is· broadly 
defined by Malinowski as 
.• a definite system of division of functions and a rigid 
system of mutual obligations, into which a sense of duty and 
the recognition of the need of co-operation enter side by 
side with a realization of self-interest, privileges and 
benefits. 72 
In Crime and Custom.!.!! Savage Society, and in the famous "Fore-
word" to Hogbin's Law and Order~ Polynesia, Malinowski dwells at 
length upon reciprocity. In these two works, reciprocity is presented 
as the basis of social structure. For example, the whole social struc-
ture of Trobriand society is founded upon the principle of "legal 
status." That is, "the claims of chief over commoners, husband over 
wife,· parent over child, and vice versa, are'not exercised arbitrarily 
and one-sidedly, 'but according to definite rules, and arranged into 
well-balance~ chains of reciprocal services. 1173 
') 
The sociological status of an individual in the tribe, whether he 
be the highest hereditary chief or a mere commoner, is dictated by a 
72 Malinowski, B., Crime and Custom in Savage Society (London: 
Kegan Paul, Trench, TrUbner and Co., Ltd:T, 1926, p. 20. 
?)Ibid., p~ 46. / 
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system of reciprocal mutual obligations. For example, to declare war 
or to organize an expedition, the chief "must issue formal summons, 
publicly announce his will, deliberate with the notables, receive the 
~ribute •.• ,"and so on. And there are the reciprocal duties of 
rank and power, the "Noblesse Oblige." Enormous tribute is claimed 
by the chiefs, but in turn the c'hiefs are expected to render the com-
moners great service. 
Marriage is conceived by Malinowski to be a system of mutual 
oblig.ations--~ "synunetrical institution." Reciprocity of' obligations 
and mutuality of give and take is the core of marriage. This is not 
only true for relations between husband and wife, but also between 
spouses and in-laws and spouses and the community. Marriage, further.-
mo~e, cannot be disassociated from the economic obligations of the 
partners. Tribal economic patterns are dependent upon the reciprocal 
services of husband and wife, as well as reciprocal relations between 
commoners and headmen and separate communities. The relationship be- , 
tween- sexual, marriage, and economic services is noted in the follo¥r7 
ing paragraph; 
Nor could we ~deal with the question of sexual reciproc-, 
ities independently from the exchange of economic services, 
from the value which one partner has for the other in con-
ferring tribal status, and from the importance which the 
biological issue of marriage, that is, children, have to 
husband or wife respecti~ely.74 
74 . Malinowski, B., "Foreword" in Hogbin'a Law and Order in Poly-' 
nesia (London: Christopbers), 1934, p. 1. - -- - --
.. 
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Law in marginal societies, according to Malinowski, is based upon 
reciprocal behavior. In his anal·ysis of "primitive" law, Malinowski 
attacks the concept that all native law is negative law, and that all 
native law is criminal law. He points out that: "Law dwells not in a 
special system of decrees which forsee and define possible forms of 
,non-fulfillment and provide appropriate barriers and remedies. Law 
75 (instead) is the specific result of the configuration of obligations." 
Among·the Trobrianders, Malinowski notes a body of "civil law": 
"Civil law," the positive law governing all the phases 
of tribal life, consists then of any body of binding obliga-
tions, regarded as a right by one part and acknowledged as a 
duty by the other, kept in force by a specific mechanism of 
reciproc76Y and publicity inherent in the structure of their 
society. 
J Law is consequently a positive form or denoting patterns of be-
havior; patterns which are consistent with social tradition and which 
demand reciprocal attention. Law should be "social control" and pre-
sent a socially meaningful system of relationships. An interesting 
~ositive attitude towards marriage and divorce laws in western society 
is recorded in the following quotation: 
no penalties against adultery will safeguard the in-
stitution of monogamy as firmly as the positive making of 
marriage into an attractive union. It can be made into an 
attractive union not so much by eugenic devices, still less 
by laws, but rather by giving scope to those ·influences 
which make for the free exercise of erotic passion ~ithin 
750p. 
760 
....E· 
cit., p. 59. 
cit., p. 58 . 
,. 
the union and by casting overboard the useless lumber of 
canonical law with its prejudice against divorce.77 
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Thus, according to Malinowski, the principle of mutuality and the 
systematic dovetailing of reciprocities is the basis of legal validity 
in all human societies. 78 
Reciprocity, as noted by Malinowski, ·is after all a truism. Group 
living necessarily assumes a certain give and take--a certain amount 
of cooperation. A detailed criticism showing the relationship between 
structuralism, reciprocity, and mores nihilism will be presented in 
"Preconceptions." 
~' A final word about structuralism: Malinowski is guilty of con-
sistently confusing functionalism and structuralism. In the Foreword 
to Fortune's Sorcerers !l.I_ Dobu, Malinowski clearly notes the existence 
• 
of a Functional School in structural terms: 
The present book may be regarded by the Functional 
Method as one of its triumphs in the field. Dr. Fortune's 
account presents the two qualities which good functional 
field-work claims as its own. On the one hand it is a pre-
cise sociological analysis of the tribal organization of the 
Dobuans. On the other hand, far from giving us merely the 
scaffolding of social structure, the book brings us right 
in touch with the living individual, it gives us the feeling 
of communal life, it allows us to re-live the fears, the 
passions, the deep traditional beliefs and superstitions of 
the natives.79 · 
77Malinowski, B., "Foreword" in Hogbin's Law· and Order in Poly-
nesia (London: Christophers), 1934, pp. lxvi-lxvii:--
78Ibid. , p. lxx. 
79Fortune, R. F., Sorcerers of Dobu (London: G. Routledge and ,. 
Sons, Ltd.), 1932, "Foreword" by :MalTDOWski, p• xviii. 
A perfect structural statement! And: 
All in all, the Sorcerers of Dobu is a pioneering piece 
of functional work, new in its way---;;r-approach, in its style 
of presentation, and in the construction of its sociological 
framework .•• , The tendency towards organic presentation, 
the broad full sweep over the totality of native culture, 
the placing of details within their proper context--all 
these qualities no one will contest.SO 
6.3 
Again, this is an explicit statement of the structural approach, 
and is clearly different from the functional approach--an analysis of 
which follows. 
The Functional Approach: The functional approach, like the struc-
· tural approach, is basic to all of Malinowski's methodology. The 
·functional approach, as has been noted briefly above, is concerned 
with the interaction between the organism ~nd the environment. Before 
systematically analyzing Malinowski's use of functionalism, let us 
inquire into the relationship of functionalism in anthropology, as 
used by !llalinowski, to the uses of functionalism in other fields of 
inquiry. This is important because, I believe, that the concept of 
functionalism as used by Malinowski was stimulated by fundamental 
developments in psychology and philosophy. support for this analysis 
will not be found in anthropological texts; not because it is untrue, 
but because the orthodox anthropologist is artificially departmental-
ized when it comes to philosophical and psychological questions. In 
other words, although anthropology is in many ways the least provincial 
80
rbid., p. xxiv. 
/ 
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of the sciences because of its generalized nature, it has purposively 
overlooked for the most part methodological developments in psychology 
81 
and philosophy. 
What were the de~elopments in philosophy and psychology which 
stimulated the functional method in anthropology? In the first place, 
I do not beliey~ that Malinowski's functional beliefs stem, as Lewie 
suggests Radcliffe-Brown's do, 82 from Durkheim, but from the American 
school of functional psychology. 
The .American school of functional psychology arose around John 
Dewey, G. H. Mead, A. W. Moore, and James R. Angell at the University 
of Chicago at.the turn of the century. In 1896, John Dewey with a 
paper on "The Reflex Arc Concept" first formulated clearly the poai-
tion of functional psychology. In this momentous article, Dewey 
. 
leveled his guns on (1) the dichotomy of mind and body, (2) elemen-
( ) . 83 tarism or atomism, and 3 the isolation of stimulus from response. · 
81
overlooking the relationship of anthropology to philosophy and 
psychology is a logical action on the part of investigators who be-
lieve they are doing "purely" descriptive work, and who do not.want to 
be bothered by pernicious preconceptions. And it leads, as will be 
shown, to "relativism." I do not mean to imply that all anthropolo-
gists subscribe to this viewpoint, but that it is a part of the gen-
eral anthropological "climate of opinion." Furthermore, it is outside 
the scope of this paper to categorize each and every important anthro-
pologist with respect to this issue. But it is possible to discuss 
the viewpoints of Malinowski, which are symptomatic of a whole school, 
in this relation. 
82 . 
Lewie, R.H., The History of Ethnological Theory (New York: 
Farrar and Rinehart), 1937, p. 2217 
83Boring, E. G. , The History of Experimental Psychology (New 
York: D. Appleton-Century Co.), 1929, pp. 539-541. 
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Dewey insisted that psychology be concerned with "totalities"; that 
"The response is to the sensations, the sensations is for the response; 
neither has meaning alone." In this respect, Boring says: "Dewey was ' 
a Gestalt-Psychologe twenty years too soon." Dewey also demands that 
psychology be concerned with "coordinations"; that is, "an organize-
tion of means with reference of a comprehensive end," or simply--
adaptation. He furthermore adds, following logically, that unity of· 
all lies through the biological function of the act. As Boring says: 
"Functional psychology is the study of the psychophysical organism in 
84 
use." Most important of all, this led to a "practical psychology" 
(out of which pragmatism arose), as the following quotation clearly 
brings out: 
Darwin's theory of survival and of adaptation is the. 
greatest practical theory of living that has ever been pro-
mulgated. A psychology that is biological in the Darwinian 
sense is inev,itably practical. Dewey's later life illus-
trates this point [his pragmatic doctrines and work in edu-
cation]. 85 
This whole thesis has been elaborated in volumes by the later 
pragmatists and behaviorists. Gestalt'psychology, behaviorism, and 
pragmatism all had their inception, in part, in this early school of 
"functional psychology." Although the direct influence of "functional 
psychology" .was perhaps limited, its stepchildren have revolutionized 
cultural investigation. 
84rbid., pp. 540-541. 
~5 Ibid., p. 541. 
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Malinowski makes repeated reference to the leaders of the 
"schools" mentioned above--John Dewey, G. H. Mead, Clark Hull, and 
others--which would substantiate the contention that he was influenced 
by the American school of functional psychology, and later on by the 
behaviorists and the pragmatists. The whole thesis of Sex and Repres-
sion in Savage Society is suggested by Dewey in Human Nature and Con-
duct, from which Malinowski took his frontispiece. In Coral Gardens 
apd Their Magic, reference is made to Dewey's pragmatic treatment of 
language in E:xperience and Nature. Malinowski notes as complementary 
to his treatment of language that of G. H. Mead, who "e~ounds a gen-
86 
eral theory of language from a moderate behaviouristic point of view." 
Mead's whole treatment of language is, incidentally, the most inten-
sive and suggestive of the works in this field, and far exceeds in 
attainment that of Malinmvaki. More will be said of this later. 
The proof of Malinowski's relationship to the above traditions is 
found in his behavioristic and pragmatic methodological attempts. This 
,, 
will be made clearer when we have analyzed in detail Malinowski's 
functional approach, and compared it with that of Dewey's, who predi-
cated by decades Malinowski's work. 
Finally, it would be foolish to say that Malinowski, a genuine 
cosmopolitan, was not familiar with the basic works of the functional 
psychologists in America--especially since one of· Malinowski's funda-
mental interests was psychology. 
86 ' Malinowski, B., Coral Gardens and Their Magic {New York: .Ameri-
can Book Company), 1935, Vol. II, p. 60:"' 
' 
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Throughout all of Malinowski's writings is repeated reference to 
the need of a change in anthropological methodology which will empha-
size the interaction of various aspects of institutions (structuralism), 
and the integration of the organism and its environment (functionalism). 
·In Argonauts of the Western Pacific, we find the following statement: 
The influence on one another of the various aspects of 
an institution, the study of the social and psychological 
mechanisms on which the institution is based, are a type of 
theoretical studies which has been practised up till now in 
a tentative way only, but I venture to foretell will come 
into their own sooner or later.87 
In the Foreword to Hogbin's work, he is even more specific: 
The functional theory of anthropology regards culture 
as an instrumental reality. The most important thing about 
culture is that it allows man to satisfy his primary require-
ments, that is, his need of food, security, protection from 
the weather, from surrounding dangers, as well as his need 
of procreation. Through culture he is able to use his envi-
ronment, to master space, to forestall illness, with an in-88 finitely greater efficiency than he could as a mere animal • 
...., 
·And: 
. The most important thing for the student, in my opinion, 
is never to forget the living, palpitating flesh and blood 
organism of man which remains somewhere at the heart of 
every institution.89 
87 Malinowski, B., Argonauts of the Western Pacific (London: 
G. Routledge and Sons, Ltd.), 1922°;P:--516. 
88Malinowski, B., "Foreword" in Hogbin's Law and Order in Poly-
nesia (London: Christophers), 1934, p. xxxi. 
89Ibid. 
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Malinowski's most explicit statement of the functional approach 
is found as one of the essays in Science~ Man entitled ."The Scien-
tific Approach to the Study of Man. 1190 This article, one of the last 
written by Malinowski, shmvs clearly the influence of behavioristic 
und pragmatic psychology. In· order to present clearly Malinowski's 
funct~onal analysis of culture, we shall examine in detail this arti-
cle. 
Biological determinism, according to Malinowski, appears in every 
culture. That man is first of all an animal is clearly noted in the 
following excerpt: 
As regards the drives, man is obviously an animal; 
hence his organic needs will always give rise to a permanent 
biological determinism in all behavior. Men have to eat, 
sleep, reproduce, and protect their bodies from excessive 
temperature, as well as from physical.destruction. There is 
a minimum of elementary conditions which have to be ful-
filled so that the individual organism survives and the 
group retains its numbers. Even a light but progressive 
J deterioration of the heal thy organic state would inevi ta'bly 
lead to cultural extinction.91 
Every culture has a set of "vital sequences" by which the biolog-
ical determinants are expressed. By "vital sequences" Malinowski 
means that for social continuity: "• •• the central activity or bio-
logical act . . • must be performed regularly and permanently in every 
9oMalinowski' B.' ''The Scientific Approach to the study Of Man, II 
in Science and Man, edited by R. N. Anshen (New York: Harcourt Brace 
and Company.,.-:--1942, pp. 207-242. 
91Ibid., p. 212. 
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culture." The "vital sequences" are of course an integral part of 
every culture and receive tremendous modification, but can always be 
69 
recognized by their essentially biological and physiological character. 
For example, in every culture there is the "vital sequence" of sex; 
first there is the sex drive, then the "act" of conjugation, and fi-
nally satisfaction or detumescence. 93 Other "vital sequences" which 
are a biological reality in every culture are noted in the following 
diagram reproduced from Malinowski's essay: 
92 ~., p. 215. 
93compare this with Dewey's statement in Logic, p. 27: "Hunger, 
for example, is a manifestation of a state of imbalance between 
organic and environmental factors in that integration which is life. 
. • . A state of tension is set up which is an actual state (not mere 
feeling) of organic uneasiness and restlessness •. This state of ten-
sion (which defines need) passes into search for material that will 
restore the condition of balance .••• The matter ingested initiates 
activities throughout the rest of the animal that lead to a restora-
tion of balance, which, as the outcome of the state of previous ten-
sion, is fulfilment." 
, 
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PERMANENT VITAL SEQUENCES U1CORPORATED 
IN ALL CULTtJREs94 
A. Impulse 
drive to breathe 
gasping for air 
hunger 
thirst 
sex appetite 
fatigue 
restlessness 
somnolence 
bladder pressure 
colon pressure 
fright 
pain 
B. Act 
intake of oxygen 
ingestion of food 
absorption of liquid 
conjugation 
rest 
activity 
sleep 
micturition 
defecation 
escape from danger 
avoidance by effec-
tive act 
C. Satisfaction 
elimination of C02 
in tissues 
satiation 
quenching 
detumescence 
restoration of mus-· 
cular and nervous 
energy 
satisfaction of 
fatigue 
awakening with re-
stored energy 
removal of tension 
abdominal relaxation 
relaxation 
return to normal 
state 
·,'Vital sequences" arise from "drives. rt 95 "Drives" are .individual, 
and are defined by Malinowski as follows: 
" 
• • basic needs • • • 
which have to be satisfied so as to keep the organisms of a community 
94 
. ..QE_. cit,, p. 216. 
95The term "drive" ·as used here is not compatible with the term 
"instinct" which was used frequently in Malinowski's earlier works. A 
criticism of the loose manner in which Malinowski used the term "in-
stinct" will be found later in "Preconceptions." However, it will be 
necessary here to briefly differentiate the terms "drive" and ttin-
stinct." Culturalists are at present disinclined to use the term 
"instinct," but have instead developed conative terms like "drive" and 
"wish." That is, the term "instinct" as used orthodoxly by Watson, 
McDougall, and others implied that a particular fundamental impulse 
would arouse a particular act. The term "drive," on the contrary," 
sees these fundamental impulses as raw materials which are subsequently 
fashioned by social forces and conduct. There is consequently a 
change in emphasis from the "biologic" to the "cultural," and Dewey, · _ 
Cooley, Mead, et al., attempt to work out the means by.which the bio-/ 
logic being becomes a socialized "self." 
I 
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96 in a. normal state of healthy metabolism." Although culture in a 
myriad of manners refashions the physiological drives, still the satis- / 
faction of the drive must be adequate. The nonsatisfaction of these 
biological needs "would imply the gradual biological deterioration of 
the group, which, if cumulative, would lead to extinction. 1197 
"Dl'ives" are, however, different from "basic needs" as used by 
·Malinowski, for "basic needs" refer "to the collective exercise of 
individual drives, integrated with reference to the community as a 
98 
whole." Whereas psychologists are primarily interested in the 
mechanisms of personality, that is, the techniques whereby individuals 
satisfy the "drives," the attention in all cultura~ analysis, accord-
i~g to .Malinowski, should~ be on individual "drives" and their 
satisfaction, but on basic community needs. 99 Biological motives 
never occur in pure and isolated individual form, but as a part or a 
cultural matrix. That is, an analysis of an individual's "vital se-
quence, 11 "drive-activity-satisfaction," would be abstracted from 
reality, for in all actual research "we are raced always with cul-
turally organized satisfactions of integral basic needs." In other 
96 Op. cit., p. 216. 
97
rbid., pp. 216-217. 
98 Ibid., p. 217. The "basic needs" include all the individual 
drives in a community which must 'be satisfied to.keep the organisms of 
the community in a healthy state. 
99Malinowski does not note it,.but this is a step from individual 
"subjectivism" or "intui tionism" to cultural "objecti vi em.'' I • 
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words~ the manner in which an individual "acts" as stimulated by 
"drives" is determined by the total environmental setting which in-
eludes such social organizations as the family, clan, tribe, and state 
--the entire cultural configuration. In brief, human action is a 
product of "cultural responses'' to "basic needs." 
The "basic needs" and their "cultural responses" are concretely 
I 
outlined by Malinowski in the following figure: 
100 
BASIC NEEDS AND CULTURAL RESPONS~S 
A. Basic Needs: 1. metabolism; 2. reproduction; J, bodily 
comforts; 4. safety; 5. movement; 6. growth; 7. health. 
·B. Cultural Responses: 1. commissariat; 2. kinship; 
J. shelter; 4. protection; 5. activities; 6. training; 
7, hygiene. 
Culture, Malinowski notes, always "determines the situation, the 
place, and the time for the physiological act."lOl For example, 
bladder pressure is an individual "drive" and must necessarily be fol-
lowed by the act of micturition. This in turn leads to biological 
satisfaction by removing the tension. But the "drive" does not demand 
I 
a particular form of expression; the form of "doing" is a product of 
cultural forces. In the United States, micturition is considered as 
"nasty" or "bad" by virtue of Christian mores which abhor the biologic. 
The attitude towards micturition among many ~arginal•peoples is quite 
100 
.2.E.· ~-' p. 217. 
101 
Ibid. I p. 220. 
different. Among them, micturition is treated emotionlessly as a 
necessary biological act. Or as Malinowski notes: 
Human beings breathe in closed rooms or caves; they 
have to combine breathing (a physiological drive) with rules 
of politeness or taboo, since human breath is, in some cul-
tures, regarded as sacred and in others as dangerous.102 
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This introduces the "instrumental phase of human behavior." That 
~s, the "vital sequence" begins with 11 Drive1 11 which demands satisfac-
l tory physiological ends, and is supported by "Drive2" which represents 
103 the culturally determined means for obtaining satisfaction. Fur-
thermore, ''Drive2 11 determines other cultural ends. "Drive2" is illus-
trated in the following paragraph: 
Drive(l) is the instrumental motive, the impulse to 
'take the round-about way which man follows when he produces 
or purchases his food, prepares it, and places it on his 
table. In this he.acts to a certain extent like the learn-
ing animal in a maze, who has to discover and to use the de-
vices which supply it with food •••• Drive(2) represents 
the culturally determined appetite. Man very often does not 
eat by hunger, hardly ever by hunger alone. He eats at the 
right time, the right place, and in the right company .••• • 
One man's meat is another man's poison; my cannibal friends 
in New Guinea would have developed a healthy appetite if 
confronted with missionary steak, .but run away in disgust 
from my tinned Camembert cheese, sauerkraut, or frankfurters, 
which latter they regarded as gigantic worms.104 · 
Instrumental performance is controlled by the culturally defined 
l02Ibid., p. 218. 
lOJibid., p. 219. 
; 
l04Ibid. 
I 
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situation, and is always an integral part of an organized system of 
105 
activities. For example, the "instrumentalities" of food produc-
tion would include the techniques of fishing, hunting, gathering or 
planting, storing, preparing, and consuming, as well as all the moral 
prescriptions which codify the activities, and also the values which 
the techpiques have. All preparatory activity must include the fol-
lowing four factors: (1) artifacts, (2) normed behavior (mores), 
(3) organized cooperation (social organization), (4) symbolic communi-
106 6ation by means of language or other signs. In this manner, cul-
ture is regarded as a system of means--techniques whereby biological 
needs are satisfied. 
The existence of all culture, according to Malinowski, is depend-
ent upon four systems of organized responses or "instrumental impera-
ti ves11: 107 (1) economics, (2) social control, (3) education, and 
108 (4) political organization. That is, every culture must have imple-
ments of production and consumption, systems of sanctioned behavior, 
105 Ibid., p. 220. 
106 Ibid. 
107 The pragmatic use of the term "instrumental" and my use of the 
term "instru:nental" as previously noted in this thesis differ markedly 
from the way Malinowski uses the term. Malinowski does not distin-
guish between "technologies" (scientific techniques) and "ceremonial 
patterns" (magical sanctions). Magic and religion he considers as 
fundame·ntal instrumentalities, in that they supply spiritual satisfac-
tion. This analysis is a result of "mores relativism," which does not 
recognize a means of evaluation. This will be discussed in great de-
tail below under "Preconceptions." / 
108 
.21?... .£!.!. ' p • 222 • 
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techniques for passing on and renewing knowledge, skills and tribal 
tradition, and authority, endowed with the power of forcefully execut-
ing sanctioned controls. 
For culture to flourish, the instrumental responses must be ade-
quate and working. Confirmation for this is supplied by historical 
evidence: 
A serious break-down in the economic, political, or 
legal order which usually also implies deterioration in the 
· systems of knowledge and ethics, leads human groups to dis-
organization and to the sinking of the cultural level. The 
break-down of many simpler cultures under the impact of 
Western civilization and the extinction of many racial 
groups supply one example. • . • [The] period of the Dark 
Ages is another case in point.109 
Malinowski and most culturalists study "functionalism" on the · 
"instrumental" level. That is, they study· the variety of means which 
have developed through culture.to satisfy the cultural imperatives--
economics, social control, education, and political organization. When 
Malinowski asks the queetion: t•What does a trait do; what is its 
function?" he answers it with the focus of interest being cultural 
integration. In other words, Malinowski is interested in the "status 
quo" function of cultural items. This, as will be shown, is an un-
scientific and static approach. 
Malinowski's analysis of the function of magic is a case in point. 
The function of magic is briefly, according to Malinowski (and cor-
rectly interpreted), th~t of sanctioning and controlling human action . 
. l09Ibid., p. 223. 
I 
I 
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The chief, for example, has the best sorcerers who put to death by 
black magic any who offend him. Control in garden work is maintained 
by the garden-magicians with their magical powers. All of the techni-
cal activity among the Trobrianders is in some way·connected with 
magic. The building of the "masawa," sea-going Kula canoe, is inex-
110 
tricably tied .UP with prescriptive rites. Magic is the great inte-
~ grating force: 
magic puts order and sequence into the various activi-
ties, nnd that it and its associated ceremonial are instru-
mental in securing the co-operation of the community and the 
organization of communal labour. As has been said before, 
it inspires the builders with great confidence in the effi-
ciency of their work, a mental state essential in any enter-
prise of complicated and difficult character. • • • · 
Magic, far from being a useless appendage, or even a 
burden on the work, supplies the psychological influence, 
which keeps people confident about the success of their 111 labour, and provides them with a sort.of natural leader. 
This is interesting and important. But what is the function of 
magic in relation to change? Malinowski does not answer this question. 
He is not concerned with process or dynamic function. 
Thus, though Malinowski insists upon a functional interpretation 
of culture, his'work is characterized by either a structural analysis 
(as pointed out) or a static-functional interpretation. The contra-
diction is evident in the following quotation: 
110 
Supra, pp. 55-56. 
111 
Malinowski, B., Argonauts of the Western Pacific (London: 
G. Routledge and Sons, Ltd.), 1922-:-p-:-Tl~~ / 
I 
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• • . I personally believe that law ought to be defined by 
function and not by form, that is, we ought to see what are 
the arrangements, the sociological realities, the cultural 
mechanisms which act for the enforcement of law. • . • The 
mafn field of primitive jurisprudence lies, therefore, in 
the analysis of every relationship: husband to wife, parent 
to child, chief to subject, clansman to clansman, tribesman 
to tribesman; in the correlation of such relationships over 
a wider scale and in their at times very complicated con-
· stellations of reciprocity and mutuality within an institu-112 
tion; finally in the relation of one institution to another. 
~ 
~ Participatory Approach: The demands of the structural ap-
proach--n skeletal outline of "institutions," filling in the "impon-
derabilia of actuul life," and capturing the "Weltanschauung"; the 
77 
difficulty of relating activities to the fulfillment of primary biolog-
ic1:1l needs in the functional approach; and the problem of "meaning" in 
u pragmatic analysis, all require intensive sociological investigation. 
And intensive field-work113 can be carried.out only when the anthro-
pologist resides with his subjects: "I have several times insisted on 
the'fact that satisfactory field-work can ?nly be done by one who 
1 . i ht t' n 114 ives r g among na ives. 
112 Malinowski, B., 11Foreword" in Hogbin's ~and Order in Poly-
nE:lsia (London: Christophers), 1934, p. ,lxiv. 
ll3By "field-work" Malinowski means: ". • • the study of living 
communities and their material culture, whether at a low level of de-
velopment or within our own civilizations." Furthermore, "Such study 
must be guided by the general theory of culture (functionalism), while 
observation has to be stated in terms of general principle. As in all 
sciences, so also here we shall have to inquire w~ether the final test 
of applicability through planned social en~ineering is possible" 
(Science and Man, pp •. 208-209). 
11~alinowski, B., Coral Gardens and Their Magic (New York: .Amari~ 
can Book Company) , 193 5 , Vol. I , p. 45~ · ,·. 
,/ 
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• Malinowski, like all modern social scientists, bitterly attacks 
the "spectator knowledge" of armchair scholars. For example, armchair 
anthropology gives a rigid and fictitious picture of native life. The 
spectator anthropologists, like Westermarck and Spencer (who are a 
rapidly diminishing breed), fail to reco~d the abuses of the pre-
scribed social patterns and controls. Furthermore, the deviations 
115 from normed behavior actually denote "belief." In Crime and Custom 
.!_!:!.Savage Society, Malinowski notes how a fictitious picture of native 
law is derived by armchair techniques: 
It is not difficult to see also, why [armchair] anthro-
pology fixed upon one side of the question, why it presented 
the rigid but fictitious doctrine of native law as the whole 
truth. For this aoctrine represents the intellectual, overt, 
fully conventionalized aspect of the native attitude, the 
one set into clear statements, into definite legal formulae. 
When the native is asked what he would do in such and such a 
cnse, he answers what he should do; he lays down the pattern 
of best possible conduct. When he acts as informant of a 
field-anthropologist, it costs him nothing to retell the 
Ideal of the Law. His sentiments, his propensities, his 
bias, his self-indulgences as well as tolerance of others' 
lapses, he reserves for his behaviour· in real life. And 
.even then, though he acts thus, he would be unwilling to 
admit often even to himself, that he ever acts below the 
standard of law. The other side, the natural, impulsive 
code of conduct, the evasions, the compromises and non-legal 
usaees are revealed only to the field-workers, who observe 
native life directly, registers facts, lives at such close 
quarters with his "material" as to understand not only their 
language and their statements, but also the hidden motives 
of behaviour, and the hardly ever formulated spontaneous 
line of conduct.116 
115This will be discussed under the "Pragmatic Approach." 
116 See pp. 120-121. 
I 
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J, II. Driberg·has written an amusing tirade against armchair 
anthropologists: 
The arm-chair anthropologist cannot even interpret 
rightly ~he material which he laboriously collates from the 
researches of others. He has no criterion whereby to test 
their veracity [an important statement which will be com-
mented upon later], or in disputed points the clue to visual-
ize the probable conduct of primitive peoples in a given 
situation. He just does not know how an institution works, 
because he has never seen it working. It is like learning 
to fly by a correspondence course, ·and about as dangerous. 
Even the cinema might help him to a fuller realization of 
actuality, but he is rarely to be found there, which is a 
pity. The sooner the species becomes extinct, the better 
for science, and the day is surely not far distant.117 
Thus, in order for the field-anthropologist to scientifically 
79 
describe a cult~re, he must live among the group, speaking their lan-
guage, participating in community activities, identifying himself with 
the group's ideals and values. He must see problems from the natives' 
standpoint. This must be the case if the goal of the field-anthropol-
ogist is to present a relativistic description of native life. And 
this is Malinowski's primary aim. 
There is, however, one point of view deeper yet and 
more important than the love of tasting of the variety of 
human modes of life, and this is the desire to turn such 
knowledge into (Socratic) wisdom. Though it may be given to 
us for a moment to enter into the soul of a savage and 
through his eyes to look at the outer world and feel our-
selves what it must feel to him to be himself--yet our final 
goal is to enrich and deepen our own world's·vision, to un-
derstand our own nature and to make it finer, intellectually 
117 Driberg, J. H., At Home With the Savage (London: George Rout-~ 
ledge and Sons, Ltd.), 1932-:-P:- 2b. -
i 
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and artistically. In grasping the essential outlook of 
others, with the reverence and real understanding, due even 
to savages, we cannot but help widening our own •••• Noth-
ing can teach us a better lesson in this matter of ultimate 
importance than the habit of mind which allows us to treat 
the beliefs and values of another man from his point of view • 
• • • The Science of Man, in its most refined and deepest 
version, should lead us to such knowledge and to tolerance 
and generosity1 based on the understanding of other men's point of vi~w. 18 
The field techniques whereby the anthropologist records every-
thing from fishirig and gardening tools to th~ way natives "feel" 
1 
about erotic li!e has been discussed above under the structural 
approach. 
But a completely relativistic portrayal of a culture is only a 
"goal" for a number of reasons. To be more em~hatic, it is a pseudo:..· 
goal. The mere presence of a field-worker at native activities, his 
participation in native life, changes to some extent the behavior of 
the natives. Herskovits was keenly aware of this problem: "But be-
cause of the distortion that occurs when a stranger invades rites of 
this sort [birth, marriage, or death rites] from motives that, what-. 
ever their scientific nature, can to native eyes only appear as inde-
119 fensible curiosity." 
Moreover, the field-anthropologist can only to a slight degree 
give up his own social-psychological heritage in order to identify 
118 Malinowski, B., Argonauts of the Western Pacific (London: 
G. Routledge and Sons, Ltd.), i922-;-pp:-517-518. 
119 Herskovits, M. J., Dahomey (New Yorkz J. J, Augustin, Pub- ,· 
lisher), 1938, p. vii. 
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himself with a strange group. Theoretical and methodological precon-
captions, as has been brought out time and again, will always color 
the collection and organization of the data. But Richards is one or 
the very few who will admit this: 
The types of observation hitherto made in primitive 
societies have naturally been determined by the theoretical 
views of the investigators. It is impossible to write a 
"purely descriptive account" of any human culture, however 
simple. The facts recorded are themselves the result of 
selection, conscious or unconscious, in accordance with the 
observer's interests or theoretical outlook, even if he re-
frains from putting any special interpretation on these 
facts. The wide field of observation which the anthropolo-
gist claims to cover in his effort to describe tribal life 
makes such selection even more arbitrary.120 
What a refreshing statement! 
The above stand does not imply an "atomistic" position--that all 
description is relative to the peculiar techniques of the observer and 
1\ 
thereby not compar!.ble. For a scientific attitude can be.maintained 
if the field-anthropologist states clearly what his theoretical and· 
methodological tools are and how they have influenced the collectioµ 
and organization of field-data. 
Before proceeding to the account of the Kula, it will 
be well to give a description of the methods used in the 
collecting of the ethnographic material. The results of 
scientific research in any branch of learning ought to be 
presented in a manner absolutely candid and above board. No 
one would dream of making an experimental contribution to 
120 Richards, A. I., "The Development of Field-Work Methods in 
I Social Anthropology," in The Study of Society, edited by F. c. Bart-
lett, et al. (New York: The Macmillan Co.), 1939, p. 274. 
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physical or chemical science, without giving a detailed ac-
count of all the arrangements of the experiments; an exact 
description of the apparatus used; of the manner in which 
the observations were conducted; of their number; of the 
length of time devoted to them; and of the de~ree of approx-
imation with which each measurement was made. 21 
82 
· The data collected by the field-anthropologist can then be inter-
preted with reference to his theories and methodologies, and the skill 
with which he has applied these. 
New approaches are being tried in field-anthropology in order to 
eliminate the personal friction of a strange observer. One such ap-
122 
proach is that recently used by Leo Sinnno~s in presenting~ Chief. 
A Hopi Indian, Don Talayesva, who can read, write, and speak Eng-
• 
lish, is currently1'keeping a diary under Simmons' tutorage. Every 
significant incident in Don's daily life is recorded. The diary is 
furthermore checked for individual interpretation against the cul-
tural si tuation--,the Hopi life-scene--as constructed by the anthro-
pologists. The Indian's life-history is also reconstructed both 
through personal memory and historical data. The historical and field-
data act as a check on the introspective nature of the individual's 
. ' 
description and interpretatio~. Material collected in this manner 
provides a wealth of knowledge about social-psychological behavior. 
Simmons could provide, for example, a "situational analysis" of most 
121 Malinowski, B., Argonauts of the Western Pacific (London: 
G. Routledge and Sons, Ltd.), 1922-,-p--:--2°. 
122 ~ 
Simmons, L. W., sun Chief: The Autobiography of ~Hopi Indian 
(New Haven: The Yale Universi~y Preas}, 1942. 
' 
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~f Don's actions. From the autobiographic sketch could be drawn the 
motivation and ''tone" of each act. The autobiographic approach is 
certainly an excellent manner for investigating personalitY. problems-- ' 
to find out how an individual feels, thinks, behaves; the approach 
will become more valuable as the studies become more numerous. For in 
that way, we will have pictures of both men and women and their varied 
123 
roles in a society. / 
This autobiographic approach is, of course, similar to the case ,, 
studies employed by the psychologists and the sociologists in western 
society, but has the additional difficulty of investigation in an 
alien situation. Similar difficulties in social work are encountered 
when studies are made in "Little Italy," "Russian Town," or in some 
other culture transplanted from the Old World. 
Another method which has been frequently used to eliminate the 
residence problem and evaluation by a stranger is to train natives to 
gather the material. Considerable intercultural friction is in this 
manner avoided. But even native investigators encounter trouble, for 
when the informants become friendly with the white man they often lose 
status in their own society, thus making it impossible to obtain many 
sources of knowledge. Furthermore, a completely relativistic study is 
still impossible, the data collected being evaluated on the basis of 
the theories and methods used by the informant. ·Franz Boas and Truman 
123some other important marginal autobiographies are: Underhill's 
~Autobiography of!:_ Papago Woman; Radin's Crashing Thunder; Michel.:: 
son's~ Autobiography of ~~Indian; Parsons' A Pueblo Indian 
Journal; Opler's Dirty Boy; et al. 
/ 
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Michelson used trained native investigators with considerable success 
in collecting texts. 
Malinowski is certainly correct in insisting that anthropologists 
... 
carry on laboratory workj that is, work in residence with marginal 
• 
peoples. However, he has created a pseudo-problem in demanding com-
plete relativity--a position which conflicts with his basic scientific 
suppositions. 
The relativistic position which demands that the field-anthropolo-
gist interpret a marginal culture through the eyes of the natives is 
inconsistent with a scientific philosophy. Science is a technique for 
evaluating data;· a technique for making choices. When the field-
worker lives with a marginal group, he collects and organized the data 
according to his methods and theories, and not with a "pure" mind. The 
"empirical" observer is a mythological character. The evaluations are 
there whether he admits them or not; the important thing is that he be 
forced to admit them. 
·At present, the emphasis in anthropology is on removing from 
field-investigation all theories and methods which will in any way 
hinder a relativistic description of culture. Many believe that pro-
longed residence will give the necessary relativistic objectivity. 
These "negativists" have created a goal which does not exist in the 
existential world. Fact and theory are one. Untll anthropology as-
sumes a positive attitude, that of improving implicit preconceptions, 
the efforts of many will be so much "busy-work." 
The Pragmatic Approach: Throughout all of Malinowski's writings 
I 
I 
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and particularly in his later work is a nascent pragmatic philosophy. 
For example, his insiste~ce upon the participatory approach was formu-
lated in the belief that only by observing the actions of individuals 
in daily activity could one really understand their thinking. The 
primary objective of the functional approach was a portrayal, not of 
rigidly codified custom, but of actual behavior: "· •• the manner in 
which a custom is carried out." 
In 1922, in Argonauts.£!_~ Western Pacific we find the follow-
ing pragmatic statement: 
There is no doubt, from all points of sociological or 
psychological analysis, and in any question of theory, the 
manner and type of behavior observed in the performance of 
the act is of the highest importance, .•• If in making-S 
daily round of the village, certain small incidents, charac-
teristic forms of taking food, of conversing, of doing work 
are found occurring over and over again, they should be 
noted down at once.124 
In 1926, in Crime and Custom in Savage Society: 
The only correct proceeding is to describe the legal 
state of affairs in terms of concrete fact. 'Illus, the owner-
ship of a Trobriand fishing canoe is defined by the manner 
in which the object is made, used and regarded bl the group 
of men who produced it and enjoy its possession. 25 
In 1929, in The Sexual~ Ef. Savages: 
As we proceed now to the study of more intimate behav-
iour, the elasticity of the rule becomes greater, and it 
grows more imperative to give a dynamic description of how 
124 See p. 20. 
125 See p. 19. 
I 
I 
a rule or an institution works, rather than how, in nat1v~6 theory, law and morality is supposed or desired to work. 1 
86 
Thus, Malinowski in his study of culture obtained the meaning of 
a cultural item with relationship to its function-~ in the society. 
This is more evidence to support the viewpoint that all anthropology 
is evaluative! 
A Pragmatic Theory 2£. Language: The manner in which Malinowski · 
carried on a pragmatic analysis can be best illustrated by examining / 
his theory of .language--a theory which incidentally lends great sup- / 
port to the pragmatic theory of language as outlined by G. H. Mead, 
John Dewey, and others. 
Part Four of Coral Gardens and Their Magic entitled "An Ethno-
graphic Theory o'f Language and Some. Practical Corollaries" and "The 
• 
Problem of Meaning in Primitive Languages" found as Supplement I in 
Ogden and Richards' The Meaning of Meaning are of great interest to 
this thesis as they show an attempt by Malinowski to remove the lan-
guage difficulties, both practical and theoretical, encountered in 
127 
anthropological investigation. Here, ·as elsewhere, is evident 
' awareness on the part of Malinowski of the need ror improvement of 
theoretical instrwrientalities in the collection of ethnographic data. 
In complete agreement with Boas• creed that "a command of the 
language is an indispen·sable means of obtaining accurate and thorough 
126 See pp. 281-282'. 
127 Mali now ski , B. , 
American Book Company), 
Coral Gardens and Their Magic (New York: The 
1935, Vol. II, pp. 3-74• 
• 
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knowledge, because much information can be gained by listening to con-
versations of the natives and by.taking part in their daily life, 
which, to the observer who has no command of the language, will remain 
. 128 
entirely inaccessible," · Malinowski believes that in order for the 
field-anthropologist to present the natives• meaning and use of words, 
which is essential in all thorough comparative field-anthropology, the 
field-worker must know the natives• language. The importance that 
Malinowski places on knowing the natives• language is evident in the 
following quotation: 
\ 
• 
For language is the ethnographer•s most important tool. 
It is through his knowledge of the vernacular and through 
his practical handling of native grammar and vocabulary that 
the ethnographer can ask clear questions and receive rele-
vant answers.129 
By knowing the natives• language, Malinowski has attempted to 
give, not what he thinks a term, for example, "valu" (village) means 
in English or finding in· English a word with a similar meaning, but an 
interpretation of the word "valu".by the cultural context with mean~ng 
derived from the field-analysis. By deriving the meaning from the 
\ 
cultural matrix, Malinowski means that "every language has words which 
are not translatable, because they fit into its culture and into that 
only; into.the physicai setting, the institutions, the material 
128 Boas·, F., Handbook of American Indian Languages, BAE, Bulletin 
40, Part I, 1911, p. 60. ~ 
129 . .~ Malinowski, B., Coral Gardens and Their Magic. (Nelv York: " 
American Book Company), 1935, Vol. II,""}i:'" 4, 
' , / 
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. 130 
apparatus and the manners and values of a people." It is only 
through knowing the way-of-life, the world of ideas of a people thor-
oughly, l•.!!.•, through intensive field investigation, that a valid 
analysis of the. meaning of a word can be given. Mere equation of 
terms done "by affixing an English label" is not a valid procedure. 
But by understanding the culture from which the word' was derived, '·and 
through circumlocution baaed upon the knowledge of the natives• use of 
the word, granunatical distinctions, and contextual annotations, ap~ 
I 
• proximate terms can be found. 
Because the classical philologist cannot give a "full description 
of language as an aspect and ingredient of culture" especially in his-
torical studies, Malinowski ·emphatically states that the traditional 
methodology used by the Indo-European·grammarians is practically worth-
less to anthropology. Too many of the orthodox philologists were over-
whelmed by the ethical aspect of language; "how you ought to speak, 
what you ought to avoid, and what ought to be your ideal." This idea 
is brought out by Jespersen in discussing the ceremonial rigidity of. 
Latin and its influence upon studies of language in the Middle Ages 
and later. 
Latin was not even taught and learnt solely with the 
purpose of opening the doors to the old classical or to the 
more recent religious literature in that language, but 
chiefly, and in the first instance, because'Latin was a 
practical and highly important means of collillIUnication be-
tween educated people. One had to learn not only to read 
130 . 
~·. p. 12. 
' 
I 
I 
Latin, but also to write Latin, if one wanted to maintain no 
matter how humble a position in the republic of. learning or 
in the hierarchy of the Church. Consequently grammar was 
not (even primarily)· the science ot' hmv words were inflected 
and how forms were used by the old Romans; but chiefly and 
essentially the art of inflecting words and _of using the 
forms yourself, if you wanted to write correct Latin. This 
you must say, and these faults you must avoid--such were the 
lessons imparted in the schools. Grammar was not a set of 
--~ facts observed ~ of rules to be observed, ~ of paradigms, 
i.e., of pa~erns, to be followed .••• In other ~rds, 
gr0.inmax=-was prescriptive rather than descriptive.13 
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Besides objecting to the normative way of viewing language, Mali-
nowski attacks the historical romanticism concerning the formation of, 
for example, "Romance languages out of Latin" and the "firm belief 
that a language becomes really beautiful and instructive--ethically, 
logically and aestbetically valuable--when it is dead." 
Three reasons are given why the classical Indo-European philolo-
gists• over-all methodology is fruitless for the anthropologist; al-
though Malinowski realizes the debt anthropology owes classical 
scholars like Rask, Grimm, and Bopp. The task of the anthropologist 
is neither normative, reconstructive, nor historical. (Here is a 
methodological error which Malinowski notes in later works, and it 
'132 
will be discussed in that connection.) Malinowski's anti-histori-
cal attitude towards linguistic studies is clearly shown in the follow-
ing quotation: 
131 Jespersen, J. o. H., Language (New York: Henry Holt and Com-
pany), 1922, p. 24. 
132 Below, pp. 117-118. 
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It will be quite clear now that the point of view of 
the Philologist, who deals only with remnants of dead lan-
guages, must differ from that of the Ethnographer, who, de-
prived of the ossified, fixed data of inscriptions, has to 
rely on the living reality of spoken languages in flux. The 
former has to reconstruct the general situation--i.e., the 
culture of a past people--from the extant statements; the 
. latter can study directly the conditions and si tuat.ions 
characteristic of a culture and interpret the statements 
through them. Now I claim that the Ethnographer•s perspec-. 
tive is the one relevant and real for the formation of fun-
damental linguistic conceptions and for the study of the 
life of languages, whereas the Philologist's point of view 
is fictitious and irrelevant. , , • To define Meaning, to 
explain the essential grammatical and lexical characters of 
language on the material furnished by the study of dead lan-
guages, is nothing short of preposterous in the l'ight of our 
argument.133 
Malinowski sees language as a product of reality, of action and 
~ 
activity, .as we shall see later, and consequently believe·s that lan-
90 
guage is intelligible only when it is placed within the "context of 
situation"; .!.·2.·, the total cultural scene. Hence historical studies 
of dead languages, made by the utilization.of written documents, are·.· 
valueless for thef are "torn out of any context <;>f situation," and "a 
word.without linguistic context is a mere figment and stands for noth-
134 ing by itself." 
An interesting theoretical consideration is introduced when Mali-
nowski brings out that it is sometimes necessary in ethnographic de-
scription to go beyond the verbal and conceptual outfit of the native; 
133 Ogden and Richards, ~ Meaning of Meaning (New York: Harcourt 
Brace and Company), 1923, with Supplementary Essay by Malinowski en-
titled "The Problem ·of Meaning in Primitive Languages," pp. 467-468. , 
. ' 134Ibid., pp. 465-467. 
I 
I 
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to employ terms that do not have their native counterpart. In doing 
this the term is not given an English meaning, but is defined in rela-
tionship to native phenomenon. As he brings out in the following 
paragraph: 
In speaking about "agriculture" and "gardening," about 
"labour" or the "organisation of garden work," about "leader-
ship" .and "economic dependence," I was using abstract scien-
tific terms which have no counterpart whatever in native 
speech, and yet have their meaning defined by facts belong-
ing to Trobriand culture. The ethnographer has constantly 
to go beyond the.native outlook and introduce certain cate-
gories which are not native. At the same time, in building 
up his concepts the ethnographer must never go beyond native 
facts.135 
In the Trobriand language, for example, Malinowski notes "gaps 
in abstract con~epts and gluts in concrete words," A "prominent char-
acteristic of the Trobriand language is the paucity of terms which 
stand for ge~eral concepts and.the multiplicity of words which de-
136 
scribe particular subdivisions." This is easily understood with 
reference to the different "cultural threshold" of the Trobrianders, 
and ncit to a "poverty of language" caused by a "pre-logical mentality'," 
Malinowski believes that terminology is, determined by the actual needs 
of the natives in their life activities, and if you do not find, for 
example, a general term for "people who do not garden," it is because 
to the Trobrianders all people garden. 
can 
135 . Malinowski, B., Coral Gardens and Their Magic (New York: Ameri-
Book Company), 1935, Vol, II, p. 19:"'"" 
136 Ibid., p. 66. 
I 
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In the collection of linguistic data, as well as with general 
field data, a number of pitfalls must be avoided. In order to de-
scribe a living-and-acting community realistically, the field-antbro-
pologist must carefully distinguish between traditional or volunteered 
statements in answer to direct questions. 137 Also, homonyms, or words 
with a multiplicity of meanings, must be carefully differentiated. 
For example, carelessness in the lumping of the meanings of the word 
"mana" (magical force) has caused a great deal of theoretical confu-
sion in anthropological literature. In this connection, Malinowski I 
• • denotes a possible generalization of linguistic behavior;!·!.•• "the 
I 
more important_the term (in the society), the more pronounced is the 
tendency to uee it over a wide range of meanings." The word will 
function with all sorts of subsidiary meanings because of its impor-
. 138 
tant pragmatic or practical role in the society. . 
But probably the most important point noted is that language does 
not simply mirror reality. The "one word--one idea--one piece of 
reality" methodology employed by some anthropologists in kinship 
studies is extremely superficial and dangerous. In doing this one may 
group together two people denoted by the same term and miss important 
"behavior patterns," recognized by the natl ves, which clear.ly_ distin-
guish the two. As Malinowski explicitly states, "a purely formal ter-
139 
minological approach to any aspect of human culture must be futile." 
l37Ibid,, p. 5, 
l38Ibid., p. 68. 
l39Ibid., pp. 65 and vii-viii. 
/ 
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An analysis of Malinowski's treatment of language shows relation-
ship to at least two "schools" of theory: the so-called "FUnctional" 
school of which he was the leading proponent, and the so-called "Prag-
matic" school in phil~sophy of James-Peirce-Mead-Dewey, Here the term 
"school" i.s used figuratively. · . ' 
Relationship to the "Functionalists" is apparent '1n everything 
Malinowski has written, and the varied theoretical foundations of 
"functionalism:" have obviously influenced his treatment of language. 
The concept th~t every element in a culture is structurally related to / 
the total cultural context, and that the "meaning" of the element is 
• 
derived from its function-role in the culture context, is used by 
Malinowski to treat language, as well as social organization, eco-
nomics, and the arts and crafts.. The task of the ethno-linguist is 
"to give a full description of language as an aspect and ingredient of 
140 
culture." The following quotation, including incidentally an un-
necessary dig at Boas, is characteristic of Malino1vski 1 s position: 
Language therefore must be linked up with all the other 
aspects of hUl!tan culture. ~anguage is not something which 
can be studied independently of cultural reality. To divide 
anthropology, as one of the leaders of our science-has done 
recently, into three disciplines, one of which is concerned 
with the human frame, the other with culture, and the third 
with language--shows that the relation between language and 
culture has not been sufficiently appreciated by modern 
anthropology in genera1.141 
140 ~., pp. Viii-ix. 
141 Ibid., pp. Vii-viii. 
,. 
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Far more interesting and significant theoretically than the rela-
tionship of language to "Functionalism" is Malinowski's "pragmatic" 
treatment of la~@age, The term ·~pragmatic" as used here by Malinow-
ski means "that words in their primary and essential sense ~. ~. 
produce and achieve." To my knowledge Malinowski's first thorough 
"pragmatic•! treatment of language is found in the supplement of ~ 
Meaning of Meanill§• Here Malinowski stated egotistically that he had 
arrived at the concept of language "as a mode of action" through sepa-
• rate field inquiry, realizing independently as did "Messrs; Ogden and / 
Richards, Dr. Head, Dr. Gardiner" the basic psychological considera-
tions of language and treating it as an "indispensable element of· con-
certed human action,,;.42 Despite Malinowski's boast, we suspect that 
he was already under the influence of the pragmatic and functional 
schools at the time that he wrote the Supplement, A more systematic 
treatment of this same thesis is found, of course, in Part Four of 
Coral Gardena. 
Malinowski, first of all, considers lan@age as an active~.£! 
human behavior rather than as a reflective or cognitive mode. Words, 
for example, should be studied for their dynamic rather than· for the,ir 
intellectual functions. Language is a· tool, and like all tools when 
in use, involves action. Language is primarily an instrument of 
action. 
However, language has been conventionally portrayed as a process 
142 
.QR_. ~·' p. 455. 
/ 
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running parallel to and exactly corresponding with the mental process. 
This relation between verbal statements and mental attitudes,.!.·~·· 
between words and ideas, has been, in fact, the prima~y consideration 
of the orthodox philologists. Malinowski brings out this idea in the 
following ~aragraph: 
Language is usually, though ..• incorrectly, regarded 
as "The expression of thought by means of Speech Sounds."· 
The obvious idea, therefore,' is that linguistic structure is 
the result of rules of human thought, that "every grammati-
cal category is--or ought to be--the expression of some log-
ical category."143 
The orthodox philologist when discussing the relationship between 
language and thought is of the "empirical" opinion that thought, the 
"Mind," existed prior tol communication. The implication is that lan-
guage is merely a symbol:l.P technique by means of which thought is com-
municated. The psychological presuppositions of this position are no 
longer tenable. Malinowski, in agreement with modern experimental 
psychology, states that "language is little·influenced by thought, but 
thought, on the contrary, having to borrow from action·~ tool--that 
' ' 144 is, language--[and] is largely influenced thereby." Malinowski 
conceives language as a necessary prerequisite to thought, The "Mind" 
does not exist as an entity before the development of communication. 
Because of his pragmatic analysis, Malinowski recognized the formative 
role of language when other linguists did not. 
143Ibid., p. 495. 
144Ibid., p. 498. 
In 'his survey of 
' / 
' / 
Trobriand gardening, Malinowski clearly brings out the "pragmatic" 
nature of language: 
These people have to· determine the area to be put under 
cultivation, to fix the boundary in short to make everything 
ready for the cutting of the boundary belt. The older men, 
with experience and a good knowledge of the ground, identify 
the fields, place the boundaries by means of landmarks and 
trace the lines of stone. All this is done by means of a 
combination of speech and bodily activity. Movements, words 
and gestures are used to solve this practical problem. The 
natives search for objects such as trees, coral outcrops, or 
stone heaps, discuss their proper names, point out, disagree. 
Finally they come to a decision which is the outcome of 
verbal discourse, of going about, pointing and using imple-
ments; for, as they come to an agreement, they leave signs, 
blaze marks on trees, and cut down saplings .••• Speech is 
here equivalent to gesture and to motion. It does not func-
tion as an expression of thought or communication of ideas 
but as a part of concerted activity. If ·We jotted down the 
words spoken there and treated them as a text divorced from 
its context of action and situation, the words would ob-
viously remain meaningless and futile. ·In order to recon-
struct the meaning of sounds it is necessary. to describe the 
bodily behaviour of the men, to know the purpose of their · 
concerted action, as well as their sociology. Speech here 145 is primarily used for the achievement of a practical result. 
~ 
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A "pragmatic" understanding of the character of language is valid, 
. . 
according to Malinowski, not only for analyzing the more mundane ac-
tivities of everyday life, but in understanding too, for example, a 
typical Trobriand magical formula. For to the native, the formula is 
not.merely a bit of traditional folklore, but a verbal act whereby 
powerful forces will be loosened--forces which will control and modify 
r 
the activities of the group. It is a momentous and sacred act, as 
145 Malinowski, B., Coral Gardens and Their Magic (New York: The' 
American Book Company), 1935, Vol. II, pp. 7-S. · 
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surely a part of real action or activity as gardening or paddling a 
., 
146 
canoe. The "meaning" of the formula cannot be cterived from the 
mere verbal prescriptions, but only fr9m the active "behavior pat-
terns" that the formula stimulates; thus the necessity of studying the 
"context of the action." Moreover, to fully interpret the "meaning" 
of the interrelated elements, the field-anthropologist must study the 
. 147 
"context of the situation," as noted above. 
The analysis of the "magical word" is one of Malinowski's most 
thorough contributions, and further illustrates the so-called "prag-
matic" character of magical utterances. It also defines the relation-
ship between magic and language (words}. For example, "when the magi-
cian mumbles over some herbs in his hut--is it just an empty monologue?" 
·148 For it is neither a piece of conversation, a prayer, nor a statement. 
What then is the "pragmatic" function of "magical words"? 
Here again we can only determine the "meaning" of words and their 
"pragmatic" function by reference to the "context of the situa:tion" 
and the "context ~f dction." The Trobrianders, as we see by the fol:-
• 
lowing quotation, firmly believe that words have power over things: 
' 
In studying the infantile formation of meaning and the 
savage of illiterate meaning, we found this very magical 
attitude towards words. The word gives power, allows one to 
146 Ibid., pp. 9-10, 
147 Above, p. 90. 
.-
/ 148Malinowski, B. , 
American Book Company}, 
Coral Gardens and Their Magic (New York: The 
1935,, Vol. II,P, 214. 
/ 
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exercise an influence over an object or an action. The 
meaning of a word arises out of :f8Jlliliarity, out of ability ~ 
to use, out of the faculty of direct clamouring as with the 
infant, or practically directing as with primitive man. A 
word is used always in direct active conjunction with the 
reality it means. The word acts on the thing and the thing 
releases the word in the human mind. This indeed is nothing 
more or less than the essence of the theory which underlies 
the use of ver.bal magic. And this theory we find based on 149 
real psychological experiences in primitive forms of speech. 
98 
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The Trobriander, and other marginal groups, believe that words 
150 
stimulate action. . Utterance of, the word "spider" in a magical 
formula will sympathetically induce a web-like development of particu- ·.; 
' lar vines. Listing of ancestral spirits produces effects on fertility, 
In Trobriand gardening, an accredited magician by means of magical 
spells produces (it is believed) generation in plants. The natives 
attrib~te scientific efficacy to magical utterances; this constitutes 
a pseudo-science. (It is interesting to note that Malinowski also 
makes this mistake when discussing garden-magic.) Although a magical 
belief, this belief h4s powerful social and cultural force. The 
.. 
'l490gden and Richards, The Meaning of Meaning, with Essay by 
Malinowski, p. 490. - -
150 It is a universal phenomenon for people to identify the symbol 
with the referent; that is, to identify the thing to which the symbol 
or sign refers. Small children (and marginal peoples) identify the 
s~gn as being an intrinsic part of the referent. Thus, for example, 
the child believes that through vocalization he can control the envi-
ronment. It isn't until much later that the child realizes that mere 
symbols will not control the environment (Piaget).. Because man be-
lieves that symbols must have a referent, he is under the compulsion 
to create "supra-empirical" referents; that is, if he cannot find 
referents in the existential world. Through this identification 
process, it is believed that words control the environment--tbus mar-
ginal man chants and we pray. Thia is a naturalistic· explanation of'' 
magic (George Gentry--lecture notes). · 
, 
, 
, 
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function then of these utterances is to produce "effective change." 
Here language, or words in action, have a "mystical power which tran-' 
scends the mere utilitarian convenience of such words in communication 
151 from man to man." 
Malino1vski further brings out that law in our society is not mere 
instrumental control (in the Deweyian sense), but control based upon 
sacred incantations and sacraments; upon mystical and religious ideals 
of the community and state. To mouth a law is to state a belief in 
the absolute sanctity of its control, or of the action (the results) / 
it stimulates. A greater part of modern legal terminology is sympa-
152 thetic magic. With little overt recognition, Malinowski illus-
trates the basic dichotomy that is intrinsic in modern western legal 
systems. On one side is a mass of technological or instrumental con-
trols {laws) sponsored by the level of technological achievement--the 
"needs" of the community {for example, chil.d labor laws), and on the 
I 
other side is the masj of magical prescriptions that permit or inhibit 
the adjustment of the social and instrumental forces ("property laws" 
are an obvious example),l53 
\ 
Furthermore, Malinowski recognized, as did Ogden and Richards, 
the instrumental-magical dichotomy in language. "The various struc-
tural peculiarities of a modern, civilized language carry • • , an 
151 
~· Cit. , p. 214. 
152 . Ibid., pp. 234-235. 
, / 
153 / A definition of instrumental will be found above, p. 22. 
I 
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enormous dead-weight of archaic use, of magical superstition and of 
mystical vagueness."154 'Then there is that part of linguistic struc-
ture which is a product of man's practical "needs," or which are basic 
to linguistic structure and function (grammar, vocabulary, sound)--a 
product of man's adjustment to hie total environment through the use 
of tools. For example, the words with meanings developed in the lab-
oratory during experimental operations or during reflective thinking 
are instrwnental rather than magical. So are many of the terms em-
ployed by the primitive in gardening, in making baskets, or in fishing. 
But in his analysis of the function of "magical words" and magic, 
Malinowski completely overlooks the dichotomy which he so vividly il-
lustrates in his field sketches. The essence of the error is that he 
believes (and defends) magic and magical words are a basic instrumen-
tality. Malinowski states that "the sacredness of words and their 
socially sanctioned inviolability are absolutely necessary to the ex-
istence of social orier," and that "if promises and contracts were not 
regarded as something more than flatus vocis, social order would cease 
155 to exist in a complex civilization as well as in a primitive tribe." 
With relationship to the function of 'magic, Malinowski states its so-
called "instrumental'' character explicitly: 
The garden magician, according.to native ideas, thus 
controls both the work of man and the forces of Nature. He 
l54ogden and Richards, 
by Malinowski, pp. 497-498. 
l55.QE_. cit., p. 234, 
~Meaning!?!.. Meaning, 1923, with Essay 
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also acts directly as supervisor of gardening, sees to it 
that people do not skimp their work, or lag behind with it. , 
Thus magic is a systematizing, regUlating, and controlling 
influence in garden work. The magician in carrying out the 
rites, sets the pace, compels people to apply themselves to 
certain tasks, and to accomplish them properly and in time. 
Incidentally magic also imposes on the tribe a good deal of 
extra work, of apparently unnecessary, hampering taboos and 
regulations ••• , In the 19ng run, however, there is rto 
doubt that by its influence in ordering, systematizing and 
regUlating6work, magic is economically invaluable for the natives.15 
The basic error in Malinowski's analysis of magic and magical 
words is that he attributes conflicting function-roles to· the same / 
phenomenon. As we have already noted above, Malinowski believes in 
the "instrumental" efficacy of magic and magical words. On the other 
hand, Malinowski repeatedly refers to the ceremonial nature of magic 
and magical words; that is, the function of magic and magical words is 
one of "power control" and mysticism. Power control can be defined 
here as the assertion of Absolute Authority over the actions of an 
individual and/or ~ndividuals by means of moral or physical coercion. 
In the case of magic among the Trobrianders, it is moral Authoritarian-
ism or dogma, in that control is based upon the sanctity of tradition 
I 
and custom accompanied by th~ fear of physical coercion through inter-
vention of deistic po?rers. The inertia of ceremonial patterns is 
vividly illustrated in the following paragraph: 
In the Trobriands, the general injunction for always 
building canoes under the guidance of magic is obeyed with-
15~alinowski, B., Argonauts of the western Pacific 
G. Routledge and Sons, Ltd.), 1922-;-pp:-59-60. 
(New York: /. ~ 
I 
out the slightest deviation, for the tradition here weighs 
very heavily. Up to the present, not one single "masawa" 
canoe has been constructed without magic, indeed without the 
full observance of all the rites and ceremonial. The forces 
that kept the natives to their traditional course of behav-
iour are; in the first place, the specific social inertia 
which obtains in all human societies and is the basis of ell 
conservative tendencies, end then the strong conviction that 
if the traditional course were not taken, evil results would 
ensue. In the case of oanoes, the Trobrianders would be so 
firmly persuaded that a canoe built without magic would be 
unseaworthy. slow in sailing, and unlucky in the Kula, that 
no one would dream of omitting the magic.rites.157 
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Why does Malinowski make such an obviously discrepant analysis? 
In the first place, Malinowski notes the function-role of magical 
words in a relativistic and static perspective. That is, if the end 
in view is maintaining status-quo social control·, then magical words 
are "absolutely necessary." But if a dynamic and scientific attitude 
is taken towards magical words, then they ·can only be evaluated as in-
hibitive to social (instrumental) change. That.Malinowski himself 
does not realize tre static nature of his.interpretation only adds to 
4 
the confusion. Furthermore, this analysis is structural rather than 
functional, because Malinowski interprets structurally related cul-
tural elements (cultural complexes) as having a single function, viz., 
garden magic, when in reality these traits have differing functions. 
For example, the garden magician is both a technologist and a 
magician. In his supervision of gardening activity he would not rely 
upon magic for the choice of the garden plot, but upon scientific 
knowledge of soil condition, drainage, etc. His magical function is 
l57Ibid., p. 115. 
/ 
lOJ 
exerted when he chants ancestral names to produce fertility. The 
garden magician believes that magical words have power over the action 
and behavior of things, so from his point of view, or from a relati-
vistic position, these magical words are "pragmatic"; that is, they 
"do" and "achieve." Frpm a native•s standpoint, and apparently Mali-
· nowski's, the incantations are effective agents of change, But the 
efficacy, the "achievements" of these magical words cannot be scien-
tifically demonstrated. And until it can be experimentally shown that 
magical words or incantations produce real material change or that it I 
actually gives the natives effective control over nature, then.we can 
only agree with the premise that magic and magical words are power 
controls. Contrast these ceremonial words with words that we know are 
really effective tools--words that are truly pragmatic. For example, 
the word "takaywa" means "to ·clear the scrub"i the meaning of this 
word is derived frpm the actions of clearing the garden plots, and 
~ 
consequently is an "instrumental" term having results which can be 
demonstrably recognized, '1Takaywa" has pragmatic consequences, where-
as incantations do not. 158 
The important point to recognize here is that the garden magician 
performs two very different functi·on-roles.; that of a scientist and 
that of a magician. While Malinowski describes clearly the two dif-
ferent functions of the garden magician, in the end he combines both 
functions under the single function of garden magic. Magic, however, 
158The quotation on pp. 95-96 above illustrates the· instrumental' 
nature of words. 
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as Malinowski recognizes, ha·s but one basic function and that is of 
sanctioning, permitting or inhibiting, social change, Magic and magi-
cal words sanction by means of poY1er control--moral or physical coer-
cion. Magic does sanction the gardening activities, but this is·not 
instrumental! That is, its control is not based upon .scientific and 
experimental knowledge of what is the most effective use of labor, 
soil, and plants, but rather upon the authority of custom and tradi-
tion. Magic sanctions human behavior in a ceremonial manner and not, 
as Malinowski says, in an instrumental manner. Magic (sanctioning) is I 
never instrumental! It cannot be demonstrated that magic is instru-
mentally or scientifically valuable. Thus, it cannot contribute to 
the social continuum. 
From the foregoing, it is obvious that Malinowski's specific 
treatment of magic and magical words lacks systematic logical develop-
/ . .,; 
ment, and that i~ is a static-structural rather than a dynamic-rune-
tional analysis. 
.; 
·Because of Malinowski's romantic idealization of "pure" native 
cultures, he committed another ethnographic error. That is, he did 
not take into account the phenomenon of acculturation--cultural 
process. The effect of this oversight with relationship to language 
can best be illustrated with reference to the more thorough field-work 
of Malinowski's student, Raymond Firth. Firth recognized that an ac-
culturating situation was an excellent laboratory for studying linguis-
tic change, lexical accretion, etc. For example, many words in Tiko-· 
/ . 
pian closely approximate European names, such as "kapu" (cap), "suka" 
' 
' 
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(sugar), "bokis" (box). However, many times European objects are 
simply described by Tikopian phraseology; for example, a smokestack is 
a "pou afi" or "firepost," socks are "a fao 0 a vae" or "enclosures 
for the feet." Then there were words for Europe'an objects ln Tikopian 
for which Firth could not account; for example, "tilo" (photograph) or 
.-"Ilatana" (iron). These words are not recognizable approxima.tions of 
European terms and have no ulterior meaning in Tikopian. 
Can any general princlples be laid'down to account for the termi-
., 
. I 
nology in use by natives for describing European objects, thereoy fur- I 
thering our understanding of linguistic change? Perhaps, but· the past 
romantic attempts to describe "pure" native cultures only ignored the 
phenomenon of culture contact. This led. to the omission of much valua-
1 ble data about ~ultural and linguistic transformation. Happily, a few 
modern anthropologists, as will be discussed later, are aware of the 
importance of acculturation studies, and are rapidly collecting data· 
before western contact destroys the field-anthropologist's laboratory. 
·Malinowski in one of his last Introductions recognized his theq-
retical error, as the following quotation shows: 
The propensity to falsify observation in the very act 
of making it, by shutting the eyes to any encroachments of 
western civilization, was detrimental to earlier field work. 
Most of the really serious mistakes, for instance, wpich I 
myself conunitted in the field, between 1914 and 1910, were 
due to the fact that I wanted my Melanesians to be genuine 
Melanesians and not at all tainted with western knowledge, 
belief, or technology,159_ 
l59Malinowski, B., "Foreword" to Thompson• s Fijian Frontier (Hozi°o-. 
lulu--Institute of Pacific Relations), 1940, p. xvii. 
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The above quotation illustrates clearly how preconceived theoret-
ical tools influence the collection of field data. For example, Mali-
nowski • s an.ti-historical attitude, which will be discussed at length 
later, led to a "synchronic" description of language. That is, he at-
tempted to describe language without historical relationships, thereby 
overlooking much valuable linguistic data. But if a compiete and sys-
tematic study of language is to be made, it should include both his-
torical or "diachronic" data and ~·synchronic" or field de.ta. This is 
especially important if "generalizations" about linguistic behavior 
are to be made, since one of the primary aims of anthropology is to 
establish "geaeralizations." 
.. 
Malinowski's "synchronic" treatment of language can in part be 
explained as an extreme or polar reaction against the also extreme his-
torical studies of the early Inda-European linguists. Despite this 
extremist position towards the utilization of historical data, Mali-
nowski's "organic" and behavioristic-pragmatic treatment of language 
is far superior to that of the orthodox historical linguists, for a 
pragmatic treatment emphasizing the "context of the situation" and "the 
context of the action" rather than the historical relationships is of 
greater value for establishing "meaning." And, because of the varied 
"social settings" of marginal groups, the problem of "meaning~' can 
beat be attacked, as Malinowski has shown, in the field laboratory. 
Malinowski in his study of marginal ·1anguages ·has made a distinc-
tive contribution to a pragmatic theory of language. The contribution 
/ 
may be summed up in three points: 
I 
' 
' , 
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{ 1) Malinowski noted that "meaning" is contextual; that is, 
"meaning" is relative to the particular cultural situation--a word has 
no "meaning" out of that situation. "Meaning" is consequently depend-
ent, for the most part, on the "cultural threshold." And for the 
anthropologist to obtain "meaning," he must pursue intensive sociolog-
ical investigation. 
(2) Malinowski clearly showed the connection between language and 
activity. "Meaning" arises through doing. Language is a form of 
social behavior. That is, words can be understood only in the stimulus-
response situation. 
(3) Malinowski illustrated that in marginal languages most of the 
symbols used have existential practical referents. That is, abstrac-
tion is not a very highly developed art in marginal communities. 
Further anthropological investigation of the· nature of language 
can most profitably follow the behavioristic-pragmatic analysis out-· 
lined by Malinowski, and developed more fully by .. G. H. Mead in Mind, 
Self, and Society and by John Dewey in Experience~ Nature. Lin-
guists in anthropology need to pay closer attention to theories of 
I 
learning being developed in psychology and pQi1osophy and to apply and 
check these by means of investigation of marginal cultures, 
I 
CHAPTER IV 
METHODOLOGICAL COMPARISONS 
Franz.~~ the Historical Position: Anti-historicity is 
Malinowski's weakest position. And even, today anthropology is still 
plagued by this anti-historical tradition (cf. Radcliffe-Brown and 
followers). As Robert Redfield says: 
... it may now be declared that Radcliffe-Brown's signal 
contribution is .•• a strictly nonhistoricnl, sharply · 
scientific method in anthropology. • . • no one in America 
has offered n strictly nonhistorical scientific method, 
equipped with a self-consistent body of .concepts and proce-
dures for getting specific jobs done in relation to ultimatf 
scientific objectives. Radcliffe-Brovm has done just that. 
It has been shown that Malinowski's violent anti-historical preju-
dice arose as a reaction against the pre-scientific methods of the 
early historical anthropologists, who were primarily interested in 
tracing origins, defining stages of development, and outlining schemes 
of social evolution. As such, Malinowski's reaction and presentatio~ 
of another method of approach--"Functionalism"--represented at the 
time a step forward toward a science of anthropology, but in taking an 
extremist position he committed grave· methodological errors--errors 
from which anthropology is still suffering. 
Malinowski's anti-historical stand is most clearly expressed in· 
1Redfield, R., Introduction to Social Anthropology.£!, North Ameri-
~ Tribes (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press), 1937, pp. ix-xi. 
lOS 
/ 
109 
Argonauts ~ the Western Pacific: 
It is hardly necessary perhaps to make it quite clear 
that all questions of origins, of development or history of 
the institutions have been rigorously ruled out of this work. 
The mixing up of speculative or hypothetical views with an 
account of facts is, in my o~inion, an unpardonable sin 
against ethnographic method. 
About historical "survivals'' Malinowski is even more expliC!it: 
To put it bluntly, I should say that the symbolic rep-
resentative or ceremonial contents of marriage are of sec-
ondary importance to the anthropologist. 'IQ insist that 
enshrined in a ceremonial act there remain large chunks of 
history, condensed and pickled souvenirs of past ages, is 
simply a case of antiquarian obsession.3 
MaHnowski, as we have noted throughout this thesis, was intent 
upon the presentation of an "organic" study of society--a study which 
would show to the field-worker ."the actual working of the social and 
cultural institutions of his natives rather than inspire him with a 
retrospective desire to build up from his data tempting but often 
imaginary visions of past stages and hiatories."4 
Malinovrski's anti-historical attitude can.be sununarized. in the 
following two points: 
(1) Intensive sociological analysis: The aim of anthropology, 
2 Malinowski, B., Argonauts of the Western Pacific (London: 
G. Routledge and Sons, Ltd.), 1922,-p:" 100. 
3Malinowski, B., ''Foreword" in Hogbi~t a Law and Order in Poly 
'nesia (London: Christophers), 1934, P• xlviii; -- - ~ 
4 Ibid., p •. lix. 
/ , 
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according to Malinowski, is an intensive sociological analysis of a 
culture with all historical considerations ruled out. The proponents 
of this position claim that the contemporary cultural-situations form 
a scientific laboratory, whereas historical investigations cannot be 
· scientific. The greater the time interval involved, the less scien-
tific the historical material. In order to eliminate the historical 
problem, a culture must be studied at one time horizon. This method-
ology Radcliffe-Brown calls a ''synohronio approach," as contrasted 
w1 th the "diachronic approach" (histot"ioal method), 
(2) Static interpretation: Anthropology should be concet"ned 
largely with the questions: How is social-equilibrium maintained? 
What are the integrative ractors?--rather than with the questions: 
How and why is social-equilibrium disrupted? What are the dynamic 
factors of change? We have previously called the former the static-
functional approach. Thus we see that in all of hie work Malinowski 
is primarily concerned with magic, religion, kinah.ip 1 family, lavr and 
order, etc.--the integrative factors which maintain social-equilibrium. 
The role of anthropology in modern science as developed by Mali-
nowski is in significant disagreement with the aims of anthropology as 
outlined ~Y Franz Boas and as modified by Kroeber, Lewie, and other 
representatives of the historical tradition in anthropology, 
What is the role Of anthropology according·to Boas? 
subject matter: History or mankind. The science of 
anthropology deals with the history.of human society. !t 
differs from history in the narrower sense of the term in 
that its inquiries are not confined to the periods ror which 
I 
I 
, 
written records are available and to peoples who hav.e de-
veloped the art of writing. Anthropological researches ex-
tend over the whole of hwnanity regardless of time and space. 
Historical inquiry reaches ciut hesitatingly beyond the do-
main of written records, Archaeological and later remains, 
and survivals of early times that persist in modern culture, 
are utilized to extend the span of time and 'to till in de-
tails for which written records are not available. In the'se 
inquiries the fields ot anthropology and history are in 
close contact.5 
13ut the most explicit statement by Boas ot temporal considera-
tions is his "three great problems of anthropology": 
l. The reconstruction 2£. human history. 
;2, The determination 2£. types 2£. historical phenomena ~ 
their sequences. 6 
3. The-dynamics of change. 
lll 
Boas, like Malinowski, attacked the unilinear evolutionary posi-
tion of the early historical anthropologists but with deeds, not in-
vectives! In ~P_ri""m.-i_t_i_v_e ~. ~ ~ 2£. Prinii ti ve M::m• and in many 
other publications, Boas attacked 
· . . . the theory according to which geometrical designs had 
developed from realistic patterns by a process of gradual 
deterioration; the theory according to which all mythologi-
cal themes and motifs had their origin in an attempt at ex-
plaining natural phenomena; the evolutionary theory accord-
ing to which totemism was a stage through which all primitive 
peoples had passed; and, lastly, the ~heory according to 
5aoas, F. (editor), General Anthropology (Boston: Heath), 1938, 
p. 1. 
6
rbid., p. 4, Then why, when Boas makes statements such as these, 
should there be any argument as to whether or not he. represents the' 
historical tradition in anthropology? 
/ 
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which secret societies, the world over, had developed out of 
the men's house and age classes.7 
But unlike Malinowski, Boas did not go to the unscientific ex-
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treme of anti-historicity. He saw the errors of historical subjec-· 
tivism, unilinear evolution, culture-area reconstructions, of the 
''quantitative methods," but Boas did not divorce history from anthro-
.pology. 
Vlhich one of the two positions--Malinowski 1 s or Boas 1--meete more 
fully the demands of scientific methodology? 
In the first place, Malinowski committed a prime logical offense 
in his criticisms of historical method; that is, he universalized a 
particular. Malinowski was criticizing a particular historical meth-
odology--historical reconstruction and the study of origins--but he 
identified this historical methodology with history as a whole and 
thus made a sweeping condemnation of history~.!!~:.!:: However, we 
know that historical methodology includes a far greater "frame of r'ef-
erence" than that recognized by Malinowski. ·For purposes of· analysie 1 
we shall refer to historical methodology (including!!!.!. historical 
avenues of approach) as the temporal process. 
In the second place, Boas recognized, as Malinowski did not, that 
history cannot be either realistically or scientifically separated 
from anthropology. All human experience is historical--or as Dewey 
says, "experience is history." Reflective thinking alws;ts involves a 
Book 
?Radin, P., Met)lod and Theory in Ethnology 
Company), 1933, p. 134. 
(New Yorki McGraw-Hui 
I 
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reconstruction of past experience. All inventions are in part his-
torical reconstructions. 
To the study of man, as Dewey shows, ~istory furnishes the neces-
sary naturalistic setting: 
Aside from mathematics, all knowledge is historic; 
chemistry, geology, physiology, as well as anthropology and 
those human events to which, arrogantly, we usually restrict 
the title of history. Only as science is seen to be ful-
filled and brought to itself in intelligent management of 
historical processes in their continuity can man be envis~ 
aged as within nature, and not as a supernatural extrapola-
tion. Just because nature is what it is, history is capable 
of being more truly known--understood, intellectu~lly real-
ized--than are mathematical and physical objects. 
Veblen devoted his life to the attempt to make economics scien-
tific. He was convinced that economics could become truly scientific 
only by replacing its traditional taxonomic, pre-evolutionary and 
static methodology with the evolutionary, genetic (historic) approach 
of the modern sciences. 
In speaking of this matter-of-fact character of the 
modern sciences it has been broadly characterized as "evolu-
tionary"; and the evolutionary method and the evolutionary 
ideals have been placed in antithesis to the taxonomic 
methods and ideals of pre-evolutionary days. But the char-
acteristic attitude, aims, and ideals which are so desig-
nated here are by no means peculiar to the group of sciences 
that are professedly occupied with a process of development, 
taking that term in its most widely accepted meaning. The 
latter-day inorganic sciences are in this respect like the 
organic. They occupy themselves ?rith "dynamic" relations 
and sequences. The question which they ask is always:· What 
8
newey, J., E:xperience and Nature (Chicago: operi Court Publishing 
Company), 1925, pp. 163-164.~ 
I 
I 
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takes place next, and why? ••• Even in so non-evolutionary 
a science as inorganic chemistry the inquiry consistently ' 
runs on a process, an active sequence, and the value of the 
resulting situation as a point of departure for the next 
step in an interminable cumulative sequence •••• There is 
no ultimate term, and no definitive solution except in terms 
of further action. The theory worked out is ·always a theory' 
of genetic succession of phenomena, and the relations deter-
mined and elaborated into a body of doctrine are always 
genetic relations.9 
Darv1inism introduced the concept of temporal process and change 
into all of the social sciences, except in the most backward fields, 
~·· orthodox economics. Unfortunately, this way bf thinking has riot / 
been wholly domesticated even .in the lnore tirogt-essive·areas, vi:z. • ., 
anthropology. Veblen, as we have noted, has brilliantly criticized 
the taxonomic character of orthodox economics. Economics has been 
mainly concerned with categorizing and dust-'colleoting •. That is, .eco-. 
nomics has not been concerned with .change or l'ii th dyri.amic cultural 
' 
forces--it has not been concerned with how or why the economic system 
came to be as it is and ho~ and wh~ it is changing. The genetic ap-
preach was entirely ovet-looked. The orthodox economists created an · 
artificial and static picture of society--the logical culmination of 
which is Pareto's "static state." They came to look upon their given 
society as immutable and 1nalterable--the concept of change was foreign 
and disturbing. But this static characteri~tiC is not peculiar to 
economics. In Malinowski's repudiation of history, or of the temporal 
process, there is a repudiation, however unconsciously, Of Darwinism--
·
9Veblen, Thorstein, The Place of science in Modern Civilization 
(New York: The Viking Press, Inc.),'"1'919, pp. 84-85. 
of change, development,' and growth. Of this anti-evolutionism in···-
anthropology, Leslie A. White has penetratingly remarked; "It is a 
significant fact that in cultural anthropology.alone among the sciences 
is·a philosophy of anti-evolutionism;respectable--a·ract we would do 
10 
well to. ponder." . . . . ;• ~ :~ . ~ ... • 1 l • ' I ,' . " ' . ' . 
. ' . In the third place, Malinowski's anti-historical attitude' Cham-
pions a still-~ technique. (As a matter· of fact, Radcliffe-Brown's 
"synchronl.c approach" might synonymously be called a still-~ method.) 
I 
For example, if a snapshot ·were taken of a-powerful' cargo ship" plowing I 
through the high seas at a given instant, then we would' have an exact .,. 
analogy to the "synchronic 11 descriptions in anthropology.· We could not 
ascertain in either instance the dynamic' forces at work iz1· the given · ··· 
situation, how they came into being,· and ·what will be their effects.· ·-· 
But science demanda:to know how and 1why the ship ·inoves and what are the 
consequences of its movement. In'a scient1fic study·of society, we I• -
likewise desire to know the cause· and effect· sequence in 'order to be .•:· 
able ·to predict and control."' · · ' \ : ·· t·' • · - ... · ... 
The still-life'technique has art additi6nal drawback· in that it 
captures and gives equal emphasis to transitory and irrelevant cul-
. ' ;_: '' .. 
tural · i terns. ·To ·continue with our ship: '~f ·a snapshot were taken of 
l' I' ' • ! ' ' (',1 1 • 
the launching of a ship which included.as its major feature (as is most 
. . . 
often the case-~see·Sunday rotogravure seetion) the.traditional cham-
, . 
pagne ceremony,· our'knowledge of the'technique'of launching:~ould not 
' ' . ' ' " . 
··'.· -,L''' .~l 
lOWhite, L~slie A., "Energy and the Evolution or Cuiture, 11 Amer1-
~·Anthropologist, "Vol. 45, No. 3, Part' I;· 1943, p;· 356. " 1 .- 0 
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be increased. we should merely have seen one more comfortable, well-
fed, society woman--and what could be a more irrelevant aspect of a 
technological society? But to be consisten~ with his relativistic po-
, ' ! .. ·,' ' . •i 
sition, Malinowski would have to assign to·the society woman, as he 
does to the garden-magician, an indispensable, integrative, and sane-
,tioning role! As· a matter of fact, we know·that. both the society woman 
and the magician are not only superfluous· but so much ''sand in the 
bearings." ·· · .. ' . ' .. 
' "In the fourth place, Malinowski 1 s ·anti-historicity is only appar- / 
ent, :never real. His naivete and capacity for self-delusion are impres-
sive. Despite his protestations and belief .to the contrary, he was al-
ways engaged in a study of temporal process •. Malinowski" could not have 
stayed in a society over any period of time-~however short--without be-
ing involved in a historical analysis; Wherever-he speaks of· human 
experience, he is speaking historically. :Many of his analyses are his-
torical even in the very narrow sense in which he defined the word. For 
'example,' in contrasting the use and importance df. the ·11 nagega" and ·the 
"masawa" canoes, Malinowski utilizes historical techniques: 
• ', r; ·' l , t "! ' : ·1 ' 
'.. ' .. 
One point of great importance in the relation of these 
two forms of canoe is that one of them has, within the last 
two generations, been expanding at the expense of the other. 
ACCording to reliable information, gathered at several points 
in the Trobriands and the Amphletts, the "nagega" type, ·that 
is the heavier, more seaworthy and better-sailing canoe, was 
driven out some time ago from the Amphletts and Trobriands. 
The "masawa," in many respects inferior, but less difficult 
,to build, ·and swifter, has supplanted the bigger type. In 
olden days, that is, about two or three generations ago, the 
"nagega" was used exclusively iniwa, Kitava, Kiriwina, 
Vakuta, and Sinaketa, while the Amphlettana·and the natives 
'I ' ' ' '' 
/ 
'1 • -
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of Kayleula would usually use the "nagega," though sometimes 
they would sail in "masawa" canoes •••• Thus, one of the ' 
most important cultural items is spreading from South to 
North. . . . Thus in this district at any rate, and probabiy 
in the Trobriands and Amphletts as well, not only the use, 
but also the manufacture of the bigger canoe has been ~uper­
seded by that of the smaller one, the "masawa," now found in 
·all these parts.11 
Thus we see that Malinowski's anti-historicity is mere verbalize-
tion. Perhaps his vocalizations convinced himself, but it is only · 
necessary for the critic to point to Malinowski's actual activities to 
prove the vaporous nature of his anti-historical diatribes. 
It is significant to note that Malinowski in later years, when 
coming under pragmatic and behavioristic influences, revised his view-· 
points toward temporal proc~ss. Impetus to this change in mind was 
given by his· belated recognition of the process of acculturation. 
Change became such an omnipresent phenomenon that Malinowski was 
forced to revise some of his basic preconceptions. The revision was. 
so complete and so enthusiastic (an admirable personal characteristic) 
. 12 
that Malinowski pioneered the field of acculturation studies in Africa • 
• a good deal of information on contact and change is 
included in this volume [Coral Gardens ~ Their Magic). I 
was often in my observations driven to note certain phenom-
ena, very largely because my earliest training in exact 
science made it to me almost physically impossible to neg-
lect the full reality which I had before my eyes. The em-
pirical facts which the etnographer has before him in the 
1~alinowski, B., Argonauts of~ Western Pacific (LOndol\: 
G. Routledge and Sons, Ltd.), 1922, p. 145. 
12 . 
Methods of Study of Culture Contact in Africa, with·an Introduc-
tory Essay by B-;--"Malinowski {()xford: OxfordUniversity Press), 1938. 
I 
! 
Trobriands nowadays are not natives unaffected by European 
influences. but natives to a considerable extent transformed ·, 
by these influences. The Trobriander as he was, even two or 
three generations ago, has become by now a thing of the 
past, to be reconstructed, not to be observed. And the 
scientificway to reach even a careful reconstruction is 
through the observation of what actually exists. 
I was thus forced to observe the facts of contact and 
change, but I want emphatically to state that my attitude, 
both in theory and practice, on this point was false. The 
Anthropology in vrhich I was brought up was still mainly in-
terested in the "real savage" as representative of the stone 
age. . • • On the other hand, the process of the diffusion 
of culture, ns it is going on now under our very eyes, is 
one of the most important historical events in the develop-
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ment of mankind. To neglect its study is definitely to fail I 
in one of the most important tasks of Anthropology. I 
I have developed this point of view in one or two arti-. 
oles . . , but I was no.t yet under its influence in doing my 
field-work. This perhaps is the most serious shQrtcoming of 
my whole anthropological research in Melanesia.lj . 
And.this is what the arch anti-historian has to say about history 
in 1938: 
But the phase of world history through which we are now 
passing imposes on the anthropologist, as has already been 
said, a new task. He has to study the processes of culture 
change in their own right. These are a historical phase of 
. first-rate importance, theoretically as well as practically. 
• • • As an historian he has to recognize that he is chroni-
cling one of the most dramatic and far-reaching crises in 
the evolution of mankind.14 
The anti-historical tenets of Malinowski and Radcliffe-Brown 
would be unimportant from an intellectual standpoint (we have already 
shown that it is a pseudo-position) were it not for the fact that they 
l3Malinowski, B., Coral Gardens and Their Magic (New York: Ameri-
can Book Company), 1935, Vol. I, pp. 480-481. . 
14
.QJ?.. ~··pp. xi-xii. / 
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have influenced a generation of younger anthropologists--Powdermaker, 
Firth, Mair, and others. The still-life technique has been positively 
mischievous in that it has confused the sc'ientific aims of anthro-
pology in positing that there could be and should be a non-historical 
approach. As Lowie says: "We cannot picture a timeless culture any 
. 15 
.more than a spaceless one." 
Murdock, although maintaining a separation between the "Fune-
tional" and "Historical'' positions, realizes that they are really 
"complementary rather than antagonistic," and that the fullest develop- ! 
ment of anthropology will come with a realization of this interrelated-
ness. 
The tvio most powerful !llovements in twentieth century 
anthropological theory are the historical·and the functional, 
the former stressin8 the uniqueness of individual cultures 
and their dependence upon their predecessors ·and neighbors, 
the latter emphasizing the cross-cultural similarities that 
result from independent adjustment to like biological, geo-
graphic, and social imperatives. These movements have grad-
ually merged, until today they are widely recognized as com-
plementary rather than a:ntagonistic._16 · · · 
While this viewpoint leaves much to be desired, it does represent 
an advance over the still-life technique. But as always, Boas was 
from.the beginning most fully aware of the interrelatedness of anthro-
pology and history. Thus, in this respect, Boas was more scientific 
15Lowie, R., "Cultural Anthropology,·a Science?" American Journal 
EI.. Sociology, November, 1936, p. 309. 
16 Murdock, G. P. , "Review" of Redfield' s The Folk Cul tu res of 
Yucatan, in the Amerio.an Anthropologist, Vol. 45, No. l, 1943, p';'""""135. 
'. 
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than Malinowski. 
In the opinion of the author, the dynamic-functional methodology 
offers the most fruitful approach to a real .science of anthropology. 
Radcliffe-Drovm: As Radin notes, the first revolt against the 
'early historical anthropologists "is associated with the names of 
.... 
Radcliffe-Brown and Malinowski in England, and with [Margaret] Mead in 
17 America,". and with Thurnwald in Germany. Along with their students, 
18 
they have formed the "school'' of "Ftmctionalism--Pure and Applied." 
Malinowski's closest ties are with Radcliffe-Brown, and for that 
reason we shall compare them at length. 
In most significant points Malinowski and Radcliffe-Brovm agree, 
but the emphasis in their work is somewhat different. Before we dis-
cuss their points of departure, let us examine the methodology on 
vthich they agree: 
(1) Both agree that anthropology can be scientific, and that one ... 
of the basic problems facing this discipline is to .refine. the tech-
niques used in investigation--to develop new tools for a "new anthro-
pology. ". 
Radcliffe-Brown regards social anthropology as a branch of the 
natural sciences: 
17 Radin, R., Method and Theory of Ethnology (New York: McGraw-
Hill Boole Company, Inc.) ,-r933, p. lb'9. 
18 Lowie, R., The History of Ethnological Theory (New York: Farrar,-·· 
and Rinehart, Inc.~1937, pp.--:230-249, 
I conceive of social anthropology'as the theoretical 
natural science of human society, that is, the investigation 
of social phenomena by methods essentially similar to those 
used in the physical and biological sciences. I am quite 
willing to call the subject "comparative sociology" if any 
one so wishes.19 
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(2) Both fundamentally agree that the goal of anthropology.is to 
.establish "laws," or generalizations if you wish, about cultural be-
havior. 20 Generalizations which will have unive~sal validity. Mali-
21 . 
nowski, however, remained an "ethnogra11hic provincial" despite his 
intentions, while Radcliffe-Brown, at one timEl or another, formulated 
many provoking generalizations. It has been suggested that Malinow-
ski• s interest in establishing generalizations was stimulated by 
Radcliffe- Brovm. 
(:3) Both are suspicious of historical me_thodology, However, 
Radcliffe-Brown does not make such a sweeping condemnation of the tem-
. -
poral process as does Malinowski. But Radcliffe-Drown establishes a 
non-existent dualism between history and social anthropology. 
I see no reason at·all why the two kinds of study--the 
historical and the functional--should not be carried on side 
by side in perfect harmony .•.• [But!J I do think that 
l9Radcliffe-Brown, A. R., "The Present Position of Anthropologi-
cal Studies," JRAI, Vol. LXX, 1931, p. 2. 
20Malinowski, B., in Science and Man, 1942, p. 208; Radcliffe-
Brown, A •. R. 1 ~·, pp. 2-6. - --
21 Lowie, R., The History of Ethnological Theory (New York: Farrar / 
and Rinehart, Inc.r;:-1937, p. 241. ' 
there are many disadvantag~~ in mixing the two subjects to-
gether and confusing t~em. 
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Radcliffe-Brm-m recognized the fact that "social evolution," the 
temporal process, forms a legitimate "frame of reference" for the 
social anthropologists. 
. . • the process of human history to which I think the term 
social evolution may be appropriately applied might be de-
fined as the process by which wide-range systems of social 
structure have grown out of, or replaced, narrow-range sys-
tems. • •• the social anthropologists should recognize and 
study . • • two features, (1) process of differentiation--
many forms out of few, (2) complex forms develop out of, or 
replace, simpler forms. Used in the sense that organic 
evolution is used.23 
It is this stand towards the.use of the term "social evplution" 
that has led some to call Radcliffe-Brown a "neo-evolutionist."24 This 
is, however, a superficial analysis for the outstanding characteristic 
of. Radcliffe-Brown's methodology is its synchronic nature. All Rad-
cliffe-Brown notes: 
In the study of social structure, the concrete reality 
with which we are concerned is the set of actually existing 
relations at a given moment of time, which link together 
certain human beings. It is on this that we can make direct 
observations.25 
22Radcliffe-Brown, A." R., "On the Concept of Function in Social 
Science," American Anthropologist, Vol. 37, No. 3, 1935, P•. 401. 
23 . 
Radcliffe-Brown, A. R., "The Present Position of Anthropological 
Studies," ~. Vol. LXX, 1931, pp. 11-12. · 
24Rad1n, P., Method~ Theory .2!. Ethnology (New York: McGraw-
H111 Book Company, Inc.), 1933, p. 170. 
25
.Qp_. c.it., p. 4 • 
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Radcliffe-Brown is primarily interested in finding out as much as 
pos.sible about the varieties and diversities of structural systems and 
building a "comparative morphology of' societies" by obtaining a "clear-
26 
cut picture of movement arrested for a static moment" --a functional-
synchronic approach. ·However, like Malinowski, Radcliffe-Brown was 
27 
. always speaking historically v1hether he recognized it or not. 
(4) Both emphasize the importance of the nebulous concept of 
"reciprocity": 
Social relations are only observed, and can only be de-
scribed, by reference to the reciprocal behaviour of the 
persons related. The form of a social structure has there-
fore to be described by the patterns of behaviour to which 
individua~s and groups conform in their dealings with one 
another.2 
" (5) Both recognize the importance of.theory.and together have 
contributed a great deal of literature on conceptual problems. Neither 
could be accused of attempting "purely" factual descriptions, as is 
the fad in anthropology. However, both, at times ·explicitly and at 
other times implicitly, postulate a dualism between fact and theory~-
an error which has already been discussed and which will be referred 
to again under "Preconceptions." 
26 Voegelin, c. F., "On Being Unhistorical.," American Anthropolo,:. 
gist, Vol. 38, No. 2, 1936, PP• 345-347. 
27 . 
Lowis, R., The History of Ethnological Theory (New York: Farrar 
and Rinehart, Inc.~1937, p. 226. 
28 Radcliffe-Brown, "The Present Position of Anthropological 
Studies," ~. Vol. I.XX, 1931, p. 8. 
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Differences arise between Malinowski and Radcliffe-Brown on the 
issue of the individual's role in society, and on the concept of 
"function" in anthropology. The differences in methodology can, of 
course, be explained by the general philosophical, psychological, and 
·. 
anthropological training that each received, 
Malinovrski, as we have shown, was first a Gestaltist and in his 
later life a pragmatic-behaviorist, while Radcliffe-Brown, by admis-
sion, stems directly out of Durkheim and the French sociological 
29 . 
school. As \,owie notes, the Durkheimian influence stimulated Rad-
clif:!'e-Brown to develop a '"Social anthropology• or 1 compare.ti ve · 
sociology'--the study of group behavior--is independent of psychology 
and ignores as irrelevant the individual as . 30 an individual." Mali-
nowski, on the contrary, in his early work (consistent with his German 
philosophical and psychological training) was primarily interested in 
the "Weltanschauung." The feelings and opinions of the individual are 
prominent in Malinowski's work. This led each to approach a problem 
in som_ewhat or a di:!'ferent :rashion. G. c. Homans in.an excellent arti-
. ' 
cle entitled "llruciety and Ritual: The Theories of Malinowski and Rad-
31 
cliffe-Brown" discusses this difference: 
29 QE.· cit., p. 221. 
30Lowie, R., ~History of Ethnological Theory (New York: Farrar . 
and Rinehart, Inc.), ·1937, p. 222. 
31 Homans, G. c., "Anxiety and Ritual: The Theories of Malinowski 
and Radcliffe-Brown," American Anthropologist, Vol. 43, No. 2, Part 1,,/· 
1941, PP• 164-172. 
Malinowski's theory of magic is vrell-known and has been 
widely accepted. He holds that any primitive people has a 
body of empirical knowledge, comparable to modern scientific 
knovlledge, as to the behavior of nature and the means of con-
trolling it to meet man's needs. This knowledge the primi-
tives apply in a thoroughly practical manner to get the re-
sults they desire--a crop of tubers, a catch of fish, and so 
f9rth. But their techniques are seldom so powerful that the 
accomplishment of these results is a matter of certainty. 
When the tiller of the soil has done the best he can to see 
that his fields are properly planted and tended; a d·rought 
or a blight may overwhelm him. Under these circumstances 
the primitives feel a sentiment which we call anxiety and 
they perform magical rites which they say will insure good 
luck. These rites give them the confidence which allows 
them to attack their practical work with energy and deter-
mination.32 
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Malinowski explicitly distinguishes between "magic" and "religion" 
--"magic" is the practical ~ done to gain certainty;. "religion," an 
explanation of acting in terms of custom and .tradition. Radcliffe-
Brown criticizes Malinowski's distinction ·between "magic" and "reli-
gion". on the basis of the term "practical." Actually, as we shall see, 
Hadcliffe-Brown is criticizing Malinowski's individualistic interpre-
tation; that is: 
The native performs one rite and says that it has a 
definite practical purpose. He performs another rite and 
says that it is performed as a matter of custom. If we call 
the first rite magic and the second religion, we are basing· 
our distinction on a difference between the verbal statement 
a native makes about the rites.33 
Radcliffe-Brown objects to this explanation because it assumes that 
32 ~., p. 164. See also pp. 9-20, above. 
33rbid., p. 165. 
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the native un~erstands and interprets a valid distinction between 
"magic" and "religion." It is a completely "individualistic" and 
"relativistic" explanation, as well as a misgUided attempt at a prag-
matic analysis. For, as Homans brings out, because the natives say 
that "magic" produces "practical results" is not sufficient proof that 
it does. It should instead be treated as a "rationalization. 1134 
It follovrs, then, that Malinowski's distinction between "magic" 
and "religion" is not valid. Because he treated magic functionally 
he arrived at. a sound conclusion as to its r61e·1n society--"power 
35 
control" and "quest for certainty." If he had also made a func-
tional analysis of religion, rather than an individualistic (atomistic) 
one,. he would have been forced to the conclusion that religion plays 
the same role as magic in culture; that is, it too is a "pmver con- · 
trol," a "quest for certainty." Vlhile Radcliffe:..Bro?m 1 s critic ism is 
. 
suggestive, he does not note this fundamental difficulty. 
Malinowski believes that.anxiety arises when the individual real-
izes that he does not have the techniques for security. "Malinowski 
is saying that the individual tends to reel anxiety on certain occa-
36 ' 
sions. 11 Radcliffe-Brown does not explicitly reject Malinowski's 
explanation, but he does offer a supposed alternative interpretation. 
'lb.at is, Radcliffe-Brown says: "· •• that society expects the 
34rbid., p. 166. 
35For a definition of "power control," see page 101, above. 
36 
.Qp_. Cit., p. 168. 
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individual to feel anxiety on certain occasions. 11 37 That customs are 
already established for meeting uncertainty, and if the proper rituals 
are performed then the individual will have security. Any anxiety 
·present is latent. However, if the ritual is not properly performed, 
he does feel anxiety. As Homans clearly brings out, "Malinowski ~· 
looking~~ individual, Radclif-fe-Brown at society • .,3B 
In the discussion of "Primitive Law" the same disagreement arises 
between Malinowski and Radcliffe-Brown: 
The tendency represented largely by the sociological 
.school of Durkheim, and clearly expressed in Professor 
Radcliffe-Brown's approach to primitive law and other phe-
nomena, the tendency to ignore completely the individual and 
to eliminate the biological elem.ant from the functional 
analysis of culture, must in my opinion be overcome: It is 
really the only point of theoretical dissension betv:een Pro-
fessor Radcliffe-Bro~m and myself, and the only respect in 
which the Durkheimian conception of primitive society has to 
be supplemented in order to be really serviceable in field-
work, in theoretical studies, and in the practical applica-
tion of sociology.39 
Malinowski, as we have seen, is primarily interested in the way 
the individual "practically" adjusts to social controls, the devia-
tions from prescribed behavior, and so forth, Radcliffe-Brown, con-
sistent with the Durkheimian tradition, is concerned With· the controls 
that law exerts on the individual, .Radcliffe-Brown is interested in 
37 6 
.91?.· ~· ' p. 1 8. 
38Ibid. 
39Malinowski, B., Foreword to Hogbin' s Law~ Order _!E. Polynesia 
(London: Christophers), 1934, p. xxxviii. 
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the structural systems and relations, But he does not ignore the 
' individual. 
The "functionalist" point of view here ·presented does 
therefore imply that we have to investigate as thoroughly as 
possible all aspects of social life, considering them in 
relation to one another, and that an essential part 2£~ 
task is the investigation of the individual and of the wa! 
Til'Which he is moulded by or adjusted to the social life, 0 
As with a great deal ~f disputes in the world of science, this 
. one is only.apparent, not real. The viewpoints of Malinowski and 
Radcliffe-Brovm are not mutually exclusive but supplementary. Empha-
sis seems to be the point of departure, of disagreement. As Homans 
says: " . two distinguished persons talking past one another 
rather than trying to find a common ground for discussion, presenting 
41 their theories as alternatives when in fac.t they are complementary, 11 
Radcliffe-Brown, unlike Malinowski, is very.hostile to the use of 
the term "functionalism" to designate a "school" in anthropology, 
I have been described on more than one occasion as be-
longing to something called the "Functional School of Soqial 
Anthropology" and even as being its leader, or one of its 
leaders. This Functional School does not really exist; it 
is a myth invented by Professor Malinowski. He has ex-
plained how, to quote his own words, "tlie magnificent title 
of the Functional School of Anthropology has been bestowed 
40Radcliffe-Brown, A. R., "On the Concept of· Function in Social 
Science," American Anthropologist, Vol. 37, No. 3, Part I, 1935, p. 400. 
• 4lHomans, G. C., "Anxiety and Ritual: The Theories of Malinowski 
and Radcliffe-Brown," American Anthropologist, Vol. 43, No. 2, Part i1 
1941, p. 172. 
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by myself, in a way on myself, and to a large extent out of 
my own sense of irresponsibility." Professor Malinowski's , 
irresponsibility has had unfortunate r.esults, since it has 
spread over anthropology a dense fog·of discussion about 
"fun'ctionalism." ••• The statement that I am a "function-
alist," or equally the statement that I am not, would seem 
to me to convey no definite meaning.42 
Radcliffe-Brown does, however, uae'ths term "function," and in a 
manner which is somewhat different from its use by Malinowski.-
cal 
As I have been accustomed to use the word, following 
Durkheim and others, I would define the social function of a 
socially standardized mode of activity, or mode of thought, ,/ 
as its relation to the social structure to the existence and 
continuity of which it makes some contribution. Analogously, 
in a living organism the physiological function of the beat-
ing of the heart, or the secretion of gastric juices, is its 
relation to the organic structure to the existence or con-
tinuity of which it makes its contribution. It is in this 
sense that I am interested in such tnings as the social func-
tion of the punishment of crime, or the social function-of 
the totemic rites of Australian tribes, or of the funeral 
rites of the Andaman Islanders. But this is not what either 
Professor Malinowski or Professor Lowie mean by functional 
anthropology.43 
And elsewhere: 
The concept of function as here defined thus involves' 
the notion of a "structure" consisting of a "set of rela-
tions" amongst "unit ent,i ties," the "continuity" of the 
structure being maintained by a "life-process" made up of 
the "activities" of the constituent units. 
If, with these concepts in mind, we set out on a sys-
tematic investigation of the nature of human society and of 
social life, we find presented to us three sets of problems. 
42Radcliffe-Bro•m, A. R. , "The Present 
Studies," ~· Vol. I.XX, 1931, p. 1. 
43 Ibid., p. 10. 
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First, the problems of social morphology--what kinds of 
social structures are there, what are their similarities and ' 
differences, how are they to be classified? Second, the 
problems of oocial physiolOGY--how do social structures func-
tion? Third, the problems of development--how do new types 
of social structure come into existence? 
..• By the definition here offered "function" is the 
contribution which a partial activity.makes to the total 
activity of which it is a part. The function of a particu-
lar social usage is the contribution it makes to the total 
social life as the functioning of the total social system. 
Such a view implies that a social system (the total social 
structure of a society together vrith the totality of social 
usages, in which that structure appears and on which it de-
pends for its continued existence) has a certain kind of 
unity, which we may speak of as a functional unity. We may 
define it as a condition in which all parts of the social 
system work together with a sufficient degree Of harmony or 
internal consistency, i.e., without producing persistent 
conflicts which can neither be resolved nor regulated.44 
The criticisms Which we levied against Malinowski's early "struc-
turalism" can be even more emphatically applied to Radcliffe-Brown's 
concept of "function." As a matter of fact, Radcliffe-Brown's entire 
methodology might be called "structuralistic." We have shown that 
Malinowski and Radcliffe-Brown developed their viewpoints as a reac-. 
ti on· 'against the "evolutionists" .or the "quantitative method,'' to use 
Radin's phrase. Certainly the evolutionary position needed correction, 
but not annihilation! . Although Radcliffe-Brown specifically denies 
45 . 
that he is anti-historical and although Lowis points out that some 
44Radcliffe-Brown, A. R., ."On the Concept of Function in Social 
Science," A'llerican Anthropologist, Vol. 37, No. 3, Part I, 1935, 
pp. 396-397. . 
45 ~·' p. 401. 
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46 
of his work is "conjectural history," hfs treatment of "function" is 
' 
,conceptually static. His interest is the status quo. As Bateson 
notes: "We have on the one hand Radcliffe-Brown, who tends to see all 
the element·s of culture in their bearing upon the solidarity, the in-
tegration, of the group."47 
Malino•nski ,· on the other hand, tends to define "function" con-
sistent with its general philosophical and psychological use; that is, 
to regard cultural elements "as worki.ng directly or indirectly for the 
satisfaction of human needs."48 Culture has developed as an efficient 
means of adaptation. However_, we have also seen that Malinowski uses 
the term "function" w.t th structural meaning. 
In conclusion we could say that Radcliffe-Brown's concept of 
"function" is consistently structural and that while Malinowski's 
early use· di' "function" was structural (Gestalt ini'luence), his later 
treatment was truly "functional" in the pragmatic-behavioristic sense. 
Both stress a static analysis of culture. 
Sigmund Freud: 
The doctrine or psycho-analysis has had within the last 
ten years a truly meteoric rise in popular favour, It has 
exercised a growing influence over contemporary literature, 
46 Lowie, R. H., "Queries," American Anthropologist, ·vol. 35; 
No. 2, 1933, pp. 293-294. 
47Bateson, G., Navan (Cambridge: The University.Press), 1936, 
p. 29. 
48 Malinowski, B., 
Vol. 4, 1931, p. 625. 
"Culture,'' Encyclopedia of~ social Sciences;' 
.-· 
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sc'ience, and art. It has in fact been for some time the 
popular craze of the day. By this many fools have been ' 
deeply impressed and many pedants shocked and put off. The 
present writer belongs evidently to the first category, for 
he was for a time unduly 1-nfluenced by the theories of Freud 
and Rivers, Jung, and Jones. But pedantry will remain the 
.master passion in the student, and subsequent refiection 
soon chilled the initial enthueiasms.49 
Malinowski's ~ and Repression .!.!!_ Savage Society is for a number 
of reasons an extremely important contribution to anthropological 
methodology. First, it challenges basic psycho-analytical doctrines 
of family relationships in the "first application of psycho-analytic 
50 . 
theory to the study of savage life." Here, as before, Malinowski is 
sensitive to methodological and theoretical ~hanges in related fields 
and their possible influence on anthropology. Secondly, the book 
shows how comparative anthropology can scientifically test for univer-
sal validity hypotheses developed by students in other fields of in-
. . 
quiry. And finally, the book is an example of a ":functional" work·as 
stimulated by the treatment of basic human drives 12.·.!i•• sex) and 
their. cultural ramifications in contrast to the "structural" emphasi~ 
of Argonauts of the Western Pacific. 
Sigmund Freud pictures the family complex as one of the most 
important psychological forces. As Malinowski states: "Psycho-
analytic doctrine is essentially a theory of the influence of family 
49 .. Malinowski, B., Sex and Repression in Savage Society (London: 
Kegan Paul, Trench, TrUbner and Co., Ltd.), 1937, p. vii. 
50Ibid., p. ix. 
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51 life on the human mind." ·Consequently, "If family life is so fate-
ful for human mentality, its character deserves more attention. For 
52 the fact is that the family is not the same in all human societies." 
However, the psycho-analyst has not tested his theories comparatively, 
he has only assumed their universal validity. 
Malinowski has thus taken it upon himself to investigate one of 
Freud's
0
basic concepts, the Oedipus Complex. This was done by com-
paring the radically different western patriarchal family with the 
Melanesian (Trobriand) matrilineal family and the influence that each 
has upon the maturation of the child. 
The Oedipus Complex, as recognized in our western patriarchal 
society, is evidenced by the strong emotional attachments that the boy 
early develops for his mother and the ambivalence and even hatred for 
the father. According to Malinowski, and in agreement with Freud, the 
institution of father-right (the authoritative, powerful, and bread-
winning father) in western society represses and frustrates the devel-
opment in the child of natural inclinations; for example, the normal 
development of the sexual drive on the part of the child. FUrthermore, 
western institutions develop rivalry between father and child for the 
affection of the mother. The child 'is an obstacle to parental freedom 
and a reminder of age and:decline. Ultimately, social friction in 
many forms develops between the child and the father. 
51Ibid. , p. 2. 
52 ' . 
~·· p. 3. 
' 
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All of these clashes are absent in the Trobriand matrilineal 
society. There is no moral horror of sexuality between boy and mother •. 
The father, instead of being a tyrannical pa~ent, is a friend and 
helper of the child. "He is a stranger, having authority through his 
personal relations to the child, but not through his sociological post-· 
53 
· . tion in the lineage." In a comparable P.osi ti on to the father in 
western society is the maternal uncle in whom authority over the child 
. . 
is vested. Consequently, the "mother's brother represents the princi-
ple of discipline, authority, and executive power"--ambivalence and / 
hatred is d-irected towards him. 
In western society there is sexual repression between the mother 
and the child--the natural biological tie_ between mother and child is 
broken by institutional adjustments; for example, foster parents, wet-
nurses, and so forth. Moreover, there is typically a "repulsion of 
the child from the mother by the father." In the Trobriand society 
the natural relationship between the Child and the mother is allowed 
to run its course--biological "needs" are satisfied. However, between 
brother and sister there is a set of strong sexual barriers--taboos. 
Consequently, the Trobriand boy feels se111ally towards his sister as 
the western boy feels towards his mother. 
Thus, the Oedipus Complex appears in Trobriand society, but in a 
very different form from that postulated by Freud. Malinowski's atti-
tude towards the Oedipus Complex is that of the social psychologist. 
53Ibid., p. 10. 
' 
The Oedipus Complex arises through biological drives but is condi-
tioned by social and cultural forces. Consequently, if there is a 
different family structure, there will be a modification of the 
nuclear complex. As Malinowski says: 
To put it concretely, it appeQ.rs necessary to d_raw in 
more systematically the correlation between biological and 
social influences; not to assume the universal existence of 
the Oedipus Complex, but in studying every type of civiliza-54 tion, to establish the special complex which pertains to it. 
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Freud, however, in true metaphysical fashion, postulates the uni-
versality of the Oedipus Complex in terms of an innate crime which is 
continued in the racial memory by a system of inherited, collective 
. 55 
tendencies. Malinowski does not in any way minimize the importance 
of the biological and psychological or unconscious factors, but he 
does show quite conclusively that Freud and the psycho-ana!ysts over-
looked the sociological factors. 
· 
54rbid., p. 82. 
55Ibid. 1 p. 171. 
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CHAPTER V 
PRECONCEPTIONS 
The term "preconception" is used here in the Veblenian sense; 
that is, to denote 2. priori, prejudiced beliefs which are held in the 
face of scientific evidence to the contrary. We must note that all 
individuals hold preconceptions and that these are usually held uncon-
sciously. Science, as the most social of all processes, raises these 
preconceptions from the unconscious to the conscious level. It is the 
duty of the anthropologist to continuously and critically examine his 
own preconceptions, as well as those of society in general, in the 
light of changi_ng knowledge. The ability to exercise critical facul-
ties and to discard deep-seated beliefs in the face of opposing evi-
dence is an indication of intellectual progress. such intellectual 
"house-cleaning" is a prerequisite to the existence of a body of rigor-
ous scientific knowledge. 
"Malinowski, although open-minded and critical to an admirable . 
degree, was no exception to the rule of human fallibility, Certain 
preconceptions which were basic to his whole way-of-thinking he held 
quite unconsciously; other preconceptions he recognized as preconcep-
tions but nevertheless retained. In the first class of preconceptions 
are the following: 
(1) A belief in the complete relativity of value--"mores rela-
tivism"; ,. 
(2) A static approach to the study of society resulting in "mores 
136 
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absolutism"; 
(3) A normative-descriptive dualism. 
In a second class are suoh preconceptions as: 
(l) Anti-historicity; 
(2) A belief in instincts. 
In this chapter, we are not concerned with all of the errors 
which Malinowski made, but only with those basic preconceptions which 
generally influenced his approach to a problem. Vie must also note 
that the above preconceptions are not separate entities but "logically" 1 
and conceptually interrelated. 
Mores Relativism: The belief that value (choices between alter-
natives)1 is completely relative finds expression in two related forms: 
(1) individual relativism, and (2) communit.Y or societal relativism. 
we can understand individual and community relativism only by showing 
their philosophical and psychological foundations. Both individual 
and community relativism are the modern versions of Cartesianism, 
2 
which is still the dominating intellectual tradition of our day. The 
psychological basis of mores relativism, as in the case of Cartesian-
ism, is hedonism or introspectionism. 
The Cartesian theory of knowledge is that the individual's con-
science is the only test of validity, Descartes treated the mind as 
1 Geiger, G. R., "Science and Values in a Changing World," Journal 
of Economics and Sociology, Vol. I, No. 1, 1941, p. 3, 
2 
Lecture notes--G. V. Gentry, Professor of Philosophy, University 
of Texas. 
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~holly individual. 3 We must remember that Cartesianism first arose as 
a protest against Scholasticism or Authoritarianism. At the time it 
was thought a great step forward in tBe liberation of the individual. 
The victory was Pyrrhic, however, since Cartesianism is no better a 
guide than Authoritarianism for fixing belief. Cartesianism fell into 
the same pitfall as Scholasticism, but perhaps the damage done by the 
fall was more serious for future generations (as Peirce has pointed 
out). Cartesianism, or introspectionism, founded as it is on pre-
scientific philosophical and psychological beliefs, remains today the 
chief inhibition to intelligent problem-solving. 
Descartes, in defying Authority, located the seat of "value" in 
the individual--whatever the individual liked was true or good,for 
that individual. Individual likes and dislikes were based upon 
pleasure-pain experiences. This hedonistic psychology has been com-
pletely discredited by modern pragmatic e~perimental psychology, and 
yet Cartesianism is still extant and thriving, In escaping tradi-
tional absolutism, Descartes fell into the error of absolutizing the 
individual. As Dewey brings out: "Wholesale revolt against tradition 
led to the illusion of equally Wholesale isolation of mind as some-
, 4 
thing wholly individual." 
In absolutizing the individual, Descartes postulated the exist-
ence of Pure Reason. Each independent mind possessed a faculty which 
3Dewey, J, , Experience and Nature 
Company), 1925, p. 224. ~-
(Chieago: Open Court Publishing 
/ 
4Ibid. 
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was capable of intuiting or introspecting the substance of Pure Reason. 
This is a concept or the immediacy o~ knowledge. The individual mind 
\~as alleged to contain within 1 tself a valid criterion of the truth 
and falsity of ideas. The old classical dualism between mind and body, 
or reason and passion, is perpetuated in Cartesianism. The mind is 
the superior realm; the body is the interior, mundane realm. Thinking 
is the higher activity; bodily behavior is the grosser. Here again we 
see the Greek spectator-theory-of-knowledge. This dualism posits in 
~ priori mind and makes a naturalist~c approach to the study of man 
impossible. 
Because he absolutized the individual, Descartes stated further 
that it ~ras possible for the individual to doubt everything--even his 
own existence! Let us critically examine Cartesianism. 
In the first place, it is psych~logically impossible to doubt 
everything. one simply cannot erase completely from one's mind the 
resuits of all past and present exp~rience. Modern psychiatry records 
the tragic results of exceptional cases in which the individual be~ins 
to doubt almost everything--the result is a padded cell. This doc-
trine of the "blank mind" is normatively suspect for it leads to self-
deception. The individual, under the delusion of being able to doubt 
everything, in reality retains unnoticed his preconceptions. In other 
word.s, this doctrine leads to uncritical thinking. 
Furthermore, modern experimental psychology is emphatic on the 
point that there is no extra faculty of intuiting or introspecting. 
The"individual mind does not contain within itself any valid criterion 
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of the truth or falsity of ideas. Charles Peirce, in a flash of bril-
liant humor, has stated that the only reason for believing in·the ex-
istence of an intuitive faculty is the desire so to believe. This 
denial of an intuitive faculty does not suggest that the individual 
isn't a creative factor, but it does remove the test of ideas from the 
individual. The pragmatic behaviorists and all science, on the basis 
of overwhelming evidence, have repeatedly stated that the only test of 
an idea is an objective test. 
I 
The pragmatists also have challenged successfully the whole con- ! 
cept of the immediacy of knowledge. The pragmatists postulate that 
all knowledge is of the discursive or mediational type. 
Cartesianism is clearly contrary to science. The outstanding 
characteristic of modern science is its insistence upon objective 
testing as the only valid criterion of truth and falsity. This is the 
very thing Cartesianism denies. Even objective Idealism has more in 
common with science than Cartesianism. 
·or course, Cartesianism carried to its logical conclusion resu~ts 
in the Cretan fallacy. If I can doubt everything, I can doubt that I 
am. Logically, I must also doubt that I am doubting. Those who pos-
tulate complete relativism must recognize that this very postulation 
is open to the charge of relativism. Thus, nothing is ever known. 
The biological sciences deny the existence of any dualism between 
"mind" and body. The "mind" is not something given to begin with. 
"Mind" is rather a relatively late evolutionary product. To the prag-
, 
matte experimental psychologists, "mind" emerges only in the organism-
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environment interactional process. That is, "mind" is the result of 
past experience, or in the language of the neuro-physiologist, "mind" 
is the total resultant of all past experiences which have left im-
prints upon the nervous system. It is this body of knowledge which 
has made possible a naturalistic approach to the investigation of the 
problem of knowledge. 
By the objective test of action, we can state that Descartes did 
not really believe what ha was saying--he was merely verbalizing, 
Descartes did actually talk to other individuals and enter into activ-
ity with them; he did eat, drink, etc.; he did dodge balls, stones, 
etc. In other words, Descartes behaved as a social being and his own 
activities are a condemnation of his busy theorizing. If Descartes 
had really believed his Olm theory, he would not have ducked in the 
face of an oncoming blow, but we kno" that he did. Vie are forced to 
agree with Einstein that the only way to asce,tain what a man really 
believes is to note that man's activities. 
If you wish to learn from the theoretical physicist 
anything about the methods he uses, I would give ~·ou the 
following piece of advice: Don't listen to his words; 
examine his achievements.5 
It is but one step further to extend the concept of individual 
relativism or hedonism to society in general. Whatever a particular 
society likes is good or right for that society. Thus, society is 
5Einstein, Albert, "On the Method of Theoretical :Physics," the 
Herbert Spencer Lecture, delivered at Oxford University, June 10, 1933· 
(~uoted in Joseph Ratner's ~Dewey's Philosophy, p. 46,) 
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absolutized. The Authority becomes the set of mores prevailing in a 
society, 
The most explicit formulation of community relativism or "mores 
6 
relativism" is found in the widely-read book Folkways written by the 
famous Yale socio-anthropologist, William Graham Sumner. It is the 
thesis of this provocative book that the truth or falsity of ideas is 
found in the "mores." "Folkways" are ways of doing that have been 
developed by man in a pleasure-pain adjustment to basic human needs--
hunger, love, vanity, fear, etc. "Mores," however, are "folkways" 
plus "the philosophical and ethical generalizations as to societal 
welfare which are suggested by them, and inherent in them, as they 
grow.,,? 
They are the ways of doing things which are current in 
a society to satisfy human needs and desires, together with 
the faiths, notions, codes, and standards of well living 
which8inhere in those ways, having a genetic connection with them. 
Consistent with Cartesian relativism, sumner postulates that the 
folkways for any society are always "right": 
The folkways are the "right" ways to satisfy all inter-
ests, because they are traditional, and exist in fact. They 
extend over the whole of life. • • , The "right" way is the 
way which the ancestors used and which has been handed doWn. 
6SUmner, W. G., Folkways (New York: Ginn and Company), 1906. 
7 Ibid., p. JO. 
8 Ibid. , p. 59. 
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The tradition is its ol'ln warrant. It is not held subject to 
folkways. It is not outside of them, of independent origin, 
and brought t9 them to test them. In ~ folkways, whatever 
~. ~right, 
What is goodness or badness of the mores? 
It is most important to notice that, for the people of 
a time and place, their own mores are always good, or rather 
that for them there can be no question of the goodness or 
badness of their mores. The reason is because the standards 
of good and right are in the mores. • • • EverythinB in the 
mores of a time and place must be regarded as justified with 
re!':ard to that time and place. "Good" mores are those which 
are well adapted to the situation. "Bad" mores are those 
which are not so adapted. • . • l!'or the men of the time 
there are no "bad" mores. What is traditional and current 
is the standard of what ought"to~e. • •• Henceciur judg-
ments -of the goodorevil consequences of folkways are to be 
kept separate from our study of the historical phenomena ·or 
them, and of their strength and the reasons for it.10 
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Societal relativism as expressed by Sumner is Cartesianism gen-
erslized; that is, in addition to ebsolutizing the individual, Sumner 
hes absolutized the societal mores. Of course, those who absolutized 
the "individual" were really·doing the s0llle thing--the "individuals" 
were expressing, as their own private decisions, the moral judgments· 
of their time and place. Descartes' "original" God, for instance, 
strikingly resembles th~ 17th-century Catholic patriarch. At any 
given time or plo.ce, the final judge ot' "value" is what the "mores" 
prescribe. What is, is right! 
Sumner's thesis has had a tremendous influence upon the social 
9Ibid., p. 28. 
lOibid. , p. 58. 
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sciEmces--upon western climate of opinion in general.. SUmnerianism, 
in one form or another, is encountered in every intellectual quarter. 
Moreover, "mores relativism," pure and perverted, is a bedrock part of 
modern anthropology. 11 For example, Calverton in his treatment of 
"cultural compulsives" (which is only another phrase for Cartefsianism) 
shows how every individual is relativistically influenced by the 
social forces that surround him--political, economic, and otherv1ise--
and how consequently one cannot make a choice which does not reflect 
12 his individual conditioning. Therefore, objectivity in the social 
sciences is impossible. Mores nihilism enters the picture via the 
personal equation. The individual may see and collect the pure facts, 
but evaluation is absolutely relative to the "culture compulsives." 
~~nt I am trying to stress, then, by the theory of cul-
tural compulsives, is that all social thought is colored by 
such compulsives, reactionary as well as radical, and that 
those who think they can escape thcim are merely deceiving 
themselves by pursuing a path of thought that is socially 
fallacious ...• The existence of cultural compulsives, 
then, mo.Ices objectivity in the social sciences impossible. 
Indeed, the actual claim to objectivity in the social 
sciences has been largely a defense-mechanism, an attempt 
unconsciously to cover up the presence of compulsive factors 
and convictions. No mind can be objective in its interpre-
tation and evaluation of social phenomena. One can be objec-
tive only in the observation of detail or the collection of 
facts--but one c·anriot be objective in their interpretation. 
11 
Lowie, R. H., Primitive Society, p. 439; Wissler, C., An Intro-
duction to Social Anthropology, p. 12; Herskovits, M., The Economic 
Life of Primitive Peoples, pp. 7-8 and 212; GoldenweiseZ::-A., Anthro-
'j?OiOe;Y:--An Introduction!£. Primitive Culture, p. 524; ~al. 
~ . Calverton, v. F., The Making ocf Man--An outline of Anthropology 
(New York: The Modern Library), 1931. 
Interpretation necessitates a mind-set, a purpose, an end. 
Such mind-sets, such purposes, such ends, are controlled by 
cultural compulsives.13 
The above is a striking example of the Cretan faHacy--of the 
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impasse which is reached when the relativistic position is accepted en 
toto. How can we seriously heed Calverton's thesis, which, by his own 
admission, is unscientific? Goldenweiser's position is even more 
indicative: 
Is Christianity, let us say, superior to Mohammedanism, I 
Judais~, or Confucianism? Yes or no, according to who you 
are or what you believe in. Or, is modern art superior to 
that of the Greeks or that of the Chinese? Again we are in 
~~quandary. Or, is modern socio-political organiz'il-' 
tion superior to that of the primitives, the Greeks, the 
Romans? How standards here can differ and how irreconcila-
ble such differences may become, on occasion, is strikingly 
brought home by the basic cleft in modern opinion between 
those who advocate dictatorship, whether communist or fas-
cist, and those others who cling to democracy with its recog-
nized failings and compensating virtues.14 
Among the more critical anthropologists--Lowie, Boas, ~~.--one 
finds a modified form of relativism. That is, these anthropologists 
will evaluate physical instrumentali t).es·, bu:t will maintain a relati v-
istic position towards morals, marriage, religion, economic systems, 
etc. This is the position taken by Boas in the following quotation: 
Observation proves that the inventions and knowledge of 
man have extended with ever increasing rapidity, and it is 
possible to speak of progress in technique •••• It is much 
l)Ibid., pp. 28-29. 
14Goldenweiser, A., Anthropology (New York: c. F. Crofts and Com-
pany), 1937, p. 524. 
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more difficult to speak of progress in any other cultural· 
activity, except in sc far as those aspects of cultural life 15 that contradict the advance of knowledge gradually disappear. 
And by Lowie: 
Tools are contrivances for definite practical purposes; 
if these are accomplished more expeditiously and efficiently 
by one set of tools, then that set is better. Hence it is a 
purely objective judgment that metal axes are superior to 
those of stone, So economic activity has for its object the 
sustenance of human existence, and when the possibilities 
for supporting life are enlarged, as by the domestication of 
an eatable and milkable species, we are justified in speak-
ing of a progressive change. But in the sphere of social 
life there is no objective criterion for grading cultural 
phenomena. The foremost philosophers are not agreed as to 
the ultimate ideals to be sought through social existence. 
, •. In short, the appraisal of sociological features (mar-
riage, suffrage, democrac:,•, etc.) is wholly different from 
that or technologicol features or culture. The latter may 
be rated according to the closeness with which they accom-
plish known ends; the former have unknown ends or ends whose 
value is a matter of philosophic doubt, hence they can be 
graded only on subjective grgunds and must scientifically be 
treated as incorrunensurable.l 
Let us examine critically their position. In the first place, 
Lowis and Boas admit tacitly that a universal form of evaluation is 
possible with respect to some aspects of culture in terms of the ac-
cwnulation of physical instrumentalities and the control which these 
give to man over his total environment. But, as the sociological fea-
tures are viholly different and distinat from the instrwnental aspects, 
15 Boas, F., ''Anthropology," Encyclopedia 2£. ~ Social Sciences, 
p, 103. 
16Lowie, R. H., Primitive Society {New York: Liveright Publishing 
Corporation), 1920, pp. 438-439· 
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no evaluation is possible in this realm of human behavior. 
In assuming this perverted relativisti~ position Lowie, for exam-
ple, hes postulated a dualism which does not in-fact exist; that is, 
the "sociological" features are entirely different and apart from 
"tools." Are they? If so, then why does modern anthropology insist 
upon an "organic" analysis? Is there no relationship between the 
machine and the state, between a tractor and an agricultural program, 
between a gun and a fascist political organization? In accepting this 
dualism, one would be forced to the conclusion that the introduction 
of printing (a tool) had no influence or effect upon medieval social 
organization, that the introduction or the horse (a tool) had no in-
fluonce upon Plains culture, and so on. 
The problem of evaluation cannot be evaded by setting up a dual-
ism between the physical instrumentalities and the "sociological" fee-
tures. Such a position is untenable, es Lowie, Boas, et al. would 
readily admit. Malinowski alone has shown quite conclusively the in-
terreletionships--structural and functionel--between items of culture. 
Thus, three alternatives face the anthropologists end the future of 
this discipline will be determined by the channel taken: 
(l) Anthropology will either continue to deny that the problem of 
evaluation exists, as Wissler does: 
However, we must not confuse this use of the term [cul-
ture] with certain qualities of individual behavior, as when 
we say a man is highly cultured, or again, with group values, 
as when we say one is civilized and the other barbarous, 
chiefly because we have set out to learn what we can about 
mode~ of human life, not to evaluate them. In any event, it 
,. 
I 
I 
I 
seems wiser to come into a full understanding of modes of 
human life before one attempts to value them. . , , Vlhat we 
need to bear in mind, then, is that when the term culture is 
used in social science, it does not imply values or ratings, 
as higher or lower, ignorant and enlightened, etc,, but 
stands for that which is expressed in the term "habits and 
customs of a tribe, 1117 
(2) Or anthropology will fallaciously set up a dualism between 
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"tools" and "institutions"--tacitly evaluating one while ignoring the 
other. This trend merely evades the basic issue. 
(3) Or anthropology will ackno•'Tledge that "choices between alter-
natives" exist in every human action and that the major problem facing 
all disciplines is the refinement of evaluative techniques. In pur-
suing this course of action, anthropology will play a major role in 
intelligently adjusting man to a dynamic environment. Administrative 
or applied anthropology will be critical, ·not apologetic. This will 
be further discussed below. 
How does Malinowski fit into this picture? His attitudes on this 
basic issue are confused, Malinowski's early work is characterized by 
absolute relativism. For example, he treated the "magic word" as an 
instrumentality by virtue of the fact that the native thought it pro-
duced efficacious results. Malinowski also distinguished between the 
function of "magic" and "religion" on the basis of the natives' state-
ments. As a matter of fact, the primary aim of Malinowski's field-
work was to portray relativistically the natives• vision of his world. 
17wissler, c., An Introduction to Social Anthropology (New York: 
Henry Holt and Go.) ,1929, p. 12. -
Nothing can teach us a better lesson in the matter of 
ultimate importance than the habit of mind which allows us 
to treat the b~gief s and values of another man from his 
point of view. 
And: 
In each culture, the values are slightly different: 
people aspire after different aims, follow different im-
pulses, yearn after a different form of happiness, In each 
culture, we find different institutions in \vhich man pursues 
his life-interest, different customs by which he satisfied 
his aspirations, different codes of la" and morality which 
reward his virtues or punish his deflections. To study the 
institutions, customs, and codes or to study their behavior 
and mentality l<ithout the subjective desir~ of feeling by 
which these people live, of realizing the substance of their 
happiness--is in my opinion, to miss the greatest reward 
which we can hope to obtain from the study of man, 9 
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The early relativistic attempts of the anthropologists are lauda-
ble in one respect; that is, they have made us critical of our ways-
of-doing and have been responsible for breaking down our western ethno-
oentrism, For example, Malinowski's Sexual Life.£!:. Savages and M. 
Mead's Coming of Age .!E_ Samoa have done a great deal to destroy the 
"ideals" of Christian sex mores. For, from the standpoint of the bfo-
logical and socio-psychological development of the child, the Trobrian-
ders and the Samoans have made a much better adjustment. In this par-
ticular instance, I would not hesitate to say that these marginal 
peoples have made a better biological-social adaptation. This is an 
18Malinowski, B., Argonauts of the Western Pacific (London: 
G. Routledge and Sons, Ltd.), 1922;°P:-518. 
19Ibid., p. 25. 
I 
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example of how evaluative techniques may be used. 
Malinowski's later work faces squarely the issue or evaluation. 
Although Malinowski does not state specifically the criterion or the 
criteria by which he would evaluate a culture item or complex, he is 
aware that cultural anthropology faces thi~ "new'' task. 
The science [anthropology] which claims to understand 
culture and to have the clue to racial problems must not 
remain silent on the drama of culture conflict and of racial 
clash. Anthropology must become an applied science. Every 
student or scientific history knows that science is born 
with its applications. The seven essays which follow are 
unanimous in their attempt to formulate criteria of practi-
cal guidance, to define indices of maladjustment, and to 
show the way in vrhich sound knowledge can be translated into 
useful practice. . .• he [the anthropologist] ought to be 
aware that in the process there are involved human interests 
and values which must be brought to light and translated 
into rules of action.20 
Malinowski further states that scientific evaluation is a task which 
the anthropologist mus~ face if he is to secure a legitimate foothold 
in the scientific community. In other words, the anthropologist must 
make scientific value judgments not only in regard to what~ and is, 
but in regard to what ought to be. 
Knowledge gives foresight, and foresight is indispensa-
ble to the statesman and to local administrator, to educa-
tionalist, welfare worker, and missionary alike. The dis-
covery of long-run tendencies; the capacity of foreseeing 
and forecasting the future in the light of the full knowledge 
of all the factors involved; competent advice on specific 
20 Malinowski, B., "Foreword" to Methods of Study of Culture Con~ 
tact.!..!!. Africa (Oxford: Oxford University Press), 1938-,-pp. x-xi.~ 
I 
questions--these are the tasks of the contact ethnographer 
as a practical expert,21 
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This interest in the problem of evaluation is found in Malinow-
ski's later work. The change in front was largely the result of two 
major influences: 
(1) The belated recognition of the phenomenon of acculturation; 
(2) The stimulus of the behavioristic and pragmatic psychologies. 
Let us consider the first of these two major influences. The 
clash of western and marginal societies ~as had, as we have shown, a 
tremendous influence upon the conceptual development of anthropology. 
Malinowski and others who were engaged in a still-life description of 
marginal groups were rudely forced to change their methods to dynamic 
ones. 
1Ul this [acculturation] imposes new tasks on the an-
thropologist. So far he has remained within the limited 
tribal horizon of an undeveloped culture. Now he is faced 
with the necessity of understanding questions of world eco-
nomics and finance, of colonial policy, of overseas educa-
tion, and of missionary aims, plans, and outlook. Since 
culture change means the entry of native societies into the 
arena of world politics and economics, the anthropologist, 
who wants to study the totality of his problem, cannot re-
main completely ignorant of that half which pertains to 
Western civilization .••• Instead, however, of lamenting 
the inevitable [acculturation], we must face the new, more 
complex and more difficult task which history has set before 
us, the task that is of building new methods and new prin-
ciples of research in order to reclaim the "anthropological 
no-man's-land. "22 
21 
Ibid., p. xxxviii. 
22 Ibid., pp. x-xii. 
J 
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The phenomenon of acculturation is not, however, a "new" on-e. 
Acculturation hos been occurring since the origin of man. Today the 
process is only more apparent because of the advanced etate of the 
arts. The phenomenon was "new" only in this respect: it was new to 
!Joli now ski. 
The speeded-up process of acculturation in our modern era makes 
the problem of evaluation in anthropology more pressing than ever be-
fore. The development of technologies have brought all peoples and 
cultures into intimate contact; swift change is the con~equence. 
Again, a number of choices between alternatives exist for the anthro-
pologist: 
First, the anthropologist may assume a "pure science" attitude--
as Murdock says, social policy is of no concern to the scientific 
anthropologist. 23 Malinowski, on the contrary, believes that the body 
of knowledge obt~ined by the anthtopologists in studying human rela-
tions can be practically and scientifically applied to solve the 
urgent problems arising from acculturation. Malinowski pragmatically 
insists that any hypothesis must be tested in practical application. 
It is the relevant consequences of practical activity that determine 
the scientific validity. In assuming a "pure science" position, the 
anthropologist is not only evading the difficulties of evaluation, but 
is tacitly condoning the anti-scientific programs or, as Veblen would 
say, the "vested interests." 
23 See above, p. 19· 
/ 
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Secondly, the anthropologist may assume a relativistic position 
which ignores the evident acculturation process. The proponents of 
this position desire to preserve intact the marginal cultures against 
the encroachment of western society. This stand is evasive, unrealis-
tic, and romantic, for, as Malinowski has pointed out, the process of 
acculturation is inevitable. If the anthropologist is to be scien-
tific, he must face the facts of the case. 
Thirdly, the anthropologist may act as an agent of exploitation. 
In refusing to scientifically evaluate, the anthropologist may hire 
his services out indiscriminately to vested interest. His function 
will be to ubtain the maximum exploitation of marginal groups. Since 
the continued existence of capitalism is contingent upon the search 
for markets, the majority of anthropologists can hardly do other than 
play an exploitative role under capitalism. For example, the anthro-
pologist, as an employee of the South African Diamond Cartel, will be 
engaged in the task of advising his employers as to how they can use 
native customs and beliefe to obtain the maximum output of native 
labor. This is only a refined employment of the opium technique used 
by the British in China. What the financial master is interested in 
is getting the most out of the natives for the least, and it is the 
job of the anthropologist to advise him how to do this as inexpen-
sively as possible. 
Finally, the anthropologist may scientifically evaluate in terms 
of basic human needs, fullest development of the individual, and 
I 
I 
I 
I 
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24 
"keeping the machines running." For example, the anthropologist may 
instrumentally distinguish between basic human needs--food, shelter, 
etc.--and wants--individual whims and fancies. A need (~., nutri-
tive diet) may be pointed out to a marginal people and they could 
then be provided with the widest possible alternative choices. The 
decision would be their's to make. The problem here is to develop in 
marginal groups an awareness of basic needs, and to make available the 
widest possible range of choices (a product of developed technologies) 
for answering the need. In a program like this, every scientific 
technique and resource would be utilized for a maximum hu.11an adjust-
ment and technological efficiency. The anthropologist would then 
serve mankind as a whole, instead of powerful vested interests. 
Let us now consider the second major influence. Vie have already 
pointed out that Malinowski in his later years was deeply impressed by 
pragmatic philosophy and psychology. At his death, Malinowski was on 
the way to rapidly becoming a thoroughgoing pragmatist, as his last 
articles so unmistakably illustrate. Now, the problem of evaluation. 
is one of the central problems of pragmatism. The pragmatists assert 
that every act involves an evaluation (a choice between alternatives).· 
Only by applying the scientific method of evaluation to all spheres of 
human activity can man gain increasing control over his environment 
and thus obtain that relative security which is the only security 
24 Ayres, c. E., "The Theory of Economic Progress," MS. at the 
University of Texas (to be published in March, 1944, by the University.,· 
of North Ca~olina Press); Dewey, J., Logic: The theory 2£. Inquiry (New 
York: Henry Holt and Company), 1938. 
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possible in an ever-changing world. The strong emphasis upon change 
is characteristic; intelligent evaluation is vital to the best adapta-
tion of the organism to its changing environment. According to the 
pragmatists, there are three essential steps in the process of evalua-
tion: 
(1) The existence of a problematic situation; 
(2) the ensuing occurrence of inhibition which makes possible 
symbolic "trial and error"; 
(3) the reaching of a solution (decision or judgment) which re-
sults in existential activity. It is only by means of the relevant 
consequences of this activity that the validity of the decision can be 
tested. 
Malinowski's formulation of the probl~m.of evaluation illustrates 
clearly the impact of pragmatism upon his way-of-thinking. Malinowski 
recognizes (although in embryonic form) that these three steps exist. 
He emphasizes the first and third steps, particularly the third, while 
largely ignoring the second step. 
In his stress upon the third factor, Malinowski shows his strong 
attraction toward the pragmatic way-of-thinking. However, it was not 
until the process of change became so obvious and so widespread in its 
repercussions that it could no longer be ignored that Malinowski began 
to realize (in a very incomplete manner) the significance of the prag-
matic analysis of the ever-present problem of evaluation. At his 
death, Malinowski had made only preliminary incursions into the fiel~ 
of evaluation. 
I 
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In anthropology, as in all other fields of inquiry, evaluation is 
the major problem. Because of its absolute relativistic position, 
anthropology has in the past side-stepped evaluation. It is for this 
reason that anthropology, as well as the other social sciences' must 
face the serious charge by the 'lhomist movement or the Hutchins• 
25 
school that the social sciences have singularly failed to solve the 
gravest problems of our day. The Hutchins• school points out that the 
absolute relativism of the social sciences makes value judgments im-
possibie; that is, the social scientist, when confronted with the 
present problem of fascism~· democracy, has no solution. The Ger-
mans like fascism, we like democracy--who is to say which is better? 
To solve this impasse, the Hutchins• school sets up as a standard 
of evaluation medieval Authoritarianism. 
supposed integration o_· medieval society. 
This school idealizes the 
26 But as Pirenne and other 
recent historians point out, this ideal is a myth, for medieval so-
ci~ty was in reality characterized by rapid change and the breakdown 
of a whole social stTUcture. Disintegration, not integration, was the 
rule in medieval society. Ralph Linton's suggestion that a return to 
an aristocracy or a rigid caste system might solve our social probleme 
25see John U. Nef, The United States and Civilization (Chicago; 
The University of Ch!csgo Press), 1942 (dedICated to R· M. Hutchins). 
Mortimer Adler is the most extreme example of this.school. Cf. Adler's 
What Man Has~ of Man (New York: Longmans·, Green and Co.), 1938. 
26 Pirenne, Henri, Economic and Social History of Medieval Europe 
(London: Kegan Paul, Trench, Trlibner and Co., Ltd. )-;""""1936. 
27 is quite in keeping with the Hutchins' position. 
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Ia there no alternative to such a recourse to arbitrary power as 
the Hutchins• school advocates? Science offers an alternative, if the 
social scientists are fearless enough to undertake the task! 
Mores Absolutism: Although Malinowski 1 e later work is charac-
terized by an awareness of cultural dynamics, his treatment of "func-
tion" is conceptually static and consequently absolutistic. That is, 
in attempting to describe a culture at a static moment for purposes of 
simplification, he established as the ultimate value the particular 
social equilibrium28 (or perhaps disequilibrium) which happened to ob-
tain at that given time. In so doing, he absoluttzed the prevailing 
mores of the community. Thus, we find him insisting that certain cere-
monial patterns are efficient, val~aole, and necessary for the main-
tenance of the status quo. Throughout his works, Malinowski.empha-
sized the ceremonial force or power control which always tends to main-
tain the given social structure, or at best is only permissive to 
change! The dynamic force (tools, ~echniques, reflective thinking, 
27 Linton, R., The Study of Man (New York: D. Appleton-Century 
Company), 1936, pp. 111-112, 131-;--
28 
T"ne "synchronists" do not use the term "equilibrium" in the 
sarne sense as .do the physical and bi.ological scientists. By a "return 
to the state or equilibrium," the !'armer mean that a prior state is 
du~licated again exactly; the latter mean that a prior state cannot 
be exactly duplicated, but that the new equilibrium is only similar 
to a preceding state. The f'ormer is backward-looking; the latter is 
forward-looking. This distinction Ls important, for it illustrates 
clearly the static, pre-Darwinian bLas of the "S)nlchronists." ' 
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ideas, etc.) was almost entirely ignored. 29 The idea of change was 
• abhorrent. This static, absolutistic, methodology has until recently 
characterized the work of the "synchronist" anthropologists--Malinow-
ski, Radcliffe-Brown, Powdermaker, ~ al.--with the result that this 
brand of anthropology became an apologia for the status quo, The 
question which these anthropologists have asked in the past is: "What 
keeps or will keep this society as it is now or as it was (social 
equilibrium)?" Of course, the answer is the ceremonial patterns. Thus, 
one trend in anthropology has had an absolute standard of value--the 
mores or ceremonial patterns which prevailed in a·given society at a 
given time. 
Furthermore, the structural anthropology carried out by Radcliffe-
Brown and Malinowski which posits that every element of culture has a 
necessary structural-role or even that " .. . . it may have one • " . . ' 
and that this forms a structural unity with harmonious and internal 
consistency, absolutizee the status quo. When a social system is in 
equilibrium, when there is harmony, consistency, and conflicts are 
resolved then the culture is "euphoric"--a state of well being. When 
dynamic change, stress, and disorganization is present in the society, 
the culture is "disphoric." But this distinction has no meaning in 
reality for cultures are always in a process of change. Radcliffe-
29 . 
In Essays Presented to C. G. Seligman (London: Kegan Paul, 
Trench, TrUbner and Co., Ltd:°)7 1934, we find a rare article by Mali-
nowski in which he deals specifically with the "Stone Implements in 
Eastern New Guinea." In Malinowski's own words: "I WI) choosing here 
a subject which lies to a certain extent outside of my own sphere of ' 
interests" (p. 189). 
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Brown's "euphoric" culture is reminiscent of Plato's ideal state; in 
other words, it is the age-old "quest for certainty." 
Normative-Descriptive Dualism: Malinowski fits into the group of 
anthropologists who hold that fact and theory are innately distinct 
but of equal importance. In Chapter III of this thesis, the fallacies 
of this position were pointed out. There is no innate dualism between 
fact and theory but only a logical, functional distinction. 
Theory has been traditionally used as an end; facts were gathered 
and used if they fitted the theoretical structure. 'Ibe reaction in 
modern anthropology to this deductive method is justified. However, 
the misuse of theory in the past does not validate its dismissal today. 
Theory should be used as a means for problem-solving, as a technique 
for evaluation. For there is theory and evaluation in anthropology 
whether or not it is recognized. 
. . . I am afraid that many of our anthropologists who are 
most distrustful of "theory" are like Moliere's character 
who spoke prose without knowing it, for a complex theoreti-
cal viewpoint is usually implicit in some of the most ap-
parently innocent "statements of fact. 113° 
' The job ahead is to dig out and critically examine implicit pre-
conceptions. And in the future, to use with awareness theoretical 
tools. Kluckhohn points out that anthropology cannot be really scien-
tific until it performs this task: 
30 Kluckhohn, c., "The Place of Theory in Anthropological Studies," 
Philosophy of Science, Vol. 6, No. 3, 1939, p, 330. 
, 
Otherwise the house that anthropology builds is bound, 
I think, to fall in tumbling ruins which will not lend them-
selves to repair or rebuilding. For, howsoever substantial 
be the bricks by themselves, unless the trusses of the theo-
retical structure which supports them are sound, the bricks 
will fall to the ground in a confused mass. A scientific 
structure, like any other structure, will be stable in so far 
as not only the primary elements of construction (the build-
ing blocks) but also the structural plan which unites and 
binds together the primary elements and the foundation up~r 
which the whole rests are rigorously tested and examined. 
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A.nti-historici ty: We have discussed and criticized Malinowski's 
anti-historical position at length in Chapter IV. Kluckhohn'a pene-
trating analysis could very well be repeated here. ~at is, like 
Moliere•s famous gentleman, Malinowski had been speaking historfoally 
all his life without knowing it. Although Malinowski was driven to 
admit the inadequacies of his anti-historical stand, he continued to 
cling. to the functional-aynchronic position, This reluctance on Mali-
nowski's part to abandon an invalid premise can, of course, be ex-
plained by his vested interest in the "organic" studies of institu-
tional life. 
Instincts: Because Malinowski was interested in the interac-
tional process between the organism and ,its environment, he was neces-
sarily led to consider the genetic propulsions of the organism. 
His early attempts to describe the genetic characteristics of man 
were crude and generalized. He utilized the psychological terminology 
of his day, which was limited and inadequate. Throughout his work we 
find Malinowski using such vague phrases as "human impulses," "natural 
3libid., p. 344. 
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propensities," "fundamental tendency," "natural inclinations," "innate 
desire;" "natural sentiments," "natural desires," and "instinctive 
cores," but never do we find a clear definition of any of these terms. 
However, as modern experimental psychology developed, such loose 
phraseology as "instinct," etc., was discarded for more specific and 
meaningful terminology, and Malinowski was able to clarify this genetic 
aspect of man. In his latest works, Malinowski uses almost exclusively 
the term "drive," which we have discussed on pages 70-71 of this thesis. 
Despite his renunciation of "instinct," etc., and his acceptance 
of the experimental results of the new laboratory psychology, Malinow-
ski still believed in the existence of certain fundamental instincts, 
. ' 
such as the paternal or maternal instinct. There is no scientific 
basis for a belief in the latter (or the former). Modern genetics is 
inclined to treat the so-called "maternal instinct" as a cultural phe-
nomenon. Malinowski's stubbornness in this respect can perhaps be ex-
plained on the basis that it was by means of fundamental "instincts" 
that he could explain certain universal phenomena, such as the family .. 
Thus, it is apparent that Malinowski held certain basic "precon-
captions." A critical analysis of Malinowski's work, or a critical 
use of his data and results, should take into account these unscien-
tific biases. 
I 
I 
CHAPTER VI 
CONCLUSION 
A panoramic survey of Malinowski's work shows a very positive 
contribution to the study of man. For a number of reasons, Malinowski 
·will remain one of the most outstanding figures in the growth of cul-
tural anthropology: 
. • . his nnme deserves to be remembered as one who set up a 
new standard of field-work, trained a new school of field-
workers, opened up new possibilities in the application of 
anthropological knowledge to colonial problems, ard breathed 
a fresh spirit into the anthropology of his time. 
Malinowski's significance lies in the very thing for which he was 
criticized--mixing fact and theory in the presentation of his field 
2 datn. Malinowski constantly demanded that anthropology develop a 
body of rigorous scientific theory. Toward this goal, he made a great 
personal contribution. Malinowski was the first to vociferously in-
sist upon an "organic" (incorrectly termed "functional") approach in. 
anthropology. That is, to describe a culture by a succession of dif-
ferent books containing essentially the same facts but arranged around 
different focal points--six, in The Sexual Life 2!_ Savages; law, in 
_9rime and Custom in Savage Society; gardening and economics, in Coral 
1Richards, A. I., "Bronislaw Kaspar Malinowski," obituary in Mnn, 
Vol. XLIII, January-February, 1943, p. 4. 
2 Fortune, R. F., Sorcerers of Dobu (London: G. Routledge and Sons, 
Ltd.), 1932, "Foreword" by Malinowski, p. xxiv. 
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Gardens and Their Magic; the Kula, in Argonauts of~ Western Pacific, 
and so on. Although a methodological problem is created by this pro-
cedure, in that undue emphasis is given to the institution described, 
it provides n very workable abstraction. And it still remains for 
field-anthropologists to develop a better technique for illustrating 
cultural interrelationships. 
Throughout Malinowski's writings one finds evidence of a wide 
acquaintanceship with other discip1ines--economics, philosophy, psy-
chology, etc. For this reason, Malinowski continually introduced into 
the field of anthropology methodological techniques developed in other 
disciplines. His pragmatic treatment of language is an excellent 
example.and may be, as Dewey brings out, his most significant contri-
bu tion. 
I knovr of no statement about language that brings out 
with the same clearness and appreciation of the force of the 
fact that language is primarily a mode of action used for 
the sake of influencing the conduct of others in connection 
with the speaker. • Nothing more important for philoso-
phers to hearken to has beon written than Dr. Malinowski's 
conclusion .••• 3 
In his treatment of "function," the interrelationships of the 
organism and its environment, Malinowski was again a leader in his 
field. 
Malinowski was also one of the first to apply psychological 
theories and techniques to marginal societies; cf. ~and Repression 
)Dewey, J., Experience and Nature (Chicago: Open nourt Publishirig 
Company), 1925, p. 206. --
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in Savage Society. He rendered psychology a great service by testing 
some of its basic premises in the marginal laboratory. 
Malinowski was writing on economic questions, using his field-
data'to attack the classical concepts of "economic man" and "artifi-
cial scarcity," when most of the cultural anthropologists were engaged 
. in "fact" hunting. He was one of the first to realize the importance 
that anthropological data had for the solution of practical problems 
in western society. Moreover, he insisted that unless problem-solving 
were to be the goal, anthropology would be so much "busy work." 
Probably the most pleasing quality found in Malinowski's work is 
his ability to change his views and techniques when these were found 
to be inadequate or incorrect. A lack of dogmatism .is apparent through-
out his writings. Tiis self-criticism in Coral Gardena and Their Magic 
is withering. Sometimes he became overenthusiastic, but he was usually 
willing to retreat gracefully when confronted by more adequate solu-
tions to problems. 
Malinowski may be strongly criticized for his vague use of the 
term "functionalism." As has been pointed out, the methodologies of 
"functionalism" were never clearly or consistently stated--at one time 
the term was used by Malinowski to mean a structural analysis of 
society, at another the term referred to the study of basic human 
needs and their cultural responses, and at still another time the term 
was used to denote the function-role of a culture trait. Eventually 
the loose usage of "functionalism" caused considerabli:i confusion in 
anthropology--a.confusion which still prevails. Malinowski recognized 
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the harm he had done in this respect and attempted to disown the func-
tionalist school. 
The purpose of this thesis was, in part, to attempt to clarify 
this issue-.:to place Malinowski's fundamental theories and techniques 
in proper perspective, In order to eliminate some confusion in termi-
nology, the term "functional" was used with its usual philosophical 
and psychological meaning; that is, to denote the integration of the 
organism and its environment. The term "structural" was used to desig-
nate a study of cultural interrelations. The term "function-role" was 
used to describe what a trait "does." If it is still necessary to 
label as a whole Malinowski's methodology, the writer would use the 
term "organismic." Like all terminology the word "organic" has many 
different implicit meanings, but even then it is far superior to the 
term "functional" with its many varied uses in other fields of inquiry. 
Moreover, to equate terms in anthropology with their general use in 
the social sciences is to bring order out of chaos. 
Malinowski, like the majority of the anthropologists, did not 
always face squarely the basic issue of evaluation. Consequently, 
there were many implicit and uncritical evaluations in his works. For 
example, his static analysis of society, which led to en evaluation in 
terms of the status quo. However, Malinowski's later works show that 
he was becoming more concerned with and critically.aware of the prob-
lem of "value." 
One irritating characteristic of Malinowski's writings is his 
frequent attacks upon pseudo-problems--the dangers of historicity,, 
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. armchair scholars, legal stagnation, and so forth. As Lowie remarks, 
Malinowski loved to batter down doors which were wide open. But all 
in all, Malinowski's positive contributions to a science of society 
greatly outweigh the negative. It behooves every student of the 
social sciences to be familiar with Malinowski's basic theories and 
methodologies, for his influence is still very much at work in all 
fields of cultural inquiry. 
In conclusion, the writer would again like to return to the major 
problem facing the anthropologists--that of evaluation. John Dewey 
has flung a significant challenge at anthropology: 
Need for a theory of human relations in terms of a 
sociology which might perhaps instructively be named cul-
tural anthropology is a further condition of the development 
of a theory of evaluation as an effective instrumentality, 
for human organisms live in a cultural environment.4 
It remains to be seen whether anthropology accepts this challenge, 
or whether it leaves this all-important task to contenders. In the 
latter case, the result would be disastrous for anthropology; in the 
former, the future of anthropology would be unlimited. It is the hope 
of the writer that anthropology will bravely meet Dewey's challenge 
and thus cooperate in solving the gravest problem which today faces 
the social sciences. 
4Dewey, J,, Theory of Valuation .(Chicago: The University of 
Chicago Press), 1939, p.""b3. 
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